Calvin University

Calvin Digital Commons
Calvin Theological Seminary Dissertations

Calvin Theological Seminary

2011

The Mythos of Sin: C. S. Lewis, the Genesis Fall, and the Modern
Mood
Jeremy G. Grinnell
CalvinTheological Seminary

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/cts_dissertations
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Grinnell, Jeremy G., "The Mythos of Sin: C. S. Lewis, the Genesis Fall, and the Modern Mood" (2011).
Calvin Theological Seminary Dissertations. 20.
https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/cts_dissertations/20

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Calvin Theological Seminary at Calvin Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Calvin Theological Seminary Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Calvin Digital Commons.

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE MYTHOS OF SIN: C. S. LEWIS, THE GENESIS FALL,
AND THE MODERN MOOD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
JEREMY G GRINNELL

GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN
MAY 2011

CALVIN

THEOLOGICAL

SEMINARY

3233 Burton SE • Grand Rapids, Michigan • 49546-4301
800388-6034 fax: 616957-8621 info@calvinseminary.edu
www.calvinseminary.edu

This dissertation entitled

THE MYTHOS OF SIN:
C.S. LEWIS, THE GENESIS FALL, AND THE MODERN MOOD
written by

JEREMY G. GRINNELL
and submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
has been accepted by the faculty of Calvin Theological Seminary
upon the recommendation of the undersigned readers:

.i:»:

Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., Ph.D.

Ron~~

Calvin P. Van Reken, Ph.D.

{il!;\

Alan JacobS~

David M. Rylaarsda ,Ph.D.
Date
Acting Vice President for Academic Affairs

Copyright © 2011 by Jeremy G Grinnell
All rights reserved

To, for, and mostly because of
Denise

Could God Himself create such lovely things as I have dreamed?
Answers Hope, “Whence then came thy dream?”
—George MacDonald, Lilith

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
The Nature of the Project ............................................................................ 4
Method of the Exploration .......................................................................... 6
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE
GENESIS FALL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
CONTEXT ............................................................................................................ 10
The “Traditional” Approach ..................................................................... 10
Modern Discussions on the Fall Narrative: A Change of Premise ........... 17
The Immediate Context: Mid-Twentieth Century .................................... 29
CHAPTER 2. C. S. LEWIS ON HISTORY, SCIENCE, AND THE TRADITION ........ 60
Question 1: Lewis, Science, History, and Origins .................................... 61
Question 2: Lewis the Churchman ............................................................ 87
Question 3: Lewis and Higher Criticism .................................................. 92
Question 4: Lewis on the Genre of the Genesis Fall .............................. 106
CHAPTER 3. NO MERE MYTH: LEWIS ON THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF
“MYTH” ............................................................................................................. 110
Navigating the Slough of Despond: Comments on Method ................... 110
The Epistemological Problem—Contact with Reality............................ 113
The Form of Things Unknown—the Language of Myth ........................ 148
Past Watchful Dragons: How Myth Works on the Imagination ............. 168
Suspending Disbelief: The Role of the Reader in Myth ......................... 185
Lewis’ Theory Considered ...................................................................... 203
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 214
CHAPTER 4. LEWIS’ TREATMENT OF THE FALL NARRATIVE......................... 217
“What Really Happened”: Lewis and the History behind the Fall ......... 219
“What to Believe”: Lewis and the Doctrine of the Fall .......................... 232
“What of Experience”: Lewis and the Myth of the Fall ......................... 256
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 275
CHAPTER 5. LEWIS MEETS THE THEOLOGIANS ..................................................278
Trajectory 1 Considered: Lewis Meets the Tradition ............................. 278
Trajectory 2 Considered: Lewis Meets Kant and Niebuhr ..................... 281
Trajectory 3 Considered: Lewis Meets Higher Criticism ....................... 288
The Myth of Demythologization: Lewis Meets the Barth-Bultmann
Debate ......................................................................................... 291
Lewis’ Contribution Considered ............................................................. 301
v

APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................... 312
WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................. 314

vi

ABSTRACT

This dissertation wrestles with the question how to profitably and theologically
handle the Fall narrative of Genesis 3 once it has been classified as “myth,” as was the
conclusion of the Formgeschichte school.
The dissertation begins by establishing the theological conversation of the midtwentieth century, which marks a zenith in the discussion. Beginning with a survey of the
traditional interpretation of the narrative as historical account, which dominated preEnlightenment churchly thought, the survey then summarizes the change of tenor that
Enlightenment and higher critical voices brought to the question. The survey concludes
with consideration of Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Barth, and Rudolph Bultmann on the
definition and role of myth in the Bible.
At this point C. S. Lewis is brought into the conversation in the belief that his
expert status as a literary critic and Medievalist would have given him a unique position
from which to help theologians wrestle with the question. Lewis is thus introduced as a
literary authority with deep commitments to traditional Christianity, yet with a healthy
respect for the conclusions of the modern sciences. In addition Lewis’ thoughts on
modern theology and higher criticism are parsed along with his agreement on the mythic
quality of the Genesis Fall narrative.
Following this comes an extended survey of Lewis’ theory of myth. Good myth
attempts to communicate truth by by-passing the abstracting intellect and addressing
itself immediately to the imagination. Close consideration is given to the epistemological
role of the imagination and the reader’s response to mythic literature.
vii

These efforts afford two levels of consideration. First, Lewis’ own views on the
Genesis narrative are presented under the following heads: (1) the possible history
standing behind the narrative, (2) the meaning and appropriate use of the doctrine
resulting from the narrative, and (3) the implications of its status as myth—how such a
narrative ought to be read and what it produces within the willing reader. Second, Lewis
is compared with the aforementioned theological trajectories and persons to consider how
his robust literary theory of myth might help clarify or critique the theological
conversation of his period. The dissertation concludes with some suggestions for further
application of Lewis’ ideas.

viii

INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Formgeschichte school of the nineteenth century suggested that the
narratives of early Genesis should be classified under the literary genre of “legend” or
“myth,” rather than direct “historical account,” questions have been rife regarding the
nature and function of these narratives as well as their relationship to history. If a
narrative is in some sense mythological, does this mean its events never happened, or
happened other than as represented? And if it did happen in differently than recorded, in
what sense can it still be considered true?
In particular, the text of Genesis 3 describes the event known as the Fall. This
story of a forbidden fruit eaten under temptation stands almost without exception as the
gateway to the Christian explanation of all the evil the world has known. Playing such a
role, it lies near the center of Christian ontology and provides the narrative impetus for
the redemptive events that follow. This narrative is then one of the great hinges on which
the Christian interpretation of the world swings, sharing its central place with such beliefs
as a divinely accomplished creation, the singularly redemptive work of the Christ, and
ultimate eschatological justice.
Being told, however, that such a foundational story was a “myth” was problematic
for many who held dear the history of churchly interpretation. For prior to the
Enlightenment, the Christian Church held overwhelmingly that the human Fall into sin
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was at least an historical event that grounded the redemptive acts of the historical Christ.1
Could it be that the Church had simply been in error about how to best understand this
narrative? If so, could one affirm at the same time both the historical veracity of these
texts and the documentary sciences that asserted their mythological character? And if not,
with whom ought one to side?
Even where one feels less concern over traditional exegesis, questions still press
of how to handle a story so central to the heart of Christianity. What is a theologian to do
with a mythical Fall into sin? Is its mythological form something to be gotten past or
something to be embraced? Are its significance and role in the Christian mind diminished
or enhanced because of this categorization? Does the theologian even know what it
means to call something a “myth?”
Beyond the particular exegetical details of Genesis 3 or even the historical
treatment the story has received in the past, the larger question is the status of the entire
narrative. On the assumption that it is indeed mythological in its form or content, how is
such a story to be treated, and what then is its relationship to history or theology? In what
way does its form-genre contribute to or detract from communicating its overarching
intention, however that is construed?
Questions such as these were at the center of a flurry of discourse in the midtwentieth century. Some of the best known and most influential theologians of the period
such as Rudolph Bultmann, Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, and their diverse followers

1

For an early and particularly poignant example of this dependency, see John Chrysostom, “The
Epistle to the Romans: Homily 10,” in Saint Chrysostom: Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles and the
Epistle to the Romans, ed. Philip Schaff, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church, Series 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 401-408.
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poured a sea of ink over a forest of paper trying to sort out these issues.2 It might even be
safely said that the question of the presence and role of “myth” in the Bible reaches a
critical and interpretive climax in the mid twentieth century.
The world of theology, however, is not the only world in which the category of
“myth” is used. Arguably it is not even the world best suited to the discussion. “Myth” is
also a fundamental genre-concept in the world of literature. And this raises a more deeply
penetrating question for the theologian. If theologians are dealing with “myth” only
because they believe they have found it in the text, and not out of some intrinsic interest
in, knowledge of, or passion for the genre, are they even the best persons to address such
questions? Wherein lies their credibility?
To illustrate the point, if one wanted an answer to the question, “What is Love?”,
one might make a good case for asking a psychologist, who understands the human mind,
or perhaps better, ask the lovers themselves, who know it viscerally and existentially. But
one would do well to suspect any assistance offered by a theologian whose only interest
in love is that it happened to be part of the Song of Songs and whose occupation therefore
requires him to say something about it. C. S. Lewis has spoken of this need to understand
the literary form even more bluntly: “It is easy to forget that the man who writes a good
love sonnet needs not only to be enamoured of a woman, but also to be enamoured of the
Sonnet.”3

2

For a sense of the foment of the period, see the various volumes of Hans Werner Bartsch’s
Kerygma & Myth from the period. Hans Werner Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth by Rudolf Bultmann and Five
Critics, trans. Reginald H. Fuller, vol. I (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1961); and Kerygma and
Myth: A Theological Debate, trans. Reginald H. Fuller, vol. II (London: SPCK, 1962).
3

C. S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 3.
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What seems to have been missing from the theological debate at that critical
period was the voice of a unique sort of expert. Much help might have been gained in
consulting one who understood the essential workings of myth, not only by profession,
but also by existential passion and personal experience. Such a source would be of further
help if he also had a strong interest in the theological issues at stake. C. S. Lewis was just
such a thinker. And Richard Cunningham recognized it as early as 1967, when he said,
Current theological discussion on demythologizing could profit by more exposure
to Lewis’ understanding of the mythopoeic nature of language, his theory of
myth, and his understanding of the epistemological function of the imagination. It
would not hurt theologians to listen to a great literary critic, an expert in
linguistics, and one of the best-read men in mythology—Greek, Nordic, Roman,
and others. More than just talking or writing about mythology, Lewis loved and
avidly read mythology throughout his life. His views thus convey some
experiential insight.4
Yet to date Cunningham’s challenge remains unanswered in any thoroughgoing way—
particularly in relation to the Genesis Fall story. This dissertation seeks to fill that void.
The Nature of the Project
A series of hefty tomes would be required to address the questions raised in the
introduction. The goals of this dissertation, however, are necessarily more modest. It will
demonstrate that C. S. Lewis’ approach to the nature and function of mythopoeia
represents an important and unheard contribution to mid-twentieth century discussions on
the mythological nature of the Fall narrative of Genesis 3.
With a few exceptions such a juxtaposition does not seem have been attempted
anywhere in the literature. Hugo Meynell’s brief article stands alone as a tantalizing
4

Richard B. Cunningham, C. S. Lewis: Defender of the Faith (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1967), 95. Likewise, Medcalf enticingly suggested, without actually executing the suggestion, “…perhaps
the literary critic’s formulation can help the theologian’s at a time when people talk as if ‘the Word became
flesh’ is itself a myth.” Stephen Medcalf, “Coincidence of Myth and Fact,” in Ways of Reading the Bible,
ed. Michael Wadsworth (Sussex, Great Britain: Harvester Press, 1981), 76.
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foretaste of the total palette considered in this dissertation.5 After surveying Karl Barth,
Rudolph Bultmann, and Karl Rahner in a few sparse paragraphs, he asks the following
leading questions,
Could not the special significance of Christianity be due largely to what it has in
common with myth? Could not Christianity actually be the true myth, in some
sense in which this is not a contradiction?...Could Christianity be thought of as
being or containing mystery, in the sense of a literally true story which affects
people by appealing to their emotions and imaginations in essentially the same
way as is done by the literally untrue but profound stories which are myths strictly
speaking?6
He offers C. S. Lewis as a proposed answer to these questions. But what Meynell
only hints at shall herein be demonstrated—specifically, that Lewis views mythopoeia,
not as a product of primitive and unenlightened thought, but as a proper literary device
for addressing that ubiquitous human longing common to both ancients and moderns.
Thus his robust psychological model is able to embrace the efficacy of the Genesis text in
its existing mythopoetic form without the need of demythologization, the establishment
of some historical narrative or prior mythology to undergird it, or conversely some suprahistorical reality inaccessible to historical scrutiny. This is possible because a good myth
succeeds in facilitating truth regarding transcendent reality by employing certain nondiscursive aspects of the human noetic package. Its primary target thus is not the intellect,

5

Hugo Anthony Meynell, “Myth in Christian Religion,” in Theolinguistics, ed. J. P. Van Noppen
(Brussels: Vrije Universiteit, 1981), 133-142. C. Stephen Evans has, likewise, offered a brief survey of
Lewis versus Bultmann on the nature of gospel myth, but again its length allows it to be little more than an
introduction to the topic. His conclusions are similar in vein to Meynell’s. C. Stephen Evans, “The
Incarnational Narrative as Myth and History,” Christian Scholar's Review 23, no. 4 (1994): 387-407. Lee
Alan Brewer’s dissertation does compare the anthropologies of Barth and Lewis, but it says little of Barth’s
thoughts on myth and focuses rather on the nature of “freedom” and choice in both men. As such it is of
limited value to these particular questions. Lee Alan Brewer, “The Anthropology of Choice: A Critical
Analysis and Comparison of the Doctrine of Man in the Theologies of Karl Barth and C. S. Lewis” (PhD
dissertation, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1989).
6

Meynell, 138.

6
but the imagination, which Lewis believes to be a truth-facilitating faculty for the person
who is willing to adopt a particular perspective.
In relation to the historicity question, the dissertation presents Lewis’ belief that
myth is doing something more, not less, than giving history. Something grander is at
work in the story of the Fall; something more is being achieved than could be gained by
an unaccomodated historical record. Now bushels of theologians would have readily
conceded this point when stated so generally, but one is hard pressed to synthesize from
the theological work of the period any adequate explanation of how this mythic story
achieves its desired work in the human mind.
That is the goal of this dissertation—to show that even a mythical Fall narrative
may serve the theological need if care is taken to properly understand what the genre
does and does not entail.
Method of the Exploration
The first chapter will focus on developing the historical context of the discussion.
Because a major aspect of the question hinges on the significant differences between
modern and pre-modern interpretation of the Genesis Fall, the survey must begin with
what might be called the Augustinian-Reformation trajectory. Following this will come a
brief exploration of the rise of at least two contrasting trajectories, consisting primarily of
Enlightenment thinkers, who disagreed with the first trajectory on the narrative’s
historicity, but responded in different ways. The first, as illustrated by Kant, attempted to
lift the narrative out of history and into a trans-historical realm. The second, that of
higher criticism, pressed the narrative downward into history as a mere example of
cultural-religious evolution. Finally the chapter concludes by laying out the contemporary
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theological landscape into which Lewis be placed. Specifically in view are Reinhold
Niebuhr and the Barth-Bultmann demythologization debate.
In chapter 2, Lewis will be presented as a thinker in the throes of this tension,
with a complex relationship to the various parties. It will first demonstrate his sympathies
with modern scientific conclusions regarding the age of the earth and species macrodevelopment (as well has his specific hesitations). Second, Lewis’ own view of himself
as a traditional churchman will be presented, along with his commitment to stand within
the tradition of what the Church has always taught—that is, that the Genesis account has
divine origin and authority and provides a true explanation of human origins and fallen
nature. Third, his great skepticism toward higher critical methodologies and resulting
conclusions will be presented. And finally and conversely the chapter will parse Lewis’
nuanced affirmation of the Form-school’s conclusion that the Fall narrative is primarily
mythopoetic as well as his rejection of efforts to reconstruct the historical development of
the myth.
Chapter 3 will lay out Lewis’ understanding of the nature and function of the
mythic genre in general. What is myth? What is its general relation to history? How does
it function? Much work has been done here, particularly by Charlie W. Starr,7 so the task
will be more synthetic than constructive. The only original contribution will be a
consideration of why myth affects people differently. Some people’s experience
corresponds to Lewis’ structure perfectly; others walk away seemingly unaffected by
myth. Lewis argues that a particular vantage point is critical if a mythic narrative is to

7

Charlie W. Starr, “The Triple Enigma: Truth and Myth as the Key to C. S. Lewis's
Epistemological Thinking” (DA dissertation, Middle Tennessee State University, 2002).
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succeed. A failure to assume this posture might explain some theologians’ rush to get
past the genre trappings to some more intrinsic message.
This analysis will afford two kinds of application. The first, covered in chapter 4,
is primarily textual. Lewis’ own treatment of the Fall narrative is parsed. While Lewis
nowhere offers direct exegesis of Genesis 3, he offers much consideration of its
historical, doctrinal, and mythological significance.
The second application will make up chapter 5. Lewis’ total program will be
brought into orbit with the contemporary theological alternatives from chapter 1 to see
how he might improve, critique, and clarify the discussion of that period.
The dissertation will conclude by thrusting Lewis’ ideas forward into our current
context. In what ways was Lewis prescient of future theological developments? How
might his work be useful to theological problems dominating the present theological
landscape?
A final note on method should here be made. Due to both the large number of
moving parts in this dissertation as well as the voluminous but often insipid quality of
secondary literature on C. S. Lewis, an ordinary survey of scholarship, normally inserted
at this point, is very nearly counterproductive, needlessly ballooning the work while
promoting more numbness than knowledge. This, combined with the highly focused and
synthetic nature of this project, means a traditional survey would consist of little more
than a long list of Lewis adepts—Kilby, Cunningham, Walsh, Hooper, and so on—each
followed by the observation that he did not offer anything significant on this topic. As
such the decision has been made to diffuse the survey into the relevant chapters where
each component of the subject is treated, thus allowing the single germane line or
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paragraph in, say, Walsh to stand out at the precise point of usefulness. It will be
abundantly clear throughout with whom and how widely the conversation in this
dissertation extends.

CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE GENESIS FALL
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEXT
This dissertation wrestles with the function of the Genesis Fall narrative when
understood as “myth.” This categorization was not always, and is still not, universally
conceded. Yet the mid-twentieth century reflects a kind of crowing elevation of the idea.
This chapter offers a brief overview of how the idea of the Fall narrative as myth came
into its prominence. This survey is not intended to be exhaustive by any means, nor does
it draw persons together in any totalizing arrangement or even in most cases show
dependence. Rather it merely identifies three broad kinds of treatment—three
trajectories—each providing ingredients which flavor the complex brew of perspectives
promoted by mid-twentieth century theologians. The typology used here is intended only
to show that otherwise diverse thinkers share orbits around a few specific relevant points
of content or methodology. In all other ways they may be radically distinct.
The “Traditional” Approach
Trajectory 1: Augustine
In nearly every way Augustine provides the archetype of the pre-Enlightenment
interpretation in the West.1 While Augustine is certainly not the first to address these

1

For a far more complete and nuanced tracing of this trajectory, see Kathryn Greene-McCreight,
Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, and Barth Read the "Plain Sense" of Genesis 1-3, Issues in
Systematic Theology (New York: P. Lang Publishers, 1999).
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issues,2 his work is so formative on the subsequent tradition, that his approach remains
almost unmodified until the Reformation, and even it, though less keen on figurative
interpretations, clearly shares the trajectory at salient points.
Regarding Augustine’s second and abortive work on Genesis, Teske offers, “that
it remains incomplete bears witness to Augustine’s inability to offer a literal
interpretation of the text.”3 If Teske is correct, he is so only insofar as Augustine was
unable to do so at that early point in his career, and the more mature Augustine admits to
just such a frustration in his earliest attempt. In reference to his first attempt, a
commentary against the Manicheans, he says,
At the time I did not see how all of Genesis could be taken in the proper sense,
and it seemed to me more and more impossible, or at least scarcely possible or
very difficult, for all of it to be so understood.
But not willing to be deterred from my purpose, whenever I was unable to
discover the literal meaning of a passage, I explained its figurative meaning as
briefly and as clearly as I was able...I was mindful, however, of the purpose which
I had set before me and which I was unable to achieve, that is, to show how
everything in Genesis is to be understood first of all not in the figurative but in the
proper sense. And since I did not completely despair of the possibility of
understanding it all in this sense, I made the following statement in the first part
of Book Two…4
He then offers as evidence of his desire for literalism a citation from his anti-Manichean
commentary, “Of course, if anyone wanted to take everything that was said according to
the letter, that is, to understand it exactly as the letter sounds, and could avoid
2

For a sense of the breadth of pre-Augustine consideration, see Peter C. Bouteneff, Beginnings:
Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2008).
3

Augustine, “On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book,” in Saint Augustine
on Genesis, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1991), 3.
4

Augustine, “The Literal Meaning of Genesis,” vol. 2, in Ancient Christian Writers, vol. 42, ed.
Johannes Quasten, trans. John Hammond Taylor (New York: Newman Press, 1982), 8.2.5; 35. Augustine
identifies the same struggle in “The Retractions,” in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 60, ed. Roy Joseph
Deferrari, trans. Sister Mary Inez Bogan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
1968), I.17; 76f.
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blasphemies and explain everything in harmony with the Catholic faith, we should not
only bear him no hostility, but regard him as a leading and highly praiseworthy
interpreter.”5 And to this should be added the preceding comments from that original
commentary: “Hence, this whole discourse must first be discussed according to history,
then according to prophecy. According to history events are narrated; according to
prophecy future things are foretold.”6
Three things are immediately obvious. First, by “proper” and “literal,” as opposed
to “figurative,” Augustine intends something like “as it happened in history,” that is,
“historical.” Second, he believed such meanings had a sort of first and foundational
meaning before any others. Third, while Augustine’s abilities did develop with time, his
exegetical assumptions about the “historical” nature of the text remained unchanged
throughout his life. The very existence of his final and extensive commentary on early
Genesis argues that he overcame in great degree his “inability.”
Yet the Bible is a divine book with a divine author, so it is reasonable to assume it
has a diversity of meaning within it. Consequently Augustine embraced a wide variety of
allegorical, tropological, or other sorts of interpretations. His later works on Genesis
contain at least as much allegorical interpretation as the early Manichean commentary.
The last three books of the Confessions, which return repeatedly to early Genesis to
develop their mystical themes, might even be considered a step beyond allegory to

5

Augustine, “On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,” vol. 2, 35. Originally in Augustine and here
quoted from, “Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees,” in Saint Augustine on Genesis, trans. Roland
J. Teske, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1991), II.2.3; 95.
6

Augustine, “Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees,” II.2.3; 95.
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something like spiritual vision.7 And in his final treatment of Genesis in The City of God
(sans the Retractions), both “literal” and “figurative” readings are found together side by
side.8 He reiterates that many legitimate interpretations of these things have been offered
by many—from those who regard the entire narrative as “figurative,” that is, “written of
in order to convey symbolic meanings,” to those who see it as wholly historical, that is,
“presented to us in a most faithful narrative of events.” But since “spiritual” meanings of
Paradise in no way prevent it from also being “corporeal” (anymore than Paul figuring
the two covenants in Sarah and Hagar robs them of their historical personhood), they are
permitted. At the same time, however, Augustine’s treatment of them in his great
apologetic assumes their historical rootedness; what’s more, it depends upon it for its
rhetorical efficacy against the non-historical fables of the pagans.9
The bottom line is that Augustine always believed, even at the stage of his life
where he despaired at his own inability to so explain it, that the recorded events were at
least historical events, just as present in the time-space continuum as the life of Moses or
Christ. The presence of other valid meanings within the text, though “permitted” and
“appropriate,”10 did not alter this first and basic reality. Kathryn Greene-McCreight sums
it up, “His understanding of the Bible as inspired allows and indeed necessitates

7

Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), XIXIII; 221-306.
8

Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. R.W. Dyson, Cambridge Texts in the
History of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), XIII.21; 567f.
9

Augustine, City of God, VII.1-28; 267-304.

10

Augustine, City of God, 568.
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allegorical interpretation, but his understanding that the Bible speaks of the same
continuity of time and space within which he lives requires literal readings as well.”11
Aquinas and the Reformation
In prima pars (Q102) of the Summa Theologiae Thomas Aquinas affirms
Augustine (by quoting The City of God) and then adds, “For what Scripture says about
Paradise is set forth in the form of historical narrative, and in all matters that are so
related in Scripture we must accept the truth of the history as our foundation and only
build spiritual explanations on top of it.”12 He further affirms this trajectory in his
discussion of sin in prima secundae.13
Even more interesting is the discussion from his other summa. Therein, Aquinas
defends the doctrine of original sin from its detractors by assuming the historical
rootedness of the first sin.14 This is significant given his audience—either Pagans, who
might not be expected to share the assumption that the biblical narrative is true, or
perhaps Arabian Aristotelians. Yet when citing the common arguments against original
sin, the question of Adam’s historicity does not appear. One might infer from this that,
regardless of whether the audience is pagan or Muslim, Thomas does not expect them to
even raise the question of whether Adam actually existed.

11

Greene-McCreight, 33. It is worth noting that the Synod of Orange in Arausiacum [A.D. 529]
assumed the historical nature of Adam’s sin so to explain, against Pelagianism, the imputation of that sin to
subsequent humanity.
12

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 13 (New York: MaGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964),
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Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 26, 24f. See all of Q81, but particularly, art 5.

184f.
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Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Charles J.
O'Neil, vol. 4: Salvation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1957), 212-223.
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Although the sixteenth-seventeenth century European Reformation highlighted
certain tensions that existed within Christianity, great tracts of the faith were still
common ground. In theological anthropology, discussions continued to be heavy on
questions such as the origin of soul, the essential nature of humanity, and the exact nature
and transmission of original sin, however, the historical nature of early Genesis was held
in common as a prevailing assumption. While questions on the meaning and implications
of Adam’s sin continued, the belief that Adam had really eaten a forbidden fruit was
embraced sometimes with at least as much vigor as in earlier days. It is reasonable to
expect this, for if allegorical interpretations are out of favor, it would not do to lose the
literal one as well—for it is all that remains.
Calvin assumes it in the Institutes and declared outright in his commentary on
Genesis that nothing is gained from leaving the “literal sense” (even for allegory).15 And
while he does acknowledge that one can find persons who think Moses is only “speaking
fabulously of things unknown,” he credits such claims only to those who seek to destroy
scriptural prophecy in its entirety—that is, to those hostile to Christianity in general. He
is more than comfortable with Moses as amanuensis of long standing oral tradition
handed down from Adam himself. For “no sane person doubts that Adam was wellinstructed in them all.”16 The historical nature of Genesis was unchallenged by the
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Reformed Church in each of its three forms of unity as well as in the Westminster
documents.17
Luther, likewise, in his Commentary on Genesis, expresses distrust of allegorical
treatments, but holds the events of early Genesis to be historical. He says, “So far as the
opinion of St. Augustine is concerned, I hold that Moses spoke literally and not
figuratively or allegorically, telling us that the world with all its creatures was made
within six days, just as the word reads.”18 This assumption was shared by the Lutheran
Formula of Concord.19 In addition to Protestant affirmations, the Council of Trent
considered it a foundational assumption, as did the Confession of Dositheus for the
Eastern Church.20
Conclusion
Given the limitations of space, this overview should still serve to provide
sufficient flavor of the pre-Enlightenment church’s trajectory. Adam was an historical
person who lived at the beginning of the world and whose decision to rebel against God
in the matter of the forbidden tree is the beginning of the moral problem for humanity.
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From this historical or “literal” foundation, many (even most) also saw additional
teaching present in it in the form of allegory, analogy, type, moral teaching, and so on.
But these additional interpretations sat atop the historical reality, rather than in place of it.
This trajectory is relevant because it remains intact into the twentieth century (although
with increasing marginalization), and Lewis frequently interacts with it.
Even though minority interpretations favoring non-historicity do exist in the premodern church, the thesis here is unaffected. The inclination of higher criticism was not
to favor some minor tradition over against the dominant one, but (as shall be seen) to
unilaterally dismiss “pre-critical” interpretation on methodological grounds.
Modern Discussions on the Fall Narrative: A Change of Premise
The Enlightenment brought certain challenges to the viability of the historical
read of the Genesis Fall. Whatever this text was meant to do, it need not (or perhaps
could not) reflect what actually happened in history. The reasons given were often some
combination of the beliefs that (1) a literal-historical Fall was rationally deficient in its
explanatory power, (2) modern science had drawn a more compelling picture of human
nature and origins that was incompatible with an historical Fall, and (3) the texts
themselves argued for a different kind of non-historical exegesis. The following survey
identifies persons expressing various forms of these conclusions and, further, identifies
two broad trajectories based upon methodologies and assumptions.
Trajectory 2: Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant’s effort to yank Christianity out of the jaws of Humean
skepticism forced him to adjust traditional Christian doctrines at points where they
seemed unviable in the new context. His efforts are import here because they illustrate an
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early Enlightenment approach to the Genesis 3 text that is frequently mirrored and comes
to a sort of climax in the mid-twentieth century.21 His thoughts regarding the human Fall
are presented within his treatment on the problem of original sin in Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone.22 Space limitations do not permit a full treatment of Kant’s
program on the original constitution of humanity with its various predispositions and
propensities. It will suffice to rehearse one of Kant’s major commitments: Ought entails
Can. If one ought to act in a particular way, then this must imply the ability to so act;
otherwise the agent cannot be held morally praise- or blame-worthy for the act. Further,
such an act cannot be considered voluntary (that is, executed by the function of the Will).
Therefore the “ought” of morality, implies the “can” of moral freedom to so act or not
act. The individual must be free in this sense at the moment of choice in order to be a
moral agent in that choice. Thus a literal Adamic Fall that creates an “inheritance” of
guilt for all humans is out of the question—more than this, for Kant, it is the most “inept”
of all explanations of the human problem.23 Thus if the story of the tragic choice in Eden
is taken as an unaccomodated historical event with its resulting moral implications for
every person, it is contradictory to human moral freedom and responsibility.
What then is the Fall for Kant? His ideas are presented in the context of sorting
through the problem that every human arrives in life already possessing what he calls a
propensity for evil or a corruption of the will. But of course such a propensity would have
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to be freely chosen if humans were to be blameworthy for it. Given his repugnance for a
passively inherited or “original” sin nature, it is more just and warranted to assert that a
detrimental moral choice was actually made prior to our becoming conscious historical
beings.24 Such a transcendent choice to embrace this propensity to evil must have been
made by each person. This choice, however, lies not within our historical-phenomenal
reality, but is part of a noumenal one. The resulting question of what such an atemporal
act of the will actually means ontologically remains necessarily unanswered in Kant, for
by definition it defies rational exploration as to its nature. 25 It is a theoretically necessary
assertion, warranted by our practical moral experience here in the phenomenal realm. We
could no sooner empirically probe this act of the will in se than we could probe the being
of God (hence the touchstone with the rest of his program).
The seminal point here is that for Kant the story of Adam’s Fall actually offers an
analogy of this otherwise inscrutable nouminal reality. While this is not formally “myth”
for Kant, it is something like it. By means of the story, Adam provides some form of
epistemological access to what no human actually experiences—the situation prior to
their transcendental choice to Fall and that moment of movement from having a morally
upright predisposition to the adoption of the propensity for evil.26 It does not reflect a
primal state of perfection in any literal or at least historical-phenomenal sense, which, he
believes, is the ubiquitous mistake of the tradition. Rather this story serves as a rational
representation of the adoption of the evil disposition by every person.
24
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At first blush this treatment may sound like the sort of watery “Adam as
everyman” of some stripes of later Protestant Liberalism. But Kant has performed a more
dramatic feat than this. Kant’s Adam represents, not the historical, but the noumenal self.
The Genesis narrative takes the self entirely out of the world of sensible cause and effect
and provides an avenue for contemplation of an historically-scientifically unverifiable
noumenal reality. That is the story’s power and its brilliance.
Kant, then, represents an early and influential expression of the idea that the
proper treatment of Genesis 3 involves, not its exegetical data per se, but what the
passage is intended to do inside the reader—how it is intended to operate and what it is
trying to accomplish—through the kind of story it is. Kant spends little time actually
considering the exegetical details of the text and virtually no time on what meanings the
original author might have intended. This might be considered a deficit in his approach,
but it is a deficit which higher criticism made good on his behalf—with interest.
The Late Nineteenth Century
The affects of the modern sciences and higher criticism’s documentary
hypotheses in the nineteenth century on theology are well known. It suffices here to point
out that as the 1800s drew to a close, Kant’s philosophical disagreements with the
traditional interpretation of the Genesis Fall had been joined (and perhaps even
overshadowed) by a widening geological and manuscript record, a new epic narrative of
species macro-development and progress, and complex models of editorial authorship.
By way of providing an indicative taste for the period, in 1890-91, Huslean
Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, Herbert Ryle gave a series of lectures on early
Genesis. When they were later published, he observed with pleasure in the preface that
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the “monstrous perversion of Christian freedom” that for so long had forced Christians to
choose between Christianity and the sciences was finally giving way to “the intellectual
progress of the age.”27 By a not-so-subtle use of overstatement, he added,
The old position is no longer tenable. A new position has to be taken up at once,
prayerfully chosen, and hopefully held. The period of transition, the period of
anxious suspense of judgment, is drawing to a close…It may be that Science
seems to be but a disappointing friend when it shows the path of traditional
interpretation to be no longer practicable. But the utterance of truth is the proof of
purest friendship; and Science, if it closes one way, guides us to another which
hitherto has been hid from view.28
Yet overstatement it was. The old interpretive lines were not yet entirely routed.
Even within the higher critical community, some held back, affirming the progression of
the critical sciences and the necessity of an historical Adam. No less than the perennially
popular Franz Delitzsch assumed such a position only a few years prior to Ryle’s hopefilled pronouncement.29 While embracing the great explanatory value of the documentary
hypothesis over Mosaic authorship, he was unwilling to abandon the historicity of Adam
as he believed such a move came with grave intellectual consequences for the faith. He
confessed that if the great geological ages are true, and with them Darwinian macroevolution
then indeed, we admit it without reserve, the Christian view of the world is
condemned as from henceforth untenable. For documentary Christianity professes
to be the religion of the redemption of Adamic mankind, and has for its
inalienable premises the unity of the first creation of man, the fall of the firstcreated pair, and the curse and promise by which this was succeeded. Hence, were
we to grant that Genesis i.-iii. speaks of the beginnings of human history with the
stammering tongue of childhood, it must still be maintained, if Christianity is to
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maintain its ground as the religion of the recovery of the lost, and as the religion
of the consummation aimed at from the beginning, that man, as the creature of
God, entered upon existence as at once human and capable of development in
good, but fell from this good beginning by failing to stand the test of his
freedom.30
His approach tended to regard the narrative more as “history clothed in figure,”
whereby something as fantastical as the speaking serpent, though astonishing, “stands on
the level with the talking of animals in fables.”31 This, nevertheless, did not prevent him
from frequently using the terms “history” and “historical” throughout, even in the same
contexts where he is working with the various redactors of the oral tradition.32
Trajectory 3: Hermann Gunkel and F. R. Tennant
The two decades following Delitzsch’s efforts showed them to be perhaps more of
a last gasp than a renewed trajectory. By the dawn of the twentieth century, Ryle’s
prediction had in the main been realized. Two major works published in the first decade
of that century suffice to demonstrate the intellectual ethos of the period preceding this
study.
First, Hermann Gunkel’s ground-breaking source and form work on legends in
Genesis was published in 1901.33 Gunkel argues that Genesis in its entirety consists of a
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beautifully edited patchwork of “legends” as opposed to “history.”34 Gunkel exhibited a
laudable sensitivity to the literary qualities of the text, but throughout he is torn over
whether the legendary forms of the narratives make them primitive or profound. Usually
his answer is both. For example, he comments that the “brevity” of the materials, their
sparse use of details, and shallow characterization are all marks of “the poverty of
primitive literary art” and yet applauds them for their enduring power and beauty [49]. In
their favor, primitive legend could succeed despite such Spartan use of detail because it
dealt in “types”—broad archetypal pictures of the kinds of persons and events easily
recognizable and immediately interpretable by the ancient human imagination.
This was but a happy accident, however, as primitive audiences presumably could
not handle “portraits made up of many separate traits and painted with artistic detail” like
the deeply-developed modern novel [54],35 nor had they “yet acquired the intellectual
power to distinguish between poetry and reality” [39f.].36 Men of antiquity were “in
general more simple;” whereas modern men are “many-sided.” And yet this same paucity
of detail is one of the major factors in their ability to grab and sustain the attention of
even the modern person. While this line of argument (and it shall be met frequently in
this period) smacks of “the white man’s burden” and other sorts of Eurocentric
assumptions that are as far out of fashion today (and at least as mythological) as the
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perceptions Gunkel himself attributes to primitive storytellers, these features are exactly
what provide Gunkel with his influential taxonomy.
For Gunkel, the literary form of legend developmentally precedes the form of
history, just as the form of myth precedes that of legend. Formal history exists in written
form, resting upon eye-witness account (or something comparable), is credible in its
content, and “treats great public occurrences”—the rise and fall of kings, peoples, and so
on [5f.]. As such, it requires a certain level of cultural development before it can occur.
Legend, on the other hand, is a product of oral history handed down from antiquity, only
being written down at a later time. It reports the incredible (apparently as judged by
modern standards of credulity) and the anthropomorphic intervention of the divine in
human affairs, and is concerned “with things that interest the common people, with
personal and private matters, and is fond of presenting even political affairs and
personages so that they will attract popular attention” [4f.]. Myth precedes even this,
consisting of “stories of the gods, in contradistinction to the legends in which the actors
are men” [14].
It is clear prima facia to Gunkel that throughout Genesis, one is meeting legend.
For though Israelite writers had mastered the art of history at an early stage (e.g. the book
of Kings), clearly the narratives of Genesis do not exhibit such characteristics. And
additionally Genesis 1-11 exhibit the quality of “faded myths” [14], that is, they are
stories containing much from old myth (Babylonian, Assyrian, and so on), but are in the
process of being converted so to be acceptable to the developing monotheism of the early
Monarchical period (the period in which they reached their final form).
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Such is the sense in which the label “myth” is appropriate to the Genesis Fall
narrative. But Gunkel echoes Ryle in cautioning, “The senseless confusion of ‘legend’
with ‘lying’ has caused good people to hesitate to concede that there are legends in the
Old Testament. But legends are not lies; on the contrary, they are a particular form of
poetry” [2f.]. The conclusion then is something like: although the Fall narrative is not
represented as an historical event even within the text, it still manifests its intended
theological power through its poetic form.37
Moving from the exegetical front to a formal theological one, outside of certain
trajectories of theological conservatism and fundamentalism, late nineteenth and early
twentieth century theology and philosophy of religion had little to say on the subject of
sin, (which in part accounts for the ruckus created by Barth’s Römerbrief in 1919).38
Biological macro-evolution and philosophical ideas of human progress had undermined
belief in an intrinsic sin problem within the race. And as traditional Christian
interpretations had pinned this exact point to the Genesis Fall like a donkey’s tail, this
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period was rather uninterested in the game as well as the blindfold that seemed
necessarily to go with it.39
Cambridge philosopher of religion F. R. Tennant, however, stands as an important
exception in this period,40 publishing three major works on the nature of sin and its
history and interpretation in religion.41 Of the three, his Sources of the Doctrines of the
Fall and Original Sin treat most directly the Genesis Fall narrative qua narrative.
By 1903, Tennant can say, “It can no longer be assumed, in the light of
knowledge yielded by comparative mythology and the prehistoric sciences, that the third
chapter of Genesis supplies us with the record of a revelation of historical fact, divinely
given at some definite time, or even with a story whose form and details were wholly the
creation of its writer’s inspired imagination” [1]. The reason for this is quite simple:
science has shown it to have happened otherwise. He says,
Indeed, if man is evolved from a non-human ancestry, if his reason, language,
morals and religion are the product of gradual development, if his antiquity is
what geology asserts it to be, and his earliest condition, as human, that to which
several sciences now strongly point, it is quite impossible to entertain at all the
view that the Fall-story, and the legends kindred to it, embody any genuine
tradition once common to the race, or, therefore, an scientific or historical truth.
[78]
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These “ifs,” however, are not intended as contingencies, but have the force of
“since.” It had already been so proven to Tennant’s satisfaction. Such historical
interpretations are thus “utterly unfaithful” to the fruit of modern research.
What is more, even Kant’s use of the text as an allegorical story of the race “has
been almost entirely abandoned; at least by theologians.”42 Such interpretations founder
on plain exegesis. For example, the serpent cursed to go belly-down leaves one with no
choice but that the author intends an actual animal, not merely a principle of immorality.
What has broken the fellowship here between Kant and Tennant (as with Gunkel)
is the intrusion of a “sense of period” [80]43—a hermeneutic focused less on the utility of
the text to address the modern concern and more on what the original author could have
possibly known and intended. Tennant sees the Fall narrative as having all the features
one would expect of the synthetic patchwork of religious ideas indicative of “the spirit of
Hebrew religion as it was passing into ethical monotheism” [77].
As with Gunkel, a key feature of this “spirit” is the hazy line between history and
the imagination for the original author-editor— “We are dealing with an age in which the
line between the natural and the supernatural, and that between legend and history, were
only vaguely drawn” [79]. The Fall narrative is not then history, but “a working substitute

42

Interestingly, the year before Tennant’s retirement from his Cambridge lectureship in 1938, in a
far off land R. Niebuhr would resurrect a very similar line of argument, showing perhaps that it was not so
dead as Tennant believed. See Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation
of History (London: Nisbet and Company Ltd., 1938), 10-12; The Nature of Man, ed. Robin W. Lovin,
Library of Theological Ethics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 180f.; and Faith and
History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 35.
43

This sense of historical perspective in literature seems to arrive almost in Kant’s wake [d. 1804].
Says Lewis, “It is doubtful whether the sense of period is much older than the Waverley novels. It is hardly
present in Gibbon.” C. S. Lewis, The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance
Literature, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 182-183. See also, C. S. Lewis, “Sir Walter
Scott,” in They Asked for a Paper: Papers and Addresses (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962), 103, referencing
Sir Walter Scott, The Waverley Novels, c.1814; and Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of
the Roman Empire, 1776-1788.

28
for history.” Regardless of the text’s relationship to history, the author-editor desired the
reader to approach the text as though it were history, or at least “the equivalent of
history.” Asking what the author-editor actually believed the historical events to have
been, according to Tennant, may be anachronistic.
Following Gunkel, Tennant expresses reservations about the immediate
application of the term “myth” to the Genesis Fall. Simply put, “This narrative is not a
myth” [82]. “Myth” is too old of a term to use for this point. Rather this story was
complied out of myths, that is, it is “more than” a myth. He says, “It still uses
mythological objects, in place of inaccessible historical facts, for the concrete
presentation of its teaching; but in its theological and ethical implications,… it has
emancipated itself from the characteristics of primitive mythological speculation, and
deserves a place amongst the earliest attempts at theological philosophy” [83]. Myth then,
for Tennant, is a product of primitive ignorance—that which the author inserts when he
does not understand the scientific nature of things. Tennant admits, however, that the
author-editor of Genesis is no scientific dullard. He is not unaware of the scientific
inaccuracies in his story, he is simply ignoring them. Thus, the Genesis Fall is
mythological, not so much in its form, but in that “it embodies, in a fossil state, legendary
or mythological matter” [87].
This raises a question for later consideration. If the author-editor wrote these
things intending the reader to read them as “the equivalent of history,” then why should
Tennant expect he can approach the author’s intention or experience the text as it was
meant to be experienced without suspending his incredulity and coming to the text as if it
were history? In this situation, modern man’s perceived superiority over his primitive
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ancestors would seem to create a dramatic barrier to understanding the original spirit of
the text. Without assuming, if only for argument’s sake, the writer’s point of view, are we
warranted in saying that we have understood the author’s intention?
The Immediate Context: Mid-Twentieth Century
The events of the early twentieth century—the Great War, the Great Depression,
and the greater war that followed them both—deflated the optimism of Modernity.
Progress—that great “given” promised by both macro-evolution and scientific
discovery—did not produce the anticipated utopia. On the contrary, industrial
dependency (and its resultant slow down in the Depression) had left millions
impoverished, while technological advancement had made possible the more effective
and efficient killing of enemy combatants.44 Suddenly the idea of an intrinsic problem
within the human race did not seem so unreasonable as it had a generation earlier.
Reinhold Niebuhr: A Modified Kantian Trajectory
It is almost impossible to have a discussion on the mythical qualities of Genesis 3
in this period without meeting Reinhold Niebuhr. His visit to post-war Europe in 1923
left him (along with his entire generation) scrambling for ways of explaining the great
disconnect between Modernity’s promise and the smoldering reality of post-war Europe.
Consequently perhaps no thinker in this time period embraces the problem of sin as a sort
of central concern more than Niebuhr.45 Of primary interest here is Niebuhr’s take on the
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Fall narrative. To understand this, however, a few comments must be made on his
thoughts of the human condition, which undergird his use of the Genesis Fall.
Niebuhr on the Nature and Corruption of Humanity
Niebuhr’s reflections on human failing can be summed up in his own words:
“Man is mortal. That is his fate. Man pretends not to be mortal. That is his sin.”46 The
problem with humanity is rooted in its very constitution. Let us be clear, says Niebuhr, it
is not a deficient nature that causes humanity’s problems—our race was created good,
and even in our sin we know essentially what humanity is supposed to be. But humanity’s
unique constitution creates both the possibility and, further, the inevitability of failure.
Humans, unlike all other creatures in the world, are a synthesis of two realities.
Humanity is tied by essential constitution both to the finite world of Nature and to
transcendent world of Spirit. According to Nature, humanity is finite, corporeal, and
mortal; according to Spirit, humanity possesses the capacity to extend itself beyond its
own perspectives—to think above its own limitations. It would be a mistake to read a
neo-platonic depreciation of the physical nature in Niebuhr, for he repeatedly affirms that
it is good for us to be so made. The presence of the transcendent within humanity is what
makes it “free”—free to become what it was not yesterday.
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When the worlds of freedom and finitude cohere in a single person, however, the
result is a tension within the self that Niebuhr, following Kierkegaard, calls “Anxiety.”
The human spirit sees the limitations of the natural self—its mortality and finitude—and
is troubled by the recognition. This state itself is not sinful; in fact, says Niebuhr, Anxiety
can often be the source of great creative inspiration, resulting in new and dramatic
improvements to the human condition.47 Yet this Anxiety is also the very temptation to
abandon our creaturely place.
The use of our freedom to abandon our God-given place in response to our
existential Anxiety is “Sin” for Niebuhr.48 When our Anxiety reaches critical mass, the
soul may rebel in two possible directions. These two possibilities form Niebuhr’s
taxonomy. Following Augustine, “Pride” is the central form of rebellion that occurs when
one responds to Anxiety by extending freedom to levels one cannot achieve and does not
merit—in essence, assuming the place of God and denying creaturely and natural finitude
[179]. In the opposite direction, and subject to much less consideration by Niebuhr, is the
sin of “Sensuality” [228ff]. Herein, the self, overcome by the possibilities of Spirit,
retreats into the Natural passions and appetites “by seeking to hide his freedom and by
losing himself in some aspect of the world’s vitalities” [179], thereby embracing mutable
goods as though they were infinite ones.
Every effort to escape the situation, however, ends in necessary failure. As
Hofman rightly summarizes the results,
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The whole attempt of man to exalt himself by ignoring his original state ordained
by God, and using only his self-knowledge falls to pieces because it cannot fit
man into the totality of the world forces which surround and limit him. And this
failure destroys not only the relation of man to his environment but equally man’s
own inner adjustment. The confusion of modern man reveals his inner and his
outer unrelatedness. 49
Finally, Niebuhr claims that, despite how it may appear, human sin does not
happen necessarily; it does, however, happen inevitably [178]. All humans face this
Anxiety; it is definitional to their humanity. And, while the “ideal possibility” exists that
faith in God’s sufficiency might prevail, all humans answer that Anxiety with rebellion
[182f.]. Whatever salvation is available to humanity, it does not consist of removing
Anxiety, for this would destroy humanity’s freedom. Only in learning to answer Anxiety
with humility and sacrificial love can we be “saved.”
Niebuhr and the Mythical Fall
Niebuhr favored Christianity among available worldviews because he believed it
the only anthropology that treated both humanity’s finite Nature and its free Spirit with
sincerity.50 Thus Niebuhr was tied to the Christian story, but this created a complex series
of problems regarding the arrival of sin in the race.
Niebuhr expressed frustration with traditional readings of the Fall that reduce the
events to mere history, embracing rather the conclusions of higher criticism as to its
mythological nature. He says, “In the same manner a symbolic historical event, such as
the ‘fall’ of man, loses its real meaning when taken as literal history. It symbolizes an
inevitable and yet not a natural corruption of human freedom. It must not, therefore, be

49

Hofmann, Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 170f.

50

Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, 14f. See also ND, I, 124.

33
regarded…as a specific event with which evil begins in history….”51 Yet he berates
Liberal Protestantism of the twentieth century for its general dismissal of the narrative’s
importance altogether. He says,
The story of the fall of man in the Garden of Eden is a primitive myth which
modern theology has been glad to disavow, for fear that modern culture might
regard belief in it as a proof of the obscurantism of religion. In place of it we have
substituted various accounts of the origin and the nature of evil in human life.
Most of these accounts, reduced to their essentials, attribute sin to the inertia of
nature, or the hypertrophy of impulses, or to the defect of reason (ignorance), and
thereby either explicitly or implicitly place their trust in developed reason as the
guarantor of goodness. In all of these accounts the essential point in the nature of
human evil is missed…52
On the nature and function of myths, Niebuhr believed they played a vital
mediating role in the dialectical relationship between the realms of Spirit-Eternity and
Nature-Time. Reason or specifically discursive human language, which is a function of
the world of Nature, cannot by definition directly explore a trans-rational reality such as
Spirit. However, since this is all we have to work with, we must be a “deceiver” in the
use of our language to say more than it is capable of.53 And “symbol” is the mechanism
for doing so. “It [symbol] is one dimension upon which two dimensions must be
recorded. This can be done only by symbols which deceive for the sake of truth.”54 We
become “deceivers, yet true” in realizing that a symbol can hold a greater meaning than
what its scientific understanding will allow; similar to what happens in art, which
“constantly falsifies these [natural] relationships, as analysed by science, in order to
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express their total meaning.”55 When symbols become bound together in a narrative form
capable of expressing something about the trans-natural reality, myth has been produced.
Christianity is, for Niebuhr, a mythic religion, in the best sense of that term. “The
Christian religion may be characterized as one which has transmuted primitive religious
and artistic myths and symbols without fully rationalizing them.”56 The great myths of
Christianity—Creation, Fall, and Redemption—each say something true and powerful to
us that can only be realized by the use of the myth.57
Niebuhr, however, believed that both traditional orthodoxy and modern liberalism
had misunderstood how myth ought to be treated.58 Modern liberalism (following
Bultmann’s lead) was embarrassed by the presence of myth in the Bible, seeing it only as
a vestigial narrative form of pre-scientific peoples. Thus they underappreciated what the
myths were capable of communicating, resulting in a decidedly earth-bound and natural
religion devoid of the transcendent. Traditional orthodoxy, however, erred in the opposite
direction of excessive literalism:
Every mythical idea contains a primitive deception and a more ultimate one. The
primitive error is to regard the early form in which the myth is stated as
authoritative. Thus the Christian religion is always tempted to insist that belief in
creation [for example] also involves belief in an actual forming of man out of a
lump of clay, or in an actual creative activity of six days. It is to this temptation
that biblical literalism succumbs.59
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But the myth cannot be ignored or dismissed. It must be preserved, not because it
reflects historical factuality, but because it has an indispensable and essential utility. In
the case of the myth of the Fall, Niebuhr believes it articulates exactly what every person
experiences existentially in the moment of temptation and sin, and which s/he can know
by simple introspection.60 Man is tempted by the serpent “to break and transcend the
limits which God has set for him” by eating of the tree.61 The image of the serpent
(understood to be Satan or the Satanic principle) teaches us that “the situation of
finiteness and freedom in which man stands becomes a source of temptation only when it
is falsely interpreted. The false interpretation is not purely the product of the human
imagination. It is suggested to man by a force of evil which precedes his own sin.”62 Thus
the original temptation is true of all people in all moments as they endure their existential
situation of Anxiety. In this sense the sin of Adam is present in everyone, and this is what
the myth of the Fall is meant to teach.
And therein lies the difficulty. Niebuhr’s fundamental belief about human failing
is that temptation exists by virtue of Anxiety, that tension between the transcendent and
the finite within us, which is systemic to the human condition. On its own terms, this
model has high explanatory value. But Niebuhr makes the further claim that this is what
Genesis 3 presents. Yet how does the Genesis 3 narrative illustrate this? The story does
not present Anxiety as a systemic situation. No Anxiety is presented prior to the
temptation, rather it comes only with the temptation itself—and even there, it is not
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imaged as such. And the source of the temptation is external—a temptation that comes
unforeseen from without after a full explication of the human condition in chapter 1. This
fact argues for a possible (logical, though perhaps not actual) human condition prior to
the existence of Anxiety and temptation, to which Niebuhr’s model does not speak.
Niebuhr may be correct in everything he says about humanity’s existential progression
from Anxiety to temptation to sin. But what hath Genesis 3 to do with this?
By 1963, Niebuhr seemed to have realized this, for in the new preface to Nature
and Destiny of Man, he expresses regret at having employed the Genesis myth to make
his case, believing that it, in his words, “obscured my essential thesis.”63 More
importantly, while Niebuhr’s treatment of the Genesis Fall is uniquely his own and may
be at points the most innovative and compelling reflection since Augustine’s treatments
of pride and privation, it does share methodological sympathy with Kant at certain key
points (and runs in the opposite direction of Gunkel and Tennant). Niebuhr expresses no
interest in the author-editor’s point-of-view or intention (as was the meat of higher
criticism), but, like Kant, uses the narrative to address a particularly pressing question
within his own historical setting. The motive, as with Kant, is laudable—the
rehabilitation of a central Christian idea from perceived loss of viability. In Kant’s case, it
was Humean skepticism, in Niebuhr’s the loss of social and scientific optimism. But to
illustrate the problem, whenever this approach is used on some event known to be
historical —say, the sacking of Rome or hurricane Katrina—it is consistently condemned
as the most arbitrary form of allegory or a most suspicious historicism. Wherein lies the
allowance for so using a myth? Is it latent in the myth’s non-historical status? Is the
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meaning of a myth ultimately limited only by creativity of the interpreter? Is a myth’s
greatest virtue that we make of it what we need in the existential moment?
Niebuhr clearly bests the banality of higher criticism in his key belief in myth’s
ability to transmit knowledge in non-discursive forms—that some truths can only be
grasped by means of this particular kind of story. Yet because he lacks the exegetical
controls of the textual critic, his reader is always left with the sneaking suspicion that the
myth has been used rather than interpreted.
Merging and Diverging Trajectories: The Barth-Bultmann Debate
Although the particular focus of this document is the Genesis Fall, one cannot
hope to bypass Rudolph Bultmann on the grounds that he is a New Testament scholar.
His demythologization program and the resulting debates almost defined for his
generation the rhetorical landscape of what myth is, how it functions in the Bible, and
how it ought to be treated. Of equal importance is Karl Barth’s response, which both
critiques Bultmann and offers an important alternative. In relation to the typology at work
here, Bultmann’s program stands in many ways as an apogee of the Gunkel-Tennant
higher critical approach and Kant’s utilitarian meaning bereft of its nouminal aspects. As
shall be seen, Karl Barth’s response alternatively reflects an echo of the Traditional
interpretation synthesized with the Kantian trajectory, nouminal aspects preserved.
We need not address every aspect of Bultmann’s program nor lay out the often titfor-tat detail of his debate with Barth. Even less helpful would be the uproarious scandal
found in Bartsch’s Kerygma and Myth volumes. While many of Barth’s observations
were echoed or critiqued by others, Barth’s reaction to Bultmann’s notion of “myth” is at
the center of this discussion.
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Bultmann, History, and Myth
Bultmann adds at least one additional perspective to the puzzle, new so far in this
discussion. Bultmann is comfortable rooting the distant origins of a biblical myth in
history. This, of course, may only be because he is dealing primarily with the Gospels,
which have a stronger historical warrant than the much more ancient narratives of early
Genesis. But nevertheless, in Bultmann history and myth can both be aspects within the
same story. This is particularly true of the Gospels, wherein “We have here a unique
combination of history and myth.”64
The mythological and the historical aspects of the story, however, do not merge.
For Bultmann the historical fact and the myth remain distinct and (more importantly)
both achieve only second tier importance in the face of “what God is trying to say to each
one of us through them.”65 Of the two, however, the historical fact [historisch] is more
important as it is the originating event that gives rise to the historic meaning
[geschichtlich], that is, its “abiding significance.”66
The historical process, as Bultmann reconstructs it, seems to go something like
the following. Some event occurs in history as history [historisch]. Over time this event
becomes circumscribed in mythological language that was originally intended to clarify
the event’s ultimate significance [geschichtlich]—which may have been only marginally
related to the historical events now lost. Thus the mythology born out of an historical
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event is intended to communicate to the hearers some truth about themselves.67 It may
even have done so successfully for the original listeners, who shared the worldview
presumed by the mythology. This then is the status of the text that we meet—an
admixture of history and tutelary myth. What then shall the modern reader do with it?
Enter demythologization.
Demythologization: The Method
The process rests upon a number of premises or steps that can be summed up
(with perhaps some inevitable oversimplification) by the following propositions:
Proposition 1: The New Testament (and by implication much of the Bible) is
subject to the mythological worldview held by its authors.68 As inherited from the
Gunkel-Tennant trajectory, Bultmann believes this worldview to be dominated by general
scientific ignorance and the inability of hearers to distinguish the scientifically incredible
from the historically verifiable.
Proposition 2: Such a worldview is incredible to enlightened modern people,69
and must therefore be rejected for the sake of the myth’s deeper intention. Thus the
narrative in its mythological form obfuscates the significance for the modern person, who
does not share that worldview.
Proposition 3: As such, to hear the relevant (and even timeless) message of the
Bible, one must get behind the mythological structure to the real intent of the passage.
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Demythologization is not so much, to Bultmann, an elimination of myth, but a
“translation” that renders its original mythological form moot. “We must ask whether the
eschatological preaching and the mythological sayings as a whole contain a still deeper
meaning which is concealed under cover of mythology. If that is so, let us abandon the
mythological conceptions precisely because we want to retain the deeper meaning.” 70
Proposition 4: The purpose of a myth is to express humanity’s understanding of
itself.71 As modern persons re-approach the historical fact anew, stripping away the
mythology, they also listen to what the mythological superimposition was trying to
capture. Thus the mythology is used as a vehicle to get at an underlying principle and
then is discarded (demythologized) for the sake of that principle, or as Bultmann calls it,
the “permanent fact.”72 Bultmann claims that such an interpretation “does far more
justice” to the historical event than does any of the mythologizing of the tradition.
Proposition 5: The employment of an existentialist hermeneutic to “translate” the
myth’s intrinsic meaning is reasonable.73 Bultmann believes Heidegger has provided the
best vehicle by which to translate mythological accounts into terms amenable to modern
humanity’s self-diagnosed existential situation.74 From this, Bultmann views human sin
as submission to anxiety, herein showing an affinity with Niebuhr (as well as Brunner
and Tillich, each after their own fashion). Whether or not this idea spirals back to
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Heidegger or Kierkegaard is an interesting future question, but does not matter here.
Given the combined weight of the thinkers espousing this understanding, it might not be
an overstatement to say the “sin as existential anxiety” approach is the quintessential
modern understanding of sin.75
Proposition 6: The loving act of God in the Christ-event is the key to
understanding and only path to actualizing authentic life.76 This proposition is not so
relevant to our thesis, but does show why Bultmann so forcefully defends his work in the
Gospels, and further, it is his touchstone with the Christian Tradition.
Before turning to Karl Barth’s critique and alternative, Bultmann might be
tentatively set into context with the previous trajectories. First, Bultmann stands within
the trajectory of higher criticism insofar as he desires to understand the history
[historisch] undergirding a myth, and shares Gunkel-Tennant’s assumptions about the
literary and scientific [in]capacities of pre-critical peoples. Yet unlike them, his concern
that the passage be understood within its historical context is only preliminary—it must
then be usefully reinterpreted for the Christian Church, for it must be after all kerygma.
Here then is the tangential point where Bultmann touches Kant. Kant lifts the
import of the story into the noumenal realm; Bultmann too lifts, but not quite so high.
The height is only that of our own existential situation. Biblical myth does not reflect
transcendent realities, as Bultmann was most suspicious of these, but timeless moral
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truths. Stripped of its mythological accretions, the narrative can be used by the careful
interpreter to address the true existential situation of the modern person.77
Karl Barth’s Response
Although the dialogue between Barth and Bultmann on this question was
generally cordial, the discussion eventually languished in disenchantment as Barth felt
perpetually unheard and Bultmann felt perpetually misunderstood.78 Nevertheless,
Barth’s critiques serve as an opening for his own positive construction of the same issue.
Only the critiques specifically related to our thesis will be mentioned here.
First, Barth believed that Bultmann’s use of Heidegger had given him a
preconceived notion of what the New Testament could and could not say before
attempting to listen to it.79 It confused Barth that while admitting that “translation” was
the secondary concern to the more primary exegesis of the original text in context,
Bultmann is “still hammering away with unparalleled persistence, at the various historical
forms in which the gospel is enshrined. Apparently he already knows what is in the New
Testament. Apparently that is why he wants himself and he wants us to concentrate
entirely on translating it from one language and one set of terms into others. For we
already know what it is we are trying to translate.”80 Given Bultmann’s definition of
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myth, Barth believed it would have been more consistent for him to have simply attacked
all things supernatural, as classical liberalism did. But even on Bultmann’s own terms,
is the demythologized kerygma allowed to say anything about God’s having
condescended to become this-worldly, objective and—horror of horrors!—
datable? Apparently it is not allowed to say that the New Testament God is the
kind of God who is capable of such condescension. Nor can it admit that it
originated in the concrete fact that the disciples saw with their own eyes, heard
with their ears, touched with their hands, in space and time, not only the
dereliction of the Word made flesh hanging on the cross, but also the glory of the
same Word made flesh risen from the dead.81
To put his critique into terms already used in this dissertation, Bultmann has not
wholly escaped the subjective use of the myth already met in Kant and Niebuhr. He still
seems to begin with the modern concern or need (Heidegger’s to be precise) and uses the
text to address it.
Bultmann answered this critique later in his career after “demythologization” had
become a household word in theological circles.82 He affirmed with his detractors that,
yes, the modern scientific worldview is a presuppositional criterion for his program, but
denied that this constitutes a rejection of scripture, only the worldview of the period in
which it was written. For Bultmann this indicated, not the gospel’s weakness and cultural
flexibility, but its transcultural character. “To demythologize is to deny that the message
of scripture and of the Church is bound to an ancient world-view which is obsolete.”83
The Christian gospel of the Word of God is not a doctrine to be accepted or rejected by
the intellect, but kerygma addressed to the hearer as a self.
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This only raised a second concern. Barth believed Bultmann held an unstated but
apparent assumption that modern humanity is myth-less. The assumption of modern
science was that it understood the world as it really was, as opposed to the pre-modern
views that understood the world in analogy—it is “like…” Barth challenges this notion
from several directions. First, does the modern scientific worldview possess no myths of
its own? What then of Marxism and the idea of the “Christian West”? Is it true that all
modern persons find myths useless?84 And what is more, does not Bultmann’s very
definition of what constitutes myth mislead? Myth is not simply any story about the
gods.85 In fact, The New Testament writers could hardly have communicated their
material in terms of such a yarn, “that was just the kind of thing they were attacking.”
Barth says that Bultmann, with his background in form criticism, has used an inadequate
definition of myth that covers only the form of the New Testament, whereas
if Bultmann used a definition which covered the content rather than the form, he
could still find plenty of mythological imagery and terminology incidentally
accepted and used in the New Testament. As for the actual content of the New
Testament message, however, he could hardly describe it as mythological in form,
proceed to dismantle it from top to bottom and replace it by some other form,
supposedly more intelligible and relevant to modern man.86
In the end, Barth thought he had shared with Bultmann from their youth the belief
that, if anything must be demythologized, it was “the belief that man was the measure of
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his own understanding and of all other understanding.”87 It was the road Barth believed
Bultmann had forsaken for the “Egyptian fleshpots.” Bultmann had, in Barth’s view,
succumbed to a particularly pernicious form of natural theology, wherein his
understanding of human nature, its basic flaw, and its solution are all predetermined by
some human process that is then superimposed onto the scriptures. By the time the
second volume of Kerygma and Myth came out, Barth confessed he was losing interest in
the discussion first because Bultmann refused to yield even an inch of ground
(“admirable doggedness in its own way, but such as to preclude any real meeting of the
minds”), and further that the debate was becoming “bogged down in sterility and
boredom, and if it is continued at all, there is little prospect of any improvement.”88
It is easy to see why Bultmann’s gospel would be offensive to Barth, for it does
seem to begin with humanity’s natural knowledge of its own existential condition, and
forms the gospel kerygma in light of it. It fails to acknowledge that point which was so
central to Barth’s concern—our utter inability to know our own condition, self, plight, or
remedy. In Barth’s view Bultmann uses the New Testament to articulate a modern gospel
that he already has in his mind. Bultmann’s program leaves one asking the question, is
the New Testament (as it stands with its mythic aspects) necessary or just helpful to
understanding our problem and its solution? While Bultmann affirms its necessity,89 the
answer seems to be mixed. It is only helpful when discussing our plight, as we can
understand our predicament pretty well by means of existentialist reflection. He does
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seem to affirm its necessity in relation to the solution—God’s act in Christ. The New
Testament record is necessary to get this, and, despite vigorous disagreement with him in
general, Barth gives him credit for this later point.90
Barth’s critique as it relates to this work may be summarized as follows: First, the
saga-form of the text is necessary and intrinsic to its meaning. It cannot be gotten past
unless one has a preconceived notion of what it is saying or can say. Second, saga is not
just a feature of ancient worldviews, but reflects systemic patterns within human thought
life—ancient and modern. Sagas then speak to modern persons as well because we are
ultimately like, not unlike, our ancestors in every way that matters to the gospel.
Karl Barth’s Alternative
As so many systematicians have bemoaned, Karl Barth defies easy categorization,
and of all the persons considered in this chapter, he is the most difficult to treat
adequately in summary fashion. To begin with, Barth agreed with the Gunkel-Tennant
trajectory that the presence of non-historical genres in no way diminished the value or
veracity of the Bible, in fact given its nature and theme, one should expect to find such
material.91 But his sympathies with higher criticism seem to end there.
First, he rejects the propensity of much of higher criticism to attempt a
reconstruction of an history behind the text. He says, “Biblical exegesis can
fundamentally only be interpretation of the texts furnished by Holy Scripture. Its task can
never be to try to get behind the witness of these texts.” As such, good exegesis simply
90
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repeats what the prophets and apostles have testified as the “mighty acts of God.” But
higher critical (or Barth’s more pejorative, “untheological”) exegesis attempts to “peel off
as far as possible, from reports of past events, all that is the contribution of the narrators
and so expose what is ‘actually’ the object of the reports (i.e. what is done and
experienced by men).”92 So, while Barth does work to establish a text’s Sitz im Leben
when such a task is necessary to its interpretation, early Genesis has for him no such
situation to analyze. Its non-historical status precludes it as a feature of its genre.
Second and closely related, as already seen with Bultmann, Barth rejects the
attempt to penetrate these non-historical texts in search of an ‘historical’ [historisch]
kernel which is supposed to give the true, that is, ‘historical’ Word of God.93 Its very
content and status as non-historical thwarts the attempt, and if it were successful, it would
succeed in robbing the narrative of its import and value as a non-historical account.
Third, Barth is unsatisfied with the basic taxonomy of genres he has inherited. In
his mind, none of the higher critics (Gunkel and Bultmann by name) have managed to
“give us any illuminated and acknowledged clarification, distinction, and co-ordination of
the terms myth [Mythus], saga [Sage], fable [Märchen], legend [Legende] and anecdote
[Anekdote], let alone any useful definition of their relationship to history and historical
scholarship.”94 But it may be arguable whether Barth’s own taxonomy sheds any
additional light. In the end his typology of genres works perhaps only for himself, and he
makes it do so. But then this is more or less what Gunkel did a generation earlier as well.
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Nevertheless Barth does not believe the Fall narrative should be categorized as
“myth” as higher criticism has done. Rather, it is “saga” [Sage].95 Barth does not take a
theological-cultural evolutionary approach to these terms as does Gunkel (wherein myth
developmentally precedes saga-legend which precedes formal history). Barth parses the
terms more in light of their intrinsic qualities.
First, like Bultmann, but for different reasons, Barth employs the German
distinction between historie (and the “historical” [historisch]) and Geschichte. Stated
over-simply, historie consists of the events that occur in the time-space world in all their
particularities and are thus capable of being scrutinized by historical methodologies. It is
the event as it happened and was (theoretically) sensibly experienced by witnesses. And
the Bible does contain this at many places,96 and the term usually comes into English as
“historical” or perhaps “mere history.”97
But the Bible also contains what Barth calls “non-historical” or “pre-historical
history” [unhistorische or prae-historische Geschichte]. These events are non-historical,
not in that they did not truly happen, but rather that they happened in a way that is not
verifiable or falsifiable empirically. This Geschichte is not unrelated to historie, but
occurs above and within in such a way that it provides meaning to historie. All important
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historie will have this non-historical aspect within it. While a little crass, it would not be
entirely inaccurate to say historie consists of events as humanity sees them, Geschichte,
of events as God knows them in all their true significance.98
How then are sensibly-dependant humans to encounter Geschichte? Barth is
absolutely certain it is not through myth. Myth does not have such a power. He says,
The customary definition that myth is the story of the gods is only superficial. In
myth both the gods and the story are not the real point at issue, but only point to
it. The real object and content of myth are the essential principles of the general
reality and relationships of the natural and spiritual cosmos which, in distinction
from concrete history, are not confined to definite times and places. The clothing
of their dialectic and cyclical movement in stories of the gods is the form of
myth.99
And a bit later,
But its [myth’s] tales and their events and figures are obviously pictures and
embodiments of what happens always and everywhere and to that extent does not
happen ‘anywhere or at any time’…It chooses and uses the form of a story, but in
the case of all intelligent persons it makes the demand that they should look
through this story, that they should not cling to it as such, but that in all the
enjoyment of its events and forms, spurred on by its cheerful play, they should
press on to its true non-historical, timeless and abstract sense, to a perception of
the eternal truth presented in the play.100
Myth, then, is by humanity about humanity. As Barth says, “the contemplation of man
and his cosmos as self-moved and self-resting.”101 It speaks of general truths, and “winks
and nods” to the reader to push past the story to the eternal truth to which it refers.
Given Barth’s disagreements with Bultmann and the higher critics already
mentioned, it is surprising to find such close proximity between them at this point. Barth
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concedes much of Gunkel’s ideas on the anthropocentric nature of myths as well as
Bultmann’s position in their existential function. Myths indeed can be winnowed for
timeless truth “kernels,” and suggestions are present in Barth that, when faced with a real
myth, he could even speak a form of Bultmannian.102 Barth does not even believe myth is
inherently bad. On the contrary, “never is man more himself and at home in his world,
never does he have in his own strength a better understanding of himself and his world,
than as an inventor and author or an intelligent hearer and reader of myth.”103 Now his
point of departure from Bultmann and higher criticism is more precisely seen.
Mythopoeia is a grand thing; myth is a good human cultural activity, but it is not myth
that we meet in the scriptures, and particularly not in early Genesis.
The Creation and Fall narratives are “pure saga,”104 not mythological in any
sense. Barth believes their very form betrays this,
What is fundamental to myth, namely, the contemplation of man and his cosmos
as self-moved and self-resting, the contemplation of his emergence as one of his
own functions, is not only not essential to it [the creation saga] but is declared by
it to be groundless in every respect. And what is unessential to myth, namely, God
and His activity, the distinction and confrontation between the Creation and the
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creature,…is not only fundamental to the biblical creation saga but the one and
only thing that it seeks to exhibit.105
Geschichte then is expressed in the narrative form of saga, not myth. Barth defines saga
as “an intuitive and poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of history which is enacted
once for all within the confines of time and space.”106 Myth is something humanity
makes for itself. Saga is something that breaks upon humanity from without, to which it
contributes nothing but the hearing. Myth is a tune a man hums to himself as he walks
down the road; Saga is a symphony that bursts upon him from an unseen orchestra and to
which he contributes neither note nor measure. It knocks him to the ground and deafens
him to every tune of his own device.
Barth does not claim to know why the Israelite imagination should have chosen to
produce saga and shun deficient mythologies or a necessarily-abortive historie, but the
fact that they did demonstrates the central role that the imagination plays as a vehicle for
God’s revelation. In his words, “…the human possibility of knowing is not exhausted by
the ability to perceive and comprehend. Imagination, too, belongs no less legitimately in
its way to the human possibility of knowing. A man without imagination is more of an
invalid than one who lacks a leg.” 107 Even more, “It is because they are in fact
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imaginative in this different way that they are inspired, that they bear witness to God’s
self-revelation, and that they demand faith and can lay claim to faith.”108
An entire work could be written just on Barth’s understanding of saga and myth.
It will suffice here to reproduce in part Greene-McCreight’s work, which has the virtue of
visual brevity (See Table 1: Barth on Saga v. Myth below).109
Table 1: Barth on Saga v. Myth
Saga
deep, inclusive
literal sense
takes narrative seriously
on the historical plane
speaks properly
truth identical with
historical picture
points beyond itself only to historical
saga and history, and not to nonhistorical meaning

Myth
timeless connexions,
relationships not recounted
narrative as embodiment of what
happens everywhere, ergo not
anywhere at any time
timeless and abstract; historical
covering for non-historical; speculation
perception of eternal truth

does not accommodate, wink or nod

monistic
accommodates,
winks and nods

Barth’s discussion of the saga of the Fall comes largely within his exposition of
the covenant of grace as the controlling motif of history. This is not incidental but the
point. This covenant, fulfilled in the Christ, is the real history at work—the Geschichte
recorded in the scriptures. If creation’s raison d’être is the covenant, the same is true of
the Fall. Whatever meaning the Fall narrative has, it has it because of its participation in
this history—more specifically in this person, the Christ.110
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This is most directly seen in his treatment of the historical Adam in the
Römerbrief. Adam’s historical relevance is only that he exists as “as the type of the
second Adam who is to come, as the shadow cast by His light.”111 The first Adam can be
only understood when he is “brought to naught” in Christ.
He does not deny an Adam of historie, but is careful in “leaving out of account
what may have occurred to the historical Adam.”112 Rather, the transcendent Adam, who
is the type of rebellious humanity overthrown in Christ, is the one with whom we must
concern ourselves. Here Barth very nearly posits an Adam of History and an Adam of
Faith not unlike Protestant Liberalism’s Christ of history and faith. And as with
Liberalism, it is the figure of faith that ultimately matters; the history is a curiosity of
interest to archeology, but not to the Church.
This distinction is made more obvious by what he does say of the Adam of
history. Such an Adam, if he existed, was surely a rebel against God. But it is not his sin
within history that condemns us. Rather the sin of this “natural, earthy, historical man”
was only the “first manifest operation” of the non-temporal Fall of all humanity. Adam
was the first case of that which ails us all, therefore it is rhetorically proper (and only in
this sense) to “call and define by his name the shadow in which we all stand.”113 In the
historical Adam, “what was invisible becomes visible,” just as in the historical Christ and
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his resurrection. Both the old and the new man “proceed from the same invisible origin”
but they are flowing in opposite directions—one to death, the other to life.114
Karl Barth Considered
Like Kant then, but for very different reasons, the Fall for Barth is “timeless and
transcendental.”115 Our fallen state is not the result of an historical act, but “lies behind
time” and is “the unavoidable presupposition of all human history.”116 It cannot be
examined by any act of historical investigation. If it could, it would cease to be what it
was and be reduced to mere history.
So then the question arises, as it did for Kant, how does such a transcendental Fall
occur? But here, unlike Kant, Barth has a great deal to say about how this impossible
possibility obtains. It is wrapped up in the pre-temporal Divine Yes and No, God’s right
and left hands, and Barth’s treatment of Nothingness as rejected possibility, but,
grievously, space precludes such a discussion here.117
What is relevant here is that Barth supersedes Kant in two ways. First, he offers a
transcendent Geschichte that is epistemologically analogous to the nouminal with all the
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benefits of empirical inscrutability, but then he creates the possibility of its intersection
with the events of history.118 This is made possible because of the centrality of the
incarnation in Barth’s theology. God has become man in Jesus Christ. His resurrection is
the archetypal example of how the entire transcendent non-historical covenant historyGeschichte can be understood within the finite narratives represented in scripture. If God
can make it so in the saga of the last Adam’s resurrection, God can do it in the saga of the
first Adam’s Fall.
Further, Barth’s commitment to the exegetical framework of the existing text
provides strong interpretive controls that were the virtue of higher criticism. Whether one
agrees with Barth’s conclusions or not, he demonstrates a clear desire to take the text
seriously as it stands and within both its immediate context and the greater context of the
covenant of grace.
A third strength, now related to higher criticism, is his reluctance to make saga
simply a product of ancient superstition and un-enlightenment. Saga is both a legitimate
and necessary genre for communicating some things—particularly non-historical truths.
One cannot get around its use; it is unavoidable for certain kinds of content. To
demythologize a “kernel” out of it robs it of the very meaning the form is intended to
facilitate. This position serves to reanimate the biblical narrative and infuse it, not just
with a moral, but with a deep structural relevance rooted in its very language. In short, it
takes the form with the same seriousness as the content.
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Fourth, Barth takes the narrative form seriously as a form. Gunkel, Driver, and
other higher critics expressed an aesthetic appreciation of the myth’s beauty and terseness
of style, but believed this was incidental (or perhaps accidental)—like a medieval artist
accidently incorporating perspective into his painting. But Barth considered the
theological value of the literary form as part of its content. As Ford points out
(specifically in relation to the gospels),
He grasped better than most exegetes in recent centuries the significance of
realistic narrative form in the Bible. He then concentrated his reflection on this
feature, shared by novels and historical writings, and this raises a range of
complex issues which his critics must not bypass, such as the relation of fact to
fiction, the role of imagination in knowing, the status of realistic narrative as
religious language, the way in which works of literature cross the hermeneutical
gap, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.119
This highlights a final strength. Barth believed that the human imagination is a
vital theological faculty. While this is perhaps not absolutely unique to Barth, it is rare for
the modern context, which tended to focus more on the intellect or rational-sensitive
mind as the noetic center. That a saga can be formulated by means of an imaginative
exercise and be epistemologically valid seems a quite profitable thought, given the
assumptions of modernity.
This, however, highlights the biggest weakness in Barth insofar as this
dissertation is concerned—a weakness to Lewis’ thoughts will offer a solution. Barth
does not extend the work of the imagination to the reader of the saga, only to its original
crafter, and it is quite understandable that he does not, given his ubiquitous concerns
about natural theology. The imagination cannot be a “natural” or intrinsic human source
for theological truth in itself any more than the intellect without becoming idolatrous. It
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can presumably be a pathway of revelation, as with any area of our humanity, but it does
not function with theological validity outside of the moment of divine revelation.
Beyond the imagination, his concern over human epistemological adequacy casts
a cloud over the nature of the saga’s efficacy. How does it achieve its effect? Wherein
lies its power? Barth cannot provide an explanation as to the point of connection between
the saga and the human constitution. He can attribute it to faith and the work of the Spirit
in the moment of revelation, but from there its operations are mysterious. The Holy Spirit
uses the saga to act upon the human soul; the human constitution in itself and as such can
contribute nothing but pride and error.
Critiques of Barth’s phobia of natural theology are perennial and somewhat
dreary to recount. Suffice it to say that if one finds Barth’s absolute resistance to natural
theology compelling, then admittedly C. S. Lewis’ proposals will offer no help, because
no problem has been admitted. To the reader (and it seems there are many) who, despite
Barth’s compelling arguments, continue to believe that scripture teaches and human
experience affirms that some aspect of humanity (be it the Imago, sensus divinitatis,
presence of a rational mind, or similar) is capable in itself of contemplating the divine,
then C. S. Lewis will be able to improve on Barth’s designs.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to offer a brief introduction to the spirit of dialogue that
existed in the mid-twentieth century, along with a bit of its historical development. Its
goal has been to identify some of the issues and questions of the period that Lewis may
be conscripted to address. By way of conclusions, a few distillations may be performed to
make these issues apparent.
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The first trajectory, that of pre-modern interpretation within the Church, generally
rooted its diverse interpretations in the historical fact of Adam’s existence and his choice
to sin under temptation. The position becomes problematic with the rise of the modern
sciences which seem to offer overwhelming evidence that the terrestrial creation
possesses an history incompatible with such a story. To this must be added the objection
(as seen in Kant) that an historical Fall is rationally deficient to explain the systemic
problem of humanity in general. In addition the story itself seems to possess certain
literary features (myth, saga, or similar) that imply that an historical interpretation was
never warranted in the first place. Need the tradition be salvaged from these critiques?
The Kantian trajectory, reflected at seminal points in a modified form by
Niebuhr, employs the story to answer the perennial question of the basic human problem
as it is being represented or challenged in the existential moment. The result by both is
similar—a lifting of the story out of history into a transcendent realm or meaning, and
thus a great deal of immediately fruitful and practical reflection blossoms in the work of
both men. It does so, however, by making quite free with the textual history of
interpretation—or rather by mostly ignoring it. But what confidence can one have that
one has understood this text in particular by this method, and not simply reaffirmed one’s
preexisting biases and desires?
Higher criticism, on the other hand, tended to reverse the poles, pressing the
narrative downward into history as mere example of cultural-religious evolution. The
exegetical Gunkel and more theological Tennant expended great energy on establishing
original context, audiences, and backgrounds for the text. The story may be beautiful and
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possess insights into the history of religion, but is strictly (or at least methodologically) of
ancient human manufacture.
Bultmann is a hybrid of these two trajectories, reflecting higher criticism’s belief
that humanity now possesses a more enlightened existential framework than our
ancestors. Therefore the intention of the myth must be translated into a more credible
form, stripped of its outdated mythological accrual. In appropriating Heidegger’s
existentialism as his hermeneutic, however, he draws out of the text the meaning that is
most useful to modern man in a manner not dissimilar to the Kantian method. But can the
form be so easily disposed of as Bultmann believes? Is the form part, not only of the
myth’s beauty, but also its message?
Barth is a different sort of hybrid still. Barth acknowledges both the historical
setting of the original story and its meaning to the author-editor and its original audience
(where such can be determined). Yet the saga form is not superfluous, but intrinsic to its
meaning. Here he shares a strength with Niebuhr. Myth-Saga is a stable and irreducible
truth-facilitating form, a product of the highest productions of the human imagination, but
deeply true in that it makes accessible to the reader realities that are beyond human
historie. However, the imagination of the hearer in itself is not (and cannot) be a
contributor to its successful receipt. The saga must work its magic from without by
means of divine revelation or mediation, without a touchstone in the human heart as such.
Consequently, how does one explain the great power a saga-myth exerts on the hearer
without making Deus revelat simply a Deus ex machina?
The next chapter introduces C. S. Lewis as a literary historian with deep
theological interests, who stands in a unique position to address some of these questions.

CHAPTER 2
C. S. LEWIS ON HISTORY, SCIENCE, AND THE TRADITION
The previous chapters introduced a number of long-standing issues surrounding
the interpretation of the Genesis 3 Fall narrative. While inadequate in any final sense, the
survey does provide a feel for how the Fall narrative was being handled in the theological
world in the mid-twentieth century.
This chapter places C. S. Lewis into this theological context by addressing four
questions. First, what were Lewis’ views on the scientific questions that relate to the
Fall’s historicity—specifically, questions regarding the age of the earth and the origins of
the human species. Second and conversely, what are Lewis’ commitments to traditional
churchly interpretations? What sort of churchly obligations does he perceive himself to
be under? How “orthodox” does he desire to be at the end of the day? These first two
questions have been addressed by many others, who will be noted in their place, but the
answers form a kind of perimeter in which his perspectives must be understood.
Third, what is Lewis’ relationship to higher criticism? What did he think about the
theological developments of the mid-twentieth century? Lewis’ disagreements with many
of the dominant assumptions within his own field of medieval English literature
particularly at Oxford are well known.1 What comparable reservations did he have about
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“goings-on” in the theological world in general? And fourth, the question of Lewis’
embrace or rejection of the specific conclusions of higher criticism on this question—
does Genesis 3 consist of mythological literature? This chapter thus sets up chapters 4
and 5, wherein Lewis’ own ideas about Genesis 3 can be analyzed, as well as chapter 5,
where his work will be brought into dialogue with the theological discussion of the
period.
It will not be necessary to here develop a biography of Lewis as the thesis here at
work depends very little on whatever biographical origin his thoughts may have,2 not to
mention his life has been chronicled with such frequency as to nearly constitute a proof
of reincarnation.3
Question 1: Lewis, Science, History, and Origins
Lewis, Darwin, and Guided Evolution
On the question of origins and the events of history, Lewis generally found the
claims of modern science compelling. Lewis did not believe the Fall story or the creation
141-157; and with a comic tinge in his Cambridge inaugural address where he refers to Oxford as “that
Western darkness from which you have so lately bidden me emerge,” “De Descriptione Temporum,” in
They Asked for a Paper: Papers and Addresses (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962), 10.
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Inc., 1982), 45-48; “On Criticism,” in On Stories: And Other Essays on Literature (New York: Harcourt,
Inc., 1982), 127-142; and “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism,” in Christian Reflections, ed. Walter
Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1967), 159-163.
3

Of the innumerable biographical sketches that exist, some of the most significant projects are the
following: Roger Lancelyn Green and Walter Hooper, C. S. Lewis: A Biography (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1974); George Sayer, Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994);
A. N. Wilson, C. S. Lewis: A Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990); for a slightly more
fictionalized approach, William Griffin, Clive Staples Lewis: A Dramatic Life (San Francisco: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1986); finally, for a biography that effectively engages in an analysis of Lewis’ thought,
see Alan Jacobs, The Narnian: The Life and Imagination of C. S. Lewis (New York: Harper One, 2008).

62
narratives that precede it were anything like unaccomodated history. His most complete
treatment of the topic comes early in his career in his first foray into apologetics, The
Problem of Pain, published in 1940.4 In this well-known passage, he draws a distinction
between the text as we have it—“a story (full of the deepest suggestion) about a magic
apple of knowledge”—with its subsequent theological doctrine and the results of modern
science.5 His interpretation of the story and its doctrine will be discussed in chapter 4. Of
interest here is what Lewis believed the sciences could confirm and deny.
Of course, neither he nor modern science could confidently assert the nature of
the actual historical events, but he offers what he calls “a ‘myth’ in the Socratic sense, a
not unlikely tale.”6 Lewis clarifies in a crucial footnote that he does not mean here by
“myth” what is meant by Reinhold Niebuhr—“a symbolical representation of nonhistorical truth,” but rather “an account of what may have been the historical fact.” What
Lewis then suggests in this place would be closer to what was called in the last chapter
the historie—the actual events as they occur within time-space—rather than their
ultimate significance (Geschichte), which will be handled later.7
Lewis’ use of the term “myth” in this way is sui generis in his corpus. He means
something different here than he will at nearly any other time.8 In his final presentation of
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this proposal in Reflections on the Psalms, Lewis gives a form of the same possible
history but does not here call is a “myth.”9 By 1958, Lewis had done a great deal of work
on myth (some of it right in Reflections on the Psalms). Perhaps working in the context of
myth-proper, he dared not use the label for this tutelary story because of its muddling
effect.
Lewis’ idea represents a form of theistic or guided evolution, or more precisely a
synthesis of theistic evolution and a special divine creative act. Aristotle defined Man as
a “rational animal;” Lewis would have agreed, but tweaked it to something like “an
animal that God miraculously made rational.” He proposes that “for long centuries God
perfected the animal form which was to become the vehicle of humanity and the image of
himself.”10 The creature may have existed for ages in this state of rude animality. He
continues, “Then, in the fullness of time, God caused to descend upon this organism, both
on its psychology and physiology, a new kind of consciousness which could say ‘I’ and
‘me,’ which could look upon itself as an object, which knew God, which could make
judgements of truth, beauty, and goodness, and which was so far above time that it could
perceive time flowing past.11
The whole creature was thus “flooded” by this new consciousness. This new Man
ruled his organism completely, down to its passions and relations with animals. He would
have seemed “savage” technologically, and would have appeared to us “naked, shaggy-
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bearded, slow-spoken,”12 but if you were holy enough not to dismiss him out of hand, at
your second consideration, you would fall at his feet recognizing him to be holier than
thou.13 Reflecting on Milton’s presentation of the royal priestly Adam in A Preface to
Paradise Lost. Lewis remarks that at such a meeting, “it is we who would have been the
stammering boys, shifting uneasily from one foot to the other, red in the face, and hoping
that our clownishness would be excused by our ignorance.”14 Here was truly the
unmarred Imago Dei. He or them (for God may have endowed many such creatures) may
have endured that way for a long time before the event of the Fall. In a letter to Sister
Penelope dated January 10, 1952, he sums up his proposal with more poetic flair.
Oddly enough, I, like you, had pictured Adam as being, physically, the son of two
anthropoids, on whom, after birth, God worked the miracle which made him Man:
said, in fact, ‘Come out—and forget thine own people and thy father’s house.’
The Call of Abraham wd be a far smaller instance of the same sort of thing, and
regeneration in each one of us wd be an instance too, tho' not a smaller one. That
all seems to me to fit in both historically and spiritually.15
Lewis follows up this Socratic story with how the Fall might have occurred in
such a situation, which will be considered in chapter 4. The point here is that Lewis did
not find the claims of Darwinian macro-evolution necessarily at odds with Christianity.
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Lewis, Guided Evolution, and the Scholarship.
Given the above, a rather odd hesitation exists in a surprising number of otherwise
excellent scholars to acknowledge Lewis’ relation to evolutionary theory and human
origins. Note the following examples. First, Cunningham says, “Yet in the broader
statement of his faith he seems to incorporate evolutionary theory into his thinking.”16
Similarly Vaus claims that his views of science “left open the possibility for Lewis of
accepting certain aspects of evolution into his theology, thus making Lewis a theistic
evolutionist.”17 Likewise Willis, “He [Lewis] seems to leave the door open for the
possibility that there were several such primordial figures who fell at the same time by an
act or series of acts resulting in disobedience.”18 Each of these statements is made in the
face of the same primary data outlined here.
This hesitation, however, seems unwarranted based on Lewis’ own statements. In
the early Problem of Pain he says, “If by saying that man rose from brutality you mean
simply that man is physically descended from animals, I have no objection.”19 In the late
Reflections on the Psalms the same affirmation and hesitation are suggested, “On the
ordinary biological view (what difficulties I have about evolution are not religious) one
of the primates is changed so that he becomes man; but he remains still a primate and an
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animal. He is taken up into a new life without relinquishing the old.”20 Further, the
personal letter that Purtill published in 1981 further nuances the point,
I accept the story of the Fall, and I don’t see what the findings of the scientists can
say either for or against it. You can’t see for looking at skulls and flint
implements whether Man fell or not. But the question of the Fall seems to me
quite independent of the question of evolution. I don’t mind whether God made
Man out of earth or whether ‘earth’ merely means ‘previous material of some
sort.’ If the deposits make it probable that man’s physical ancestors ‘evolved,’ no
matter. It leaves the essence of the Fall itself intact. Don’t let us confuse physical
development with spiritual.21
In addition, several writers who might be described as possessing a more
fundamentalist hermeneutic, such as Boss, Wheeler, and Watson, easily recognize and
quickly criticize Lewis for not producing a more traditional and historical interpretation
of early Genesis (Edgar Boss as early as 1953).22 Presumably Lewis’ commitments
would have been equally obvious to the more sympathetic Cunningham and Willis. Why
then hedge on it? The explanation may be no more than a desire to preserve Lewis’
orthodox standing against accusations from such as Wheeler. Such a motivation would be
understandable, if methodologically suspicious.
An honest attempt at critique can be found in David Watson. He critiques outright
Lewis’ defense of developmental origins of hominid life as being inconsistent (with
overtones of incoherence). Watson discusses Lewis’ assertions in a two-part serial
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published in 1943.23 In these articles, Lewis attempts to mediate the tensions between
historical creedal affirmations and modernist beliefs about the nature of the universe.
Lewis’ germane assertion is that whenever a true advance in knowledge occurs, some
aspects of old belief change and some remain. “New bottles for new wine, by all means:
but not new palates, throats and stomachs, or it would not be, for us, ‘wine’ at all.”24
Lewis believes the unchanging categories might consist of such things as (1) the simple
rules of mathematics, (2) the primary principles of morality, and (3) the fundamental
doctrines of Christianity.
He then offers several examples of this principle, two of which serve for Watson’s
critique. First, the affirmation of Christ’s resurrection would be understood differently by
an African tribesman and a medical specialist from Harley Street (a London street noted
for its large number of private medical specialists). To the tribesman it is a blunt fact—a
dead man got up and walked. The doctor (that is, one who believed it) would agree, but
would add a great deal more regarding biochemical and physical processes working in
reverse. The knowledge of the doctor is truly an advancement over that of the tribesman,
but what is common is that both know they have seen a miracle. Or if they both
disbelieve it, the only difference would be the doctor’s far more detailed explanation for
why it could not happen.
Second (and to the point here), when Genesis says “God made man in his own
image,” the ancient author may have envisioned a “vaguely corporeal God making man
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as a child makes a figure out of plasticine.”25 A modern Christian philosopher would
imagine an immensely long process lasting from the first creation to humanity’s readiness
to receive spiritual life—that is guided evolution. The rejected idea is the same—“that
matter by some blind power inherent in itself has produced spirituality.”
Watson critiques Lewis, arguing that the second illustration does not show the
same thing as the first. In the first case two persons both believe in an instantaneous
miracle—a resurrection. The difference is only the amount of detail in which they can
discuss it. In the second, only the first believes a miracle has occurred; the philosopher
rather believes in a process “going on before our eyes according to a fixed natural ‘law’
of evolution.”26 As such it is not supernatural, but merely natural. This observation then
in the hands of Watson’s hermeneutic becomes evidence that Lewis has failed to embrace
the biblical intention. The evolutionary position has not the same basic content to Watson
as a special immediate act of creation. Thus as predicted above, Lewis’ orthodoxy
becomes suspect.
Watson’s critique of Lewis, however, only obtains if he has read him correctly. If
Lewis were comparing instantaneous creation with blind evolutionary “laws,” Watson’s
critique would be sound. But Lewis is not doing this. Lewis’ proverbial philosopher
rejects blind development according to absolutely fixed laws with the same vigor as the
biblical author. As with everywhere else in Lewis’ corpus this is a guided evolution—and
the distinction is not a minor one. The Creator God superintends the process to produce
the desired creature with the required spiritual capacity, followed by a supernatural (i.e.,
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miraculous) endowment to establish it as homo sapiens sapiens. Thus in fairness to
Lewis, both his biblical author and his philosopher do believe in the miraculous—a God
who creates humanity. The difference is in the accompanying mental picture—immediate
miraculous act or long period of guided development with miracle as the final climax.
One additional and recent work also needs to be addressed. G. C. Holt’s 2009
dissertation on Lewis’ anthropology from his letters is an important work for its focus on
an under-examined area of Lewis’ thought.27 Holt’s primary reason for working from his
correspondence is that he believes they can serve an important falsifying function
regarding his authorial intent. Stated differently, they can show in some cases what Lewis
did not believe, and thereby bracket away misreadings of his published work. That Holt
works primarily from Lewis’ correspondence is a great virtue, given the lack of attention
his letters generally receive. This same self-imposed limitation, however, becomes the
dissertation’s greatest flaw. The myopia generated by Lewis’ correspondence sans his
publications is certainly greater than the opposite one. Correspondence is by definition
more occasional and less precise, and further consists of only half of the context (that is,
the recipient’s letters are seldom available).
Oddly, Holt critiques Boss and White for claiming Lewis was a theistic
evolutionist, on the argument that Lewis was not against science, but only against
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scientism as expressed in evolution.28 Holt’s argument that Lewis did not embrace a
theistic evolution is grounded on the absence of such an affirmation in his letters. At best,
he argues, the letters (particularly the Acworth letters) show a hesitant unwillingness to
commit himself.29 He then proceeds to assert a philosophical progression in Lewis’
thought between the publication of Perelandra (1943) and Magician’s Nephew (1955)
toward a special creationism, as seen in the Narnian cosmology.30 His conclusion,
In Lewis’s thought there is a progression over time concerning the question of
human origins, that is amply demonstrated in his correspondence. He came to
realize that for evolution to be true, God must have made an evil world (the latter
is nefas credere). He arrived at an understanding that if humans are simply a
product of random chance, then humans have no value, and that the internal moral
compass within humanity tells that this is not true and therefore must not be
believed.31
The problems with this conclusion are legion. First, to claim that Lewis rejected
human development from pre-human hominids from his letters alone demonstrates a
staggering methodological flaw, constituting (at best) an argument from silence. Holt’s
focus on Lewis’ letters is worthy, but to draw from it a final conclusion regarding Lewis’
thoughts is unacceptable and myopic. Holt does not interact anywhere with the definitive
material in Problem of Pain or Reflections on the Psalms, or even remarkably Lewis’
letter to Sister Penelope of January 1952, cited earlier.
Second, the philosophical change Holt posits between Perelandra and Magician’s
Nephew simply on the basis of the narrative presentation is equally flawed. Disregarding
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the specious nature of arguing directly from fiction to the author’s true belief, what
alternative to a special creation did Lewis have in a story such as Magician’s Nephew ?
How could he have represented a billion-year development of a world (if he had wanted
to) and still accomplished the vital narrative point of having Digory witness it? Narnia
requires a special creation because of the constraints of the plot. If Lewis had no
narrative alternative, then its significance is underdetermined. Likewise, that Perelandra
is more sympathetic to evolutionary biology is not above being challenged (consider the
discussion of Schwartz’s thesis to follow).
Third, throughout the dissertation Holt is too quick to assert growth, change, and
alteration in Lewis’ perspective without considering mediating alternatives. Nine times in
chapter 2 alone he posits fundamental shifts or developments in Lewis’ thoughts.32 But
might not all this “change” be equally credited to the occasional and casual nature of the
genre—the letter—wherein one often speaks colloquially, imprecisely, and flippantly? In
his letter to Arthur Greeves of January 8, 1931, Lewis seems to think so, saying, “I quite
agree with what you say about letters being haphazard and informal—in their choice of
subject. Things ought to come up just as they do in conversation.”33
Finally, even the basic shift that Holt posits—away from guided evolution toward
special creation—does not seem supportable from Lewis published work here shown.
Thus no change in Lewis’ thought exists to require explanation.34
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In the end Holt has simply not earned the right to draw the conclusions he makes.
He does not use Lewis’ correspondence as his thesis asserts he will—as a means of
falsifying claims about Lewis’ original intentions in his published work. He rather uses
the correspondence to construct Lewis’ original intentions without interacting with the
published works at all.
Lewis, Wells, and Scientism
Lewis says the problems he did have with macro-evolution were not religious in
nature, nor even scientific.35 While Lewis has been accused of having a negative view of
science,36 he repeatedly clarified that his disagreements were not with the scientific
method or any reasonable application of it, but rather the tendency to elevate science (as
popularity understood by the non-scientist) to categories comparable to religion,
complete with a metanarrative of progress—that is, what may be called, “scientism” or
even “Wellsianity.”37 His concern is akin to what is sometimes seen in the work of
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“historicists” (rather than historians), who, “by use of their natural powers, discover an
inner meaning in the historical process.”38 As might be expected, he does express concern
over the effects of such movements on the practical sciences. For example, seeing the
mess we have made of our own planet and culture, his opinion of human space travel and
colonization was low.39 While Gary Ferngren and Ronald Numbers have suggested from
Lewis’ letters to Captain Bernard Acworth between 1944-1960 that Lewis’ sympathies
for macro-evolution became more troubled as he grew older,40 his concerns even here
were not about what science could legitimately demonstrate but rather with “the fanatical
and twisted attitudes of its defenders.”41 Lewis saw in his lifetime the rise of a more
“popular Evolutionism” that was committed, not just to biological “change,” but to
universal “improvement.”42 The distinction between Lewis’ respect for well-drawn
scientific conclusions and his rejection of pseudo-science elevated to the level of
religious fervor can be seen neatly in a 1951 essay:
Permanent Things, ed. Andrew A. Tadie and Michael H. Macdonald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing,
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To this deep-seated objection I can only reply that, in my opinion, the modern
conception of Progress or Evolution (as popularly imagined) is simply a myth,
supported by no evidence whatever. I say ‘evolution, as popularly imagined.’ I am
not in the least concerned to refute Darwinism as a theorem in Biology. There
may be flaws in that theorem, but I have here nothing to do with them…For the
purposes of this article I am assuming that Darwinian biology is correct. What I
want to point out is the illegitimate transition from the Darwinian theorem in
biology to the modern myth of evolutionism or developmentalism or progress in
general.43
Elsewhere he calls such “Wellsianity” merely an “optical illusion” that comes
from too closely attending to only half of nature—the owl’s emergence from the egg and
the oak from the acorn—forgetting that the egg was produced from a full grown owl and
the acorn by a mature oak.44 Lewis himself embraced something like this view prior to
his conversion to Christianity, but “on these grounds and others like them one is driven to
think that whatever else may be true, the popular scientific cosmology at any rate is
certainly not.”45
But even in his disagreement he maintains a professional disinterest, saying
without jest that, as a myth, “It [the myth of inevitable progress] is one of the most
moving and satisfying world dramas which have ever been imagined…neither the Greeks
nor the Norsemen ever invented a better story.”46 It begins with nothing, features a
struggling hero, who continues to advance by millionth chances against the forces of
chaos, rises by its own bootstraps to sound its barbaric Yop!, only to finally be
overwhelmed again by the power of chaos in the slow cold death of the universe. As
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myth proper he finds it more imaginatively satisfying—more absolute and tragic in its
literary form—than Christianity itself.47
Conclusion
In answer to the first question, then, Lewis is not adverse to conclusions of
science, even if they stand in apparent contradiction to a received interpretation of a
biblical event, so long as the scientific conclusions are well-founded and free of the
rhetorical posturing that accompanies modern developmentalism. Specifically related to
the early Genesis narratives, Lewis believes that science has indeed offered a compelling
case for species macro-development and an old earth, but does not believe that this
necessarily and in all forms compromises Christianity or the veracity of its scriptures.
Lewis, Bergson, and the Élan Vital
While Lewis’ relation to evolution seems relatively clear, Sanford Schwartz has
offered an insightful thesis proposing a more nuanced relationship.48 As his proposal runs
counter to the interpretation of Lewis presented here, he demands analysis at some
length.
Schwartz’s Thesis
Schwartz asserts that the Perelandra volume of the Space Trilogy has historically
been interpreted as a war between religious and naturalistic points of view, and that,
therein “Lewis seems to present an impassable conflict between Christianity and post-
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Darwinian tendencies of modern thought” [569]. Yet, Schwartz believes that a third and
more pivotal perspective is in the mix—an “in-between” position—that was deeply
influential on Lewis. Although he was critical of it as a total system, it was the dominant
force behind the construction of the Perelandrian world and story—that force was Henri
Bergson’s Creative Evolution [569f.].
By way of summary, Bergson’s vitalism stood over against mechanistic
interpretations of the world in the biological sciences, as well as against philosophical
positivism’s attenuation of the human mental life, both of which dominated the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries [571].49 In its place Lebensphilosophie (of
which, Bergson is an heir) emphasized the power of “Life”—the dynamic and underlying
force behind all nature—occupying a middle ground between naturalism and spiritualism.
He says, “In defiance of a tradition that privileged Being over Becoming, unity over
multiplicity, and essence over existence, vitalists celebrated the creative and multiform
power of ‘life’ that spontaneously gives rise to new forms of expressions and ceaselessly
strives to overcome the obstacles that impede its realization” [572].
Bergson built his early career critiquing logical positivism for its unwarranted
application of mechanistic methodologies from the physical sciences to the realms of the
human mind and was widely credited (by his publicist, at least) with “dispelling ‘the
nightmare of determinism’” [574]. In his most relevant and celebrated text, Creative
Evolution, he reinvented Darwinism away from its rationalistic and mechanistic
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structures. He posited “the existence of a creative spiritual impetus, the élan vital, that
spontaneously produces novel forms of life and thereby raises creation to new and
previously unpredictable levels of development” [574]. The bridge between religious and
naturalistic views of the world was thus built. In further conversation, particularly with
Roman Catholic intellectuals, the possibility of equating this force to the Christian God
was seen, further establishing its utility for theological consideration.
Whether or not Schwartz has correctly presented Bergson’s ideas does not change
the particular critiques presented below. The question herein is related, not to the
definition of emergent evolution, but to Lewis’ appropriation of it however it is
understood. As such, Schwartz’s understanding of emergent evolution is granted.
Schwartz believes that “most interpreters” have embraced an oversimplified thesis
of what Lewis was doing in Perelandra—that Lewis was against Emergent Evolution and
used Perelandra to critique it. Against this, Schwartz says, “Given these clearly defined
battle lines, it is surprising to find that some of the most distinctive features of
Perelandra’s new Eden are derived from the same ‘biological philosophy’ espoused by
the enemy. In a dramatic departure from traditional views of the earthly paradise, Lewis
presents the prelapsarian order as a state of continuous flux and dynamic development”
[569]. He further argues that this prelapsarian order stands in great contrast to the
traditional view of the “static” garden state. Lewis makes the whole virgin world more
dynamic and fluid (literally) in a way that more closely resembles the vitalism of Bergson
than it does the “immutable condition” of traditional interpretations of Paradise.
He admits at the outset that “it seems strange, if not contradictory” that Lewis
should employ the very approach he is critiquing, but offers that this tension can be
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lessened by realizing that Lewis was at the time of Perelandra’s composition also writing
his Preface to Paradise Lost. Therein, Lewis rejects the standard Romantic understanding
of Satan as “exalted tragic hero” for the sake of an Augustinian privatory interpretation of
Satan as “…a parody of the God against whom he has rebelled…[becoming] a warped
imitation of his Creator” [570]. Thus Schwartz argues that a similar motif might “account
for the otherwise baffling situation in Perelandra.”
Lewis then is constructing an original emergent world—“a Christian vision of
Becoming”—while negating the naturalistic philosophical implication of Bergson’s
model. Lewis, like Bergson, represents a view that is “in-between” the religious and the
materialist, only Lewis’ view is a Christian one.
His view is supported by evidence such as Lewis’ early fascination with Bergson
and his lifelong appreciation of Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity.50 Schwartz offers a
long synopsis of the book with commentary, identifying aspects of the book that have
their analogue in Bergson’s thought. The dominant thread consists of the general
resistance to a mechanized understanding of linear time—the narrator’s impulse to retreat
in the beginning, Ransom’s momentary desire to recapture a pleasurable experience (“the
urge to immobilize the flux”), Un-Man’s offer of “what might be” rather than “what is,”
the Lady’s need to learn of past-present-future rather than accepting the flux, and the fact
that the furry Martian creatures will not come again. Even the very terrain—the flux of
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the land masses and the prohibition of the “fixed land”—underscores Lewis’ desire to
invest this world with the sort of dynamism characteristic of Emergent Evolution.
But what of the introduction of Weston, who seems a pejorative parrot of Bergson
himself? This is the point of difference, says Schwartz. The creative evolution outlined
by the antagonist Weston represents a “dangerous distortion of the divinely ordained and
beneficent temporal dynamism with which he invests his imaginary paradise” [571].
Further he says, “To be sure, Weston’s doctrine bears only a rough resemblance to the
sophisticated views of Bergson, Alexander, and Morgan…Nevertheless, Lewis employs
Weston’s self-serving vulgarization to bring to light the dangerous assumptions behind
‘biological philosophy’…In Weston’s hands it degenerates into little more than an excuse
to pursue the ‘fixed idea’ of interplanetary conquest” [583].
Thus, while acknowledging how often Lewis criticizes Bergson, Schwartz
suggests that Perelandra represents Lewis’ attempt to construct his own version of
creative evolution by endowing his imaginary world with “a principle of dynamic change
in which even the evolutionary lapses, including the spiritual catastrophe that has
overtaken our fallen planet, are transfigured into something new and more marvelous by
the redeeming act of God” [577].
His conclusion then is that “we may begin to look at Lewis’s novel less as an
irreconcilable struggle between on old-fashioned Christian humanism and a newfangled
heresy than as the effort of a modern Christian intellectual to sustain and enrich the
former through critical engagement with the latter” [571].
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Schwartz’s Thesis Considered
Schwartz offers an insightful and helpful analysis of the unique role of flux and
dynamism in Lewis’ Perelandra. For this he is to be credited.51 As to the general thesis,
however—that Lewis owes Bergson’s Creative Evolution the primary debt for such a
device—Schwartz has some challenges to overcome at the level of his basic thesis.52
Lewis is said to be attempting to overcome a weakness in the “tradition.” To what
does “tradition” refer, however? Note the relationship between the following assertions.
First, at the outset Schwartz clearly has the tradition of churchly interpretation of early
Genesis in view. “Traditional views of the earthly paradise” can have no other referent.
But, second, the entirety of his discussion of emergent evolution emphasizes its
innovations over against a “tradition,” here understood as modern mechanistic
naturalism. Third, Bergson and Lewis are both supposed to assume a position “inbetween” spiritualism and naturalism. Only two possible arrangements for these three
ideas seem possible, and Schwartz attempts both in this article.
In the first arrangement, he claims that the two opposing forces consist of
churchly spiritualism and modern scientific naturalism [572]. This is what the elan-vital
is supposed to stand between—“simultaneously spiritualizing biology and naturalizing
the spiritual” [575]. But he cannot mean this, for his entire reason for faulting the
churchly tradition in the introduction was that it lacked “continuous flux and dynamic
development, that is, the “static” nature of churchly interpretative tradition is what Lewis
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attempts to improve. But was it not naturalist biology that was supposed to feature the
fault of being mechanistic and lacking dynamism? Was not this what the “spiritual” side
was supposed to contribute to the “in-between” position? It seems instead (the second
alternative arrangement) that both the “spiritual” and the “biological” exhibit the same
flaw—a lack of flux and dynamic development.
The introduction actually presents this second alternative—that churchly
interpretation and scientific naturalism are on the side of “static” mechanistic reduction.
But then what is the referent for the “spiritual” side? Consequently how can there be an
“in-between” position? There does not seem to be any way of coherently using both
typologies at the same time.
The greater problem, however, is that neither alternative seems to fit the evidence.
Taking the second alternative first, the claim that the pre-Enlightenment history of
churchly interpretation saw the paradisal state as lacking “continuous flux and dynamic
development,”—that it had an “immutable condition”—is simply an unverifiable claim.
He cites no church fathers, medieval doctors, or reformers as evidence. It can only be
asserted as an a priori assumption to create the desired tension, which is exactly how
Schwartz uses it. Presumably, the reader is expected to draw on a vague imaginative
picture of Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther as rather stubborn intractable fellows, too
dependent on something like Aristotle’s unmoved mover to understand the vitality of the
living world—locked, hide-bound, and out of touch. If the reader actually shares that
imaginative picture of history (and many highly-educated persons do), Schwartz’s
assumption can work.
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This would be a difficult commitment, however, for anyone who has actually
encountered the tradition’s use of the Paradisal narratives. One need only go back to
chapter 1 of this dissertation to gain a sense of how rich and dynamic was the church
fathers’, medieval doctors’, and reformers’ understanding of the paradisal state, both in
terms of Adam’s existential condition and opportunities as well as its interpretive
fecundity. The space required to demonstrate the vitality of the church’s image of
paradise would be prohibitive; the effort required to do so would not.53
The first alternative, however, undermines Schwartz’s thesis as well, but now
from the other direction. If in fact, the churchly tradition is to be equated with the
“spiritual” side of the “in-between” position, then how is Perelandra an expression of the
“in-between” and not simply an expression of the “spiritual?” Put differently, why does
Schwartz feel pressed to find another source for the vitality of Perelandra beyond the one
Lewis is already dependent upon? If nothing else, the long-standing Veni, Creator
Spiritus liturgical tradition, with its affirmation of the ever-present work of the divine
Spirit in the world, offers all the same imaginative richness as the élan-vital, but with the
benefit of already being Christian. Why might this not be an equally reasonable source
for Lewis’ ideas? Why would he need to christen Bergson when such an imaginatively
rich tradition already exists within Lewis’ own Anglicanism? Even Schwartz’s proposed
solution to the “strange, if not contradictory” idea involves the irony of Lewis’
cotemporary work on Milton, a literary member of the pre-Enlightenment interpretive
tradition. Would the Preface to Paradise Lost not equally stand as a piece of evidence
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that Lewis is already hip-deep in the voice of the traditional church and well aware of its
narrative possibilities at the time of Perelandra’s composition?
From another direction (and 20 years earlier), Robert Smith asserts that the origin
of the Perelandrian vision is “the tradition of the birth of Venus from the foamy sea.”54
The Green Lady, a virtual Venus rising from the swelling sea, overthrows the
protagonist’s conceptions of love and gender—very nearly the narrative expression of
Lewis’ own arguments in Allegory of Love and prescient of his use of it in The Four
Loves, 20 years later. No surprise should be felt at this, particularly given Lewis’ belief
that pagan myths often functioned as a preparatio evangelica.55 The point then is that at
least two alternatives to Bergson exist for the Perelandrian landscapes, neither of which
require the sleeping-with-the-enemy aspect of Schwartz’s thesis.
This then draws out the greatest difficulty in Schwartz’s proposal—that Lewis’
actual use of the élan-vital metaphysic through his corpus is almost universally
pejorative. While Schwartz is correct that Lewis read Bergson and Alexander with
benefit in his pre-conversion days, the attraction was qualified and seems to have soured
dramatically as he aged. In Alexander’s case, no one can dispute the profundity of affect
his distinction between “contemplation” and “enjoyment” had on Lewis. It became a
centerpiece of his thought and shall be presented in all its glory in chapter 3. But what
relationship may exist between this idea and emergent evolution Schwartz does not
identify. Schwartz seems to argue that since Lewis was entranced by one thing Alexander
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said, he must have been equally enamored of something else Alexander said on an
entirely different topic. The flaw is obvious.
Regarding Bergson, Lewis is not even this complimentary.56 In Mere Christianity,
Lewis does lay out Emergent Evolution (and Bergson by name) as a view “in-between”
the Materialist and the Religious.57 But it would be shabby and very nearly mean to cite
this as the source of Schwartz’s idea, as not a whisper of a question exists as to where
Lewis stands—he is clearly and wholly on the Religious side. To Lewis, Emergent
Evolution is “in-between” in the most untenable and unattractive sense in that it “gives
one much of the emotional comfort of believing in God and none of the less pleasant
consequences,” like morality, responsibility, and guilt. The Life-Force is “a sort of tame
God. You can switch it on when you want, but it will not bother you.” This is hardly the
sort of perspective one would expect Lewis to try to redeem, especially as the radio
lectures that became Mere Christianity were being given at the same time Lewis was
completing Perelandra.
By way of an unsystematic rummaging through Lewis’ corpus, the following
examples can be added. Writing to Acworth in 1960, Lewis critiqued de Chardin’s The
Phenomenon of Man, calling it “evolution run mad.”58 He accused de Chardin of
“repeating Bergson (without the eloquence) and Shaw (without the wit),” and ending up
with something like Pantheism. He then applauded the Jesuits for forbidding him to write
on the subject any more. In Miracles, Pantheism is exactly what he calls “worship of the
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life-force.”59 This is a claim he originally made a few years prior in an essay, calling
Bergson a “more modern form” of the old nature religions, which by itself might be
either a complement or an insult, but then he adds of Bergson, “but he repented, and died
a Christian.”60 Apparently Lewis thought Bergson’s ideas were (tongue-in-cheek aside)
incompatible with Christian salvation. Elsewhere Lewis argues that the creative
evolutionists, as opposed to Christians, were the ones who ought to look at the giant
universe with fear, for the “Bergsonian” is only pretending—“as though by concentrating
on the possibly upward trend in a single planet he could make himself forget the
inevitable downward trend in the universe as a whole, the trend to low temperatures and
irrevocable disorganization.”61 At the very close of his life, he still places the more
“highly poetical philosopher” Bergson in the slightly pejorative category of poets rather
than scientists in transmitting to the masses the dominant metaphysical myth of the day.62
Later in the same work, he makes the Pantheistic connection, placing Bergson directly in
the trajectory of Schelling, Keats, Wagner, Goethe, and Herder and others all the way
back to Robinet, not as an “in-between” position, but as merely a continuation of a
movement that existed before Darwin and that prepared the way for his embrace when he
arrived.63 Finally to Bergson’s own notions of the relationship of “life” to “Life” as “the

59

Miracles, 83, 119.

60

C. S. Lewis, “The Grand Miracle,” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed.
Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1970), 86. Lewis makes another oblique reference to
Bergson’s conversion in “Revival or Decay?,” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed.
Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1970), 250.
61

“Dogma,” 44.

62

Discarded Image, 17.

63

Discarded Image, 220f.

86
residuum of the vital operation to the operation itself,” Lewis answers, “This is very well
if Life is a thing, a ‘force’, or a daemon. But none of the metaphors will work if it is an
abstract universal. Triangles are not related to Triangularity as parts to a whole, or
content to container, or residuum to operation.”64
Schwartz is correct to underline the appreciation Lewis had for Bergson as a
youth, and the early date of Perelandra (1943) does stand as an argument in favor of his
thesis. If Lewis were enamored with Bergson in his youth, one would certainly expect the
influence to be strongest at that stage. Yet nowhere in Lewis’ later writings does he
affirm any such literary dependency;65 rather, we meet at best a cool antipathy toward
Bergsonian evolution and at least as often outright antagonism.
All this leaves one with the overwhelming sense that if Schwartz’s solution is
correct, it is a wearying one at best. Ockham might well raise an eyebrow at such
needlessly complicated connections when such simple and sensible explanations stand
immediately before us—that in Perelandra, Lewis is either rehearsing certain wellestablished themes already present within the churchly interpretive imagination against
the popular pseudo-science of developmental evolution or expressing an epic story drawn
from Pagan mythology along the lines of what he would later do in Till We Have Faces.
This generates a final thought, regarding what Schwartz calls the dominant
interpretation of the Space Trilogy—that of “an impassable conflict between Christianity
and post-Darwinian tendencies of modern thought.” If the implication is that since Lewis
was for Christianity, he was thus against Darwin, Schwartz is correct in calling this idea
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reductionistic. The previous section showed that he did not see them as incompatible. In
fact the only time evolution clearly did trouble him was when it took exactly the step
from science to “Wellsianity” that Schwartz now says Lewis sought to mimic.
To the point, however, Schwartz’s thesis begins with a reaction against an
inferred body of secondary literature that pits Lewis against Darwin. But as has been
shown the best Lewis scholars do not argue for such a mono-dimensional read of Lewis.
Neither does Schwartz name a single scholar guilty of this error. In short, Schwartz,
having assumed into existence a tension within Lewis (or at least within his scholarship),
articulates a creative and complicated resolution to it. But surely a solution can only be as
vital as the original problem it was contrived to solve.
Question 2: Lewis the Churchman
To what degree did Lewis perceive himself as under the authority of the Anglican
church? Stated differently, how thoroughly did he believe his theological thought needed
to coincide with the historical and interpretive voice of the church? This matters because
if Lewis feels no such obligation, nothing is gained by looking for it. Any “orthodoxy” he
possesses is incidental and accidental. If, however, he deeply desires to reflect “the
tradition” then novelty may in fact be an unintended product of ignorance.
The answer is actually rather straightforward. Lewis indicates his desire to stand
within the general historical trajectories of the church, to avoid theological or
ecclesiastical novelty, and to articulate the contents of the Christian faith that is
“…professed by all baptized and communicating Christian.”66 On several occasions
Lewis expresses a willful conforming to a perceived ecclesiastical authority on subjects
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that, if left to himself, he would have chosen to stand elsewhere. Twice in Problem of
Pain he makes such claims. First, as already mentioned, in relation to the story of the
Fall, he defers his preference for “the story of the magic apple” for the sake of the
Church’s established doctrine of sin. He does this on the grounds that “I assume that the
Holy Spirit would not have allowed the latter to grow up in the Church and win the assent
of great doctors unless it was true and useful as far as it went.”67 Second, on the existence
of hell as a place of everlasting retributive punishment, he says, “There is no doctrine
which I would more willingly remove from Christianity than this, if it lay in my power,”
and “I would pay any price to be able to say truthfully ‘All will be saved.’”68 Yet he
cannot, both on the grounds that reason demands such final justice and that scripture
expressly teaches it and Christendom expressly confesses it. The very attempt to define
the word “Christian” in Mere Christianity has the force of something like, “If you are
going to call yourself one, then conform to the meaning of the word.”69 He even
deprecates, through the mouth of Screwtape, those who take to themselves the role of
clergy but refuse to conform themselves to the rule of faith.70
This attitude of submission to a pre-existing authority is not one Lewis reserved
for his religion. It was a feature of his academic profession, his own literary work, and
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even his relationships. In relation to his work as a medieval scholar he declares in his
inaugural address for his Cambridge chair, “It is my settled conviction that in order to
read Old Western literature aright you must suspend most of the responses and unlearn
most of the habits you have acquired in reading modern literature.”71 He means here that
to read the classics aright, one must submit oneself to the assumptions of the world in
which they were written and not presume the modern position of intellectual superiority.
Describing the imaginative process of how he came to write the Narniad, he says,
Then came the Form. As these images sorted themselves into events (i.e., became
a story) they seemed to demand no love interest and no close psychology. But the
Form that excludes these things is the fairy tale. And the moment I thought of that
I fell in love with the Form itself: its brevity, its severe restraints on description,
its flexible traditionalism, its inflexible hostility to all analysis, digression,
reflections and ‘gas’. I was now enamoured of it. Its very limitations of
vocabulary became its attraction; as the hardness of the stone pleases the sculptor
or the difficulty of the sonnet delights the sonneteer.72
He applies the same logic (although a bit more problematic in result) to his view
of marriage, both as a young single man73 and a few months before he became a
widower74— the difference between them being not the content, but only the sensitivity
with which the topic is approached. Lewis believed in a hierarchical Form of marriage. It
is that to which the man and woman must submit to have the sort of marriage Lewis
believes proper.75 The very thesis of The Four Loves is that various sorts of love (from
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affection to friendship and so on) have a Form that make them what they are and can only
be fully enjoyed in the embrace of the limitations of the Form. What is more, Lewis’
entire moral code reflects the necessity of submission to an external reality—that of the
Tao.76 Its demands are rationally apprehended and an act of submission is required if one
wishes to act morally.
Finally and in the light of the Tao, even the very internal dispositions of one’s
humanity are in need of reorganizing according to a series of “stock responses,” wherein
one becomes trained to respond properly to given stimuli. He says in Preface to Paradise
Lost, In my opinion such deliberate organization is one of the first necessities of human
life, and one of the man functions of art is to assist it.”77 In short, one is obligated cast
aside the very preferences of our “Romantic Primitivism” and learn rather to love truth,
beauty, and goodness and to hate the false, the loathsome, and the evil.
It is obvious that Lewis believed that the willing submission to a preexisting (or at
least external) Form was a source of not only delight but success. For humans to think
and act coherently, they must submit to certain Forms.78 It is essential to human
wholeness to submit selfish autonomy to religious, imaginative, moral, and literary
Forms. These Forms make demands, and one can only faithfully perform one’s functions
in the act of submission to such basic realities—the seed must die before it can live. Thus
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one explanation for Lewis’ desire to stand within traditional Christianity despite areas of
disagreement can now be suggested.
Lewis’ commitments to historical Christianity were not an uncritical or
unconscious reality—a simple fideism born of ignorance—but were rather the intentional
response of a value-laden life. If one wants to write good sonnets, one must embrace the
Form,79 or if fairy tale, then that Form. If one wishes to be “Christian,” then it is no good
attempting to formulate one’s own version. The word has a meaning—a Form—and one
must either submit to it or else call oneself something else. To express it as he does in
Mere Christianity, “All this is said simply in order to make clear what kind of book I was
trying to write; not in the least to conceal or evade responsibility for my own beliefs.
About those, as I said before, there is no secret. To quote Uncle Toby: ‘They are written
in the Common-Prayer Book.’”80 Or as he puts it elsewhere, we do not believe in
Christianity because it is noble or useful or strong, but because it is true.81
Thus in relation to the questions posed in this dissertation, one should expect
Lewis, on the basis of his own commitments, to work hard at being faithful to the historic
beliefs of the Church, even in the places where he disagrees. This will serve as his default
orientation, his bias, or even his presupposition.
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Question 3: Lewis and Higher Criticism
This section addresses the first half of a larger question regarding Lewis’
relationship to mid-twentieth century theology. In chapter 4, Lewis’ perspectives on the
Genesis Fall will be brought into conversation with those of the theologians from chapter
1. Here the question is more general. What was Lewis’ overall appraisal of higher
criticism and theology as a discipline? Lewis confessed to be neither a theologian nor a
higher critic by trade or training.82 He stood outside the world of the theologian. The
disadvantages of such a position are obvious—Lewis lacked professional credibility to
engage them on their own turf (much as they would have struggled to discuss medieval
literature with Lewis). Yet knowing this, Lewis was keen on offering what he could—
that is, what did the work of mid-twentieth century theologians look like to an educated
Christian from the outside? His conclusions were enlightening, and could not do less than
underscore his above-outlined relationship to traditional Christian beliefs.
In 1959, Lewis was asked by the Principal of Wescott House, Cambridge, to give
an address to budding seminarians on an educated layperson’s view of the state of
theology.83 This address not only has the virtue of providing with succinctness Lewis’
ideas on textual criticism in general (fleshed out at greater length in other places84), but
also focuses on how those ideas differ from the dominant ones in the theological climate
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of his day. So pivotal is this address in fact for the present thesis that it is almost remiss
not to quote the entire text. Nevertheless, as this would be unseemly, an attempt at a
reasonable summary shall be made. Relevant references to his other works will be
inserted where they are most helpful.85
Lewis begins the address by admitting his ignorance of the issues of theology.
Musing upon why the principal had asked him to speak anyway, he offers, “But I think
his idea was that you ought to know how a certain sort of theology strikes the outsider.
Though I may have nothing but misunderstandings to lay before you, you ought to know
that such misunderstandings exist” [152]. By “outsiders,” of course, Lewis meant two
different things—the uneducated outsider and the outsider who is educated, but in a
different subject matter. Lewis, being one of the latter, can only speak from that
framework. What uneducated persons make of modern theological developments, Lewis
does not know and is not going to guess at here. For himself, he notes that it is primarily
on the authority of New Testament higher critics, such as Schweitzer, Bultmann, Tillich
and others, that “we are asked to give up a huge mass of beliefs shared in common by the
early Church, the Fathers, the Middle Ages, the Reformers, and even the nineteenth
century” [153]. Lewis, however, expresses skepticism of such authority for four reasons.
Reason 1: Higher Critics are Deficient as Readers
The first reason amounts to a critique of their qualifications to speak
authoritatively on the kind of literature with which they deal. “Whatever these men may
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be as Biblical critics, I distrust them as critics. They seem to me to lack literary judgment,
to be imperceptive about the very quality of the texts they are reading” [154]. Lewis
suggests that those who have been “steeped” in the minute study of the New Testament
all their lives may now have a myopia, whereby their “literary experiences of those texts
lacks any standard of comparison such as can only grow from a wide and deep and genial
experience of literature in general” [154]. Without a literary standard against which to
compare the biblical literature, Lewis wonders if they do not become prone to miss some
of the most basic aspects of the biblical literature as literature. “If he [the critic] tells me
that something in a Gospel is legend or romance, I want to know how many legends and
romances he has read, how well his palate is trained in detecting them by the flavor; not
how many years he has spent on that Gospel.”
By way of example, he considers a commentary he once read wherein the
commentator claims the Fourth Gospel is a ‘spiritual romance,’ ‘a poem not a history’
like Jonah, Paradise Lost or Pilgrim’s Progress.86 Replies Lewis (with clear agitation),
“After a man has said that, why need one attend to anything else he says about any book
in the world?... I have been reading poems, romances, vision-literature, legends, myths all
my life. I know what they are like. I know that not one of them is like this” [154f.]. What
does the fourth gospel feel like to Lewis? It can be only one of two things. It is either
“reportage” of actual events (with errors perhaps) or else “some unknown writer in the
second century, without known predecessors or successors, suddenly anticipated the
whole technique of modern, novelistic, realistic narrative. The reader who doesn’t see
this has simply not learned to read” [155].
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Lewis then turns on Bultmann by name. When Bultmann comments on the
“unassimilated’ nature of the parousia predictions in Mark 8 which follow the predictions
of the passion,87 Lewis wonders, “What can he mean? Unassimilated? Bultmann believes
that predictions of the parousia are older than those of the passion. He therefore wants to
believe—and no doubt does believe—that when they occur in the same passage some
discrepancy or ‘unassimilation’ must be perceptible between them. But surely he foists
this on the text with shocking lack of perception” [155].
Lewis then rehearses the passage: Peter’s confession of Christ, the succeeding prophecy
of coming death, Peter’s “false step,” the rebuff, the generalized moral to the crowd that
all must so take up their cross, the summons to martyrdom. Lewis’ conclusion:
“Logically, emotionally, imaginatively, the sequence is perfect. Only a Bultmann could
think otherwise” [156].
Finally he tackles Bultmann for holding that the historical personality of Jesus is
of no interest to the kerygma of the church, and consequently that no attempt was ever
made to give the Lord any specific personality by the biblical writers.88 Lewis responds
with apoplectic frustration,
Through what strange process has this learned German gone in order to make
himself blind to what all men except him see? What evidence have we that he
would recognize a personality if it were there? For it is Bultmann contra mundum.
If anything whatever is common to all believers, and even to many unbelievers, it
is the sense that in the Gospels they have met a personality…Jesus of peasant
shrewdness, intolerable severity, and irresistible tenderness. So strong is the
flavor of the personality that, even while He says things which, on any other
assumption than that of Divine Incarnation in the fullest sense, would be
appallingly arrogant, yet we—and many unbelievers too—accept Him at His own
valuation when He says ‘I am meek and lowly of heart’…I begin to fear that by
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personality Dr Bultmann means what I should call impersonality: what you’d get
in a D.N.B article or an obituary or a Victorian Life and Letters of Yeshua BarYosef in three volumes with photographs. [156]
This then is Lewis’ first point: “These men ask me to believe they can read
between the lines of the old texts; the evidence is their obvious inability to read (in any
sense worth discussing) the lines themselves. They claim to see fern-seed and can’t see
an elephant ten yards away in broad daylight” [157].
Reason 2: The Presumption of a Lost and Recovered Christianity
Lewis believes that liberal theology always involves somewhere the claim that
real Christianity was lost at a very early stage and has now been rediscovered by the
modern scholar.89 Here Lewis’ own field of expertise is brought to bear, for he recognizes
this sort of logic from the world of literary criticism. For example, Lewis was educated to
believe that the real meaning of Plato had been misunderstood by Aristotle and grandly
violated by the neo-Platonists. Yet when moderns “recovered” the true meaning of Plato,
it turned out conveniently that he was an English Hegelian. And of course, Lewis was
forced to endure the quarterly reinterpretations of what various Shakespearean plays
“really meant.” He shakes his head, “The idea that any man or writer should be opaque to
those who lived in the same culture, spoke the same language, shared the same habitual
imagery and unconscious assumptions, and yet be transparent to those who have none of
these advantages, is in my opinion preposterous. There is an a priori improbability in it
which almost no argument and no evidence could counterbalance” [158]. The “lost”
Christ or Christianity that higher criticism recovers, always seems to stand in some

89

See Screwtape, 106-108, for Lewis’ take on the “historical Jesus” search, which he believes
revolves on exactly this point.

97
unexpectedly convenient proximity to the critic’s own presuppositions on the nature of
Christ or Christianity, of which the next reason is an archetypal example—the default
disbelief in the possibility of the miraculous.
Reason 3: The a priori Disbelief in the Possibility of the Miraculous
This subject is, of course, an old saw for Lewis about which he had already
published a good deal.90 In fine, modern theologians are continually asserting that things
like Jesus’ “predictions” must be the insertion of a later writer. To which Lewis replies,
“This is very sensible if we start by knowing that inspired prediction can never occur”
[158]. But surely scholars are in no better position to assert this than anyone else. That is,
we cannot believe or disbelieve in the miraculous simply because an authoritative biblical
scholar says we should. No one can be an authoritative expert on the miraculous by
definition. In short, “On this [topic] they speak simply as men; men obviously influenced
by, and perhaps insufficiently critical of, the spirit of the age they grew up in” [158].
Frequently in his writing Lewis expresses this concern over the uncritical embrace
of modern assumptions within the academic world (theological, scientific, and
otherwise). He suggests that the prevailing models of a culture are embraced, beyond
whatever truth/falsity they express, in part because they reflect values already dominant
in the spirit of the age—in this case the impossibility of the miraculous.
By way of other examples, in relation to Darwin, Lewis argues that a culture
dominated by a progress-oriented mythology precedes Darwin by several generations—
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already present in Wagner’s Nibelung’s Ring and Keats’ Hyperion.91 Darwin did not
offer a staggeringly new idea to the world, “on the contrary, the attraction of Darwinism
was that it gave to a pre-existing myth the scientific reassurances it required.” This is not
only true of Modernity, but was equally so of the great architecture of the Ptolemaic
cosmos of the Middle Ages that preceded it.92 The science of that day was frequently
mustered to support and enable the already embraced vision of the primum mobile and
the motions of the spheres. After all, “Nature has all sorts of phenomena in stock and can
suit many different tastes.”93
The modern scholar’s particular fault then is not so much that s/he uncritically
embraces the spirit of the age—all ages have that feature. But the modern scholar has the
uniquely debilitating vice of being interested, not so much in whether an ancient author is
speaking truth or error, but in how the text is to be understood as only a product of its
time. Within the subtext of Screwtape Letters, one can hear the tempter’s approval (and
thus Lewis’ disapproval) of this “Historical Point of View,”
When a learned man is presented with any statement in an ancient author, the one
question he never asks is whether it is true. He asks who influenced the ancient
writer, and how far the statement is consistent with what he said in other books,
and what phase in the writer’s development, or in the general history of thought, it
illustrates, and how it affected later writers, and how often it has been
misunderstood (specially by the learned man’s own colleagues) and what the
general course of criticism on it has been for the last ten years, and what is the
‘present state of the question.’ To regard the ancient writer as a possible source of
knowledge—to anticipate that what he said could possibly modify your thoughts
or your behavior—this would be unutterably simple-minded.94
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Thus every generation becomes cut off from every preceding generation such that
the dominant vices of one’s own generation cannot be corrected by the dominate virtues
of another. Four years after Screwtape Letters, he makes this narrative image patent in an
essay requested by the World Council of Churches, “The tactics of the enemy in this
matter are simple and can be found in any military text book. Before attacking a regiment
you try, if you can, to cut it off from the regiments on each side.”95 The modern person
then has lost what was once the common birthright of all preceding peoples—Jewish,
Christian, or Pagan—the belief that valuable truth can be still be found in ancient
books.96 This tendency then in part creates an uncorrectable skepticism in the modern
biblical critic for anything that does not already conform to modern sensibilities.97 It is
the characteristic modern vice—a self-reinforcing historical elitism—which turns the
study of the past into, not a search for truth or even wisdom, but a search for historical
explanation of past phenomena. To the specifics of this task Lewis now turns in his
seminarian address.
Reason 4: On the Reconstruction of the Text and its Sitz im Leben
Herein we find Lewis’ “loudest and longest” rant. He highlights that one of the
major tasks of the modern theologian-critic consists of the reconstruction of the history
behind the text— who his sources were, when and where the author wrote, and under
what conditions and influences. Lewis admits it is often performed with “immense
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erudition and great ingenuity,” and would be very convincing to him if not for one thing,
“What forearms me against all these Reconstructions is the fact that I have seen it all
from the other end of the stick. I have watched reviewers reconstructing the genesis of
my own books in just this way…My impression is that in the whole of my experience not
one of these guesses has on any one point been right; that the method shows a record of
100 per cent. failure” [159f.].
At the time of giving this address, Lewis had published all of his major fiction,
Till We Have Faces being published three years earlier.98 He had by this time seen his
Space Trilogy, Narniad, and other works reviewed and dissected innumerable times. And
on the whole, whenever a reviewer attempted to draw a causal connection between some
aspect of the text and something going on in Lewis’ mind, life, or past, Lewis found the
connections were usually “pure moonshine.”99
Now surely differences exist between Sunday Times reviewers and great biblical
scholars. Lewis agrees, but all the advantages lie with the Times reviewers. The books
they analyze are written in their own language by their own contemporaries with similar
educations, living in the same “mental and spiritual climate.” Biblical critics have none of
these advantages. He wonders, “how much Quellenforschung in our studies of older
literature seems solid only because those who knew the facts are dead and cannot
contradict it?” [160]. In the end then, how can Biblical critics be so confident (or we in
them) given the track records of those with such greater advantage?
You may say, of course, that such reviewers are foolish in so far as they guess
how a sort of book they never wrote themselves was written by another. They
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assume that you wrote a story as they would write a story; the fact they would so
try, explains why they have not produced any stories. But are the Biblical critics
in this way much better off? Dr Bultmann never wrote a gospel. Has the
experience of his learned, specialized, and no doubt meritorious, life really given
him any power of seeing into the minds of those long dead men who were caught
up in what, on any view, must be regarded as the central religious experience of
the whole human race? It is no incivility to say—he himself would admit—that he
must in every way be divided from the evangelists by far more formidable
barriers—spiritual as well as intellectual—than any that could exist between my
reviewers and me. [161f.]
In the end Lewis hopes and believes this theological tendency will blow over;
after all, he notes, his own field had already emerged from such a phase. “The confident
treatment to which the New Testament is subjected is no longer applied to profane texts.
There used to be English scholars who were prepared to cut up Henry VI between half a
dozen authors and assign his share to each. We don’t do that now” [162]. After all, even
the possibilities of an historical Homer and King Arthur do not seem so farfetched as they
once did. He comforts the seminarians that if they experience insecurity regarding all this
critical work by theological giants, it may not be the seminarian’s stupidity or youth that
causes it. Perhaps room can be found for skeptics of theological method, not just of
historical tradition. After all, skepticism can be a healthy thing, and need not be reserved
for the New Testament and the creeds. “Try doubting something else.” [164].
When faced with stories of transcendence, we must take our ignorance seriously
and be a bit agnostic about our own capacities. The very categories of “literal” and
“symbolic” become problematic, because all the experiences by which we judge
transcendent stories are entirely on the side of immanence. On that basis skepticism of
the story may be warranted, “but how if we are asking about a transcendent objective
reality to which the story is our sole access?” [166]. Lewis has more to say in the closing
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paragraphs of the address, but it is not of concern here. This final quotation, however, is a
key foreshadowing of what is to come in the next chapter.
What can be gleaned from all this in relation to the immediate question is that
Lewis distrusted the results of higher criticism as a general movement, first, on
methodological grounds—that they spoke of things beyond their experience or
competence. But his concern is also pastoral, and what’s more, this seems to have
provided the greater reservoir of his passion for the subject. Lewis was frustrated that
theological discourse had, in his opinion, ceased to be interested in practical Christianity.
Even worse, he thought higher critics, by being uncritically modern, actually participated
in the undoing of the basic faith structures that had long upheld and nourished
shopkeepers, plumbers, and the mass of common persons. It orphaned them of the
wisdom and comfort of the sages and saints by reducing ancient wisdom to historical
events to be analyzed but not heeded. 100
Perhaps Lewis’ most generous summary of his thoughts on the problems within
higher criticism is found in the conclusion of Miracles, where he advises the curious
reader about how to take the next step in their consideration of the miraculous:
My work ends here. If, after reading it, you now turn to study the historical
evidence for yourself, begin with the New Testament and not with the books
about it…And when you turn from the New Testament to modern scholars,
remember that you go among them as a sheep among wolves. Naturalistic
assumptions…will meet you on every side—even from the pens of clergymen.
This does not mean (as I was once tempted to suspect) that these clergymen are
disguised apostates who deliberately exploit the position and the livelihood given
them by the Christian Church to undermined Christianity. It comes partly from
what we may call a ‘hangover.’ We all have Naturalism in our bones and even
conversion does not at once work the infection out of our system. Its assumptions
rush back upon the mind the moment vigilance is relaxed. And in part the
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procedure of these scholars arises from the feeling which is greatly to their
credit—which indeed is honourable to the point of being Quixotic. They are
anxious to allow the enemy every advantage he can with any show of fairness
claim. Thus they make it part of their method to eliminate the supernatural
wherever it is even remotely possible to do so, to strain natural explanation even
to the breaking point before they admit the least suggestion of miracle.101
Now it may be, caveats Lewis, that this movement away from the inspired sage,
which requires all persons to hold confidently only what they can rationally discover for
themselves, is a prelude to a great social and historical advance—where each is now
expected to attain those spiritual heights once reserved for the few. If so, so be it. But, he
cautions, “A society where the simple many obey the few seers can live: a society where
all were seers could live even more fully. But a society where the mass is still simple and
the seers are no longer attended to can achieve only superficiality, baseness, ugliness, and
in the end extinction. On or back we must go; to stay here is death.”102 This detaching of
the long-held beliefs of Christianity from the common person, whether by insidious
design or simply as a byproduct of the modernist “hangover,” is to Lewis a systemic
problem in modern theology—one he felt called to address. In his answer to Dr.
Pittenger, he says,
When I began [writing], Christianity came before the great mass of my
unbelieving fellow-countrymen either in the highly emotional form offered by
revivalists or in the unintelligible language of highly educated clergymen. Most
men were reached by neither. My task was therefore simply that of a translator—
one turning Christian doctrine, or what he believed to be such, into the vernacular,
into language that unscholarly people would attend to and could understand. For
this purpose a style more guarded, more nuancé, finelier shaded, more rich in
fruitful ambiguities—in fact, a style more like Dr. Pittenger’s own—would have
been useless…
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One thing is for sure. If the real theologians had tackled this laborious
work of translation about a hundred years ago, when they began to lose touch
with the people (for whom Christ died), there would have been no place for me.103
And in a follow up letter to the editor on the exchange, he adds, “Any fool can write
learned language. The vernacular is the real test. If you can’t turn your faith into it, then
either you don’t understand it or you don’t believe it.”104
Lewis on Higher Criticism Considered
Questions of apostasy and modern “hangovers” aside, it must be admitted that
Lewis’ critique of the methods of professional theologians may simply be out of court—a
failure to recognize that professional theologians have technical and theoretical dialogues
unfit for public consumption as do all professions—from research physicians to
biologists, from lawyers to Lewis’ own profession of Medieval English. Heron asserts as
much, wondering if Lewis’ lack of theological pedigree causes him to do an injustice to
higher criticism in general, and Bultmann in particular.105 He says, “By temperament and
training [Lewis] was more philosopher and literary critic than historian. His desire was
not, except incidentally, to understand the past ‘as it was’ or to track historical
developments for the sake of their interest for the historian. He was therefore ill-equipped
to appreciate the interest of historical-critical biblical study.” Granting Heron’s critique
an appropriate hearing, it may be a touch overzealous to call the author of Allegory of
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Love and The Discarded Image uninterested in history or critical study of texts. What is
more, his English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama is an intractable
piece of erudition sufficient to cure insomnia in any save his most committed literary
peers.106 White’s critique is as usefully moderated as it is succinct, when he says that
Lewis “was a better authority on the great old theologians than on their contemporary
counterparts.”107
But it seems over-simple that one so academically proficient as Lewis could not
recognize that the vernacular is not the only language game with value. Surely he would
have to concede that theologians be permitted the same license to ply their jargon-filled
trade as doctors, lawyers, and specialists in any field? And a careful read shows that
Lewis would have graciously granted theologians their technical discourse provided they
took on the additional task of “translation”—much as the physician must translate the
technical jargon of medicine to the patient. Therein lies the rub. Lewis believed
theologians existed for the church, just as doctors exist for the sick. Insofar as Lewis
believed modern theological shepherds were contributing to the sheep’s sickness and not
their mending, he bleated. Heron summarizes admirably the context as Lewis would have
seen it, “The net result of the appropriation of Bultmann’s ideas in academic theology of
England after 1945 seemed to Lewis to run out into the sand of a total evacuation of
biblical meaning, a dissolution of theological substance, and abdication of evangelical
conviction, and a failure of Christian imagination.”108
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Question 4: Lewis on the Genre of the Genesis Fall
One will notice that the preceding discussion does not address the Genesis Fall or
early Genesis or even the Old Testament. Lewis’ primary target in his seminarian address
is New Testament higher criticism. But, as was seen in chapter 1, the methods of
Bultmann in the New Testament had their Old Testament analogue and even predecessors
in Gunkel and others. Would it be such a stretch to assert that Lewis would have felt an
equivalent distaste about similar efforts in Old Testament studies?
This is a bit hasty, however. Lewis thought that “gospel” was a very different
genre from what one finds in early Genesis.109 Even prior to his full conversion to
Christianity, Lewis had already identified the difference. He says in his autobiography, “I
was by now too experienced in literary criticism to regard the Gospels as myth. They had
not the mythical taste.”110 This distinction will be more clearly seen in the next chapter
but can be felt immediately with Lewis’ own term for the distinction—“Myth became
Fact.”111 Whatever the gospels are, they have more to do with fact than with myth. The
early Genesis material (Fall narrative included), however, is a very different kind of
literature. One must not equivocate, so to speak between Gunkel and Bultmann. Lewis
clearly disapproved of Bultmann’s results; it is not so clear that he would have disagreed
with Gunkel’s, and certainly not in the same way.
In fact, a form of ironic agreement exists between Lewis and Old Testament
higher critics on the matter. In a number of his major works, he speaks of the Genesis
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Fall in very similar terms. He cites Jerome with approval that Genesis “is told in the
manner ‘of a popular poet,’ or as we should say, in the form of a folk tale,” even
admitting the “depth and originality” of the Hebrew cosmology compared with those of
other near east nations.112 Gunkel of course agreed. Similarly, as was discussed at the
outset of this chapter Lewis offers in Problem of Pain his own alternative history to the
story of “a magic apple,” calling it one of the “myths in Holy Scripture.”113 When
answering audience questions in 1944, he responded to a question about the need to
“rewrite” the Bible given the “lower state of mental development” people had in those
days in their willingness to believe the “preposterous.”114 After commenting on the lack
of evidence that people were less intelligent back then, he parses his answer in terms of
Old and New Testament,
The Old Testament contains fabulous elements. The New Testament consists
mostly of teaching, not of narrative at all: but where it is narrative, it is, in my
opinion, historical. As to the fabulous element in the Old Testament, I very much
doubt if you would be wise to chuck it out. What you get is something coming
gradually into focus…And it comes still more into focus as it goes on. Jonah and
the Whale, Noah and his Ark, are fabulous; but the Court history of King David is
probably as reliable as the Court history of Louis XIV. Then, in the New
Testament the thing really happens…If we could sort out all the fabulous
elements in the earlier stages and separate them from the historical ones, I think
we might lose an essential part of the whole process. That is my own idea.115
While the Fall narrative is not identified here, little question can exist about which
category Lewis would put it in. It would have to be fabulous, like the Ark. Freshwater
sums up the difference as follows: “One can see that Lewis assigned portions of the Old
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Testament to a solely mythical level while he assumed that the New Testament must
almost in its entirety be both mythical and historical.”116
The only evidence in Lewis’ entire corpus that might be mustered to the contrary
is Perelandra, wherein repeated reference is made to Eve’s Fall as a true and apparently
historical event standing opposite to the resisted temptation in that younger world.117 But
it would be scanty evidence amounting to a category mistake to draw conclusions about
real terrestrial history from Lewis’ use of it in a science fiction story.118
What is interesting, however, is that Lewis expresses no concern over what a
mythological Fall narrative (versus an historical one) might do to the faith of the simple
shopkeeper envisioned in the previous section. He assumes in all his works that his reader
is enlightened enough to realize that the science has spoken definitively on the matter,
and whatever the text is doing, it is not straightforward history. It might be optimistic,
however, to assume that the average shopkeeper understands the difference between a
fabulous Fall and an historical atonement by miraculous resurrection—after all, it is a
nuance lost on a great number of highly educated agnostics to this day.
On this final question then, Lewis believed that the genre that best fit the Genesis
Fall narrative was “myth.” He believes it so, not because of an a priori bias against the
possibility of the supernatural (as in much higher criticism), but because the stories of
early Genesis fit that literary form. Yet this is not so much a solution as part of the
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problem. Moorman surveyed the theological landscape in 1960 and concluded that the
primary problem was not indentifying myth but explaining how it worked. He said,
Myth is currently used as a sort of universal literary solvent; the unspoken
assumption would seem to be ‘Let us reduce this poem, this novel, this play to its
basic mythical, structural, ritual ingredients and there will then be an end to all
critical problems.’ Such a point of view avoids the main literary problem raised
by myth in literature, which, as I have said, is primarily a problem of function.119
Thus the key question is how this particular form—that of myth, legend, or
perhaps even “fairie story”—actually works. And on this question Lewis will make his
great contribution. Lewis believed that myth was not just a literary form, like sonnet or
novella. Nor is it, as higher criticism argued, merely the expected manifestation of the
heuristic religious mentality of the day. Rather, as the next chapter will demonstrate, he
believes that this form is actually an indispensible epistemological device, capable by
design of communicating a very specialized form of truth to the properly attuned
imagination—truth in fact that cannot be apprehended by the intellect alone. In his words,
“Sometimes fairy stories may say best what’s to be said.”
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CHAPTER 3
NO MERE MYTH: LEWIS ON THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF “MYTH”
As shown in the preceding chapter, Lewis believes the Genesis Fall is “myth,”
which of course generates the predictable host of questions regarding historicity,
exegesis, and meaning. Thus to speak of C. S. Lewis on the Genesis Fall or even to bring
him into conversation with the parties from chapter 1, this chapter is necessary. This
chapter then takes a central and necessary, albeit preliminary, place for the question of
Lewis’ interpretation of the Fall narrative.
“Myth” as a concept possesses a central importance, not only in Lewis’ treatment
of scripture, but in his entire epistemology. Anyone familiar with Lewis’ corpus will
immediately recognize the unavoidable nature of technical terms such as longing, joy,
transposition, truth, fact, reality, imagination, and so on. Thus this chapter threatens at
every moment to become bloated and overwhelming in its review of Lewis’ entire
epistemological concern. As such, certain limitations in method are required.
Navigating the Slough of Despond: Comments on Method
Several factors complicate any attempted overview of Lewis on the nature and
function of myth. First, Lewis’ thoughts are spread over his entire corpus. Myth is
discussed fragmentally and occasionally in numerous essays and critical works, deployed
latently in his apologetic works, and modeled in his own mythic fiction. The danger of
myopia is great unless one considers his entire corpus.
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Second, the subject has been oft treated. The secondary literature here manifests
itself as a nearly impassable continent of material, much of which is forgettable for its
repetition and imprecision. This chapter will then of necessity employ the following
limiting devices.
First, the chapter does not attempt to offer a new or novel interpretation of Lewis
on myth, but merely lay out what has been exhaustively treated elsewhere with an eye
toward our particular use of it later on. This sketch will be drawn primarily from Lewis’
own work, and the more important secondary source material will be mustered where
necessary to clarify and explain.
Second, this chapter will not attempt an exposition of Lewis’ epistemology in full.
Concepts will be ruthlessly curtailed to only those necessary to demonstrate the way in
which myth interacts with the mind attempting theology-exegesis.
Third, a number of important but related topics on myth itself will have to be
bypassed. For example, no attempt will be made to chart the biographical trajectory that
resulted in Lewis’ own position. It is a long and interesting journey chronicled in part by
Lewis himself,1 and is wrapped up in his lifelong friendships with Owen Barfield, J. R. R.
Tolkien, Hugo Dyson, and others. This has, however, been treated at length by others.2
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Space, time, and prudence allow here only consideration of the view he ultimately
embraced, not the ones he outgrew.3
Fourth, in an effort to remain concise, a number of debates in the secondary
literature will not be engaged directly but will be relegated to footnotes where they can be
fleshed out at leisure. Likewise, unless it is absolutely necessary for clarity, this author’s
own disagreements with secondary material will also be kept to a minimum.4 Instead, the
chapter will focus on constructing a kind of “best fit line” through the Lewis literature
with an eye towards its utility in the following chapters.
Finally, presenting this material in a reasonable space will require a tight
structure—tighter than Lewis himself ever used, for he never published a definitive
epistemology. As such, the reader should remember the structure here is not one that
Lewis ever used and may have never occurred to him, but is rather a logical one designed
to communicate the germane aspects of his epistemology as efficiently as possible.
The chapter will take a problem-solution approach, first laying out a series of
epistemological problems of varying degrees of gravity as they presented themselves to

3

Thorson notes that Lewis’ conversion so radically altered his metaphysic that his pre-conversion
epistemology is almost unrelated to his final epistemology, which concerns here. Stephen Thorson,
“Knowing and Being in C. S. Lewis's 'Great War' with Owen Barfield,” CSL: The Bulletin of the New York
C. S. Lewis Society 15 (November 1983): 7. Interestingly, debate arises, however, on the timing of his
arrival at his mature view. Granting that Lewis’ conversion to Christianity in 1929-31 was formative,
Schakel and Wilson both argue that the formation of his mature position is concurrent with his turn toward
writing fiction, following his debate with G. E. M. Anscombe in 1948. Peter J. Schakel, Reason and
Imagination in C. S. Lewis: A Study of Till We Have Faces (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1984),
148ff.; and Wilson, 213ff. Jacobs vigorously rejects the connection between the Anscombe debate and
Lewis’ fiction. Jacobs, Narnian, 231ff. Starr charts three phases of gradual development (with the rejected
possibility of a fourth). Starr, 36-75, 265-270.
4

For example, while it would make riveting polemics, Warnock’s staggeringly imperceptive
critique of Lewis’ view of the myth/history question in the Gospels will be mentioned only in passing,
favoring instead the majority view of the scholarship, which sees Lewis’ position as adequately nuanced
within his total argument. Mary Warnock, “Religious Imagination,” in Religious Imagination, ed. John
McIntyre (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1986), 142-157.
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Lewis. Following this, “myth” will be introduced as a partial solution to them. Myth will
then be defined and set into its context as a form of communication. Third, the exact
nature by which myth addresses these epistemological grievances will be worked out.
Fourth, the necessity of the reader’s proper perspective in relation to the efficacy of myth
is clarified, and finally, Lewis’ theory will be critiqued.
By chapter’s end the following questions will have been addressed: What is
myth? How does it function? Why is it an irreducible tool for facilitating knowledge of
higher realities? And why does it seem to produce a greater effect in some than others?
The Epistemological Problem—Contact with Reality
At every level, Starr’s dissertation stands as a high water mark on questions of
Lewis’ epistemology. While he slightly overstates the sui generis nature of his project,5 it
would not be an exaggeration to say that his is the most thorough treatment to date of the
interrelationship of such terms as reality, fact, truth, myth, reason, and imagination in
Lewis. As this chapter is not aimed at offering a novel interpretation of Lewis’
epistemology, it will rely heavily upon Lewis himself and Starr’s work in this early
“shelf-building” section of the chapter.
“Reality” and the Nature of Facthood
The first step is not exactly a problem, but rather the precondition of the
problem—Lewis’ belief in an objective external reality, and what is more a “Supernature” above it.
5

A careful reading of the secondary source material with which Starr deals occasionally shows
that the “Lewis critics” in his cross-hairs are often more consistent with Starr’s own conclusions than he
gives them credit for being—their true faults being the imprecision born of brevity rather than error. This is
particularly true of Hooper on “myth,” Walter Hooper, C. S. Lewis: Companion and Guide (San Francisco:
Harper San Francisco, 1996), 564ff.
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Existence of an Objective External “Reality”
Lewis was beyond doubt an objectivist on the question of external reality. There
exists a “something” external to the mind that has its own particular, solid quiddity,
which the mind cannot change but to which its thoughts may or may not correspond. In
the radio addresses that became Mere Christianity, he argues that this is the thing
humanity has been wondering about “ever since men were able to think,”—what the
universe really is in itself.6 About the same time as this statement was hitting the
airwaves, he was arguing in print that the unalterable aspects of this reality—particularly
the phenomenon of pain—are themselves an argument for its existence. He says, “Until
the evil man finds evil unmistakably present in his existence, in the form of pain, he is
enclosed in illusion. Once pain has roused him, he knows that he is in some way or other
‘up against’ the real universe…”7
Further, his theories of both morality and values are grounded in the existence of
a world external to the mind. In The Abolition of Man he offers his famous argument
from the objective sublimity of the waterfall, concluding with,
Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be
such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or
incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could
merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence, or our contempt...It is the
doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and
others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we
are.8

6

Mere, 31.

7

Pain, 95, italics added for emphasis. Starr makes the insightful observation that in the
epistemological progression of Orual, Lewis is actually chronicling this journey in Faces. Starr, 148ff.
8

Abolition, 25, 29. For the same argument more concisely delivered, see C. S. Lewis, “The
Poison of Subjectivism,” in Christian Reflections, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing,
1967), 72-81.
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From these few brief citations, a first piece of Lewis’ epistemological taxonomy
can be asserted. The terms “real” and “reality” (and even “fact”) seem to Lewis to
identify the objective nature of “what is out there,” irrespective of the subjective knower.
It is perhaps, in the nomenclature of theology-philosophy, Kant’s ding an sich—equally
applicable to God and a rose, whose true essences abide not in the world of mental
percepts, but as noumenal facts. The point is that whatever synthetic role the mind plays
in the epistemological task, it is, for Lewis, limited in some sense by the “facts” of what
things are objectively like.
Existence of Objective External “Higher Reality” and Ultimate “Facthood”
To be sure, Lewis did not believe that God and a rose existed on the same level of
reality. Rather, he speaks of God as “…the rock bottom, irreducible Fact on which all
other facts depend.”9 Further, he believed external reality to be hierarchical.10 At times
his primary interests are dualistic, speaking merely of the distinction between “nature”
and “super-nature” (that is, the supernatural), or at times “sensibles” and
“supersensibles.”11 But his dualism is only pedagogically pragmatic, for he also admits
the possibility of innumerable “natures” that would all be “super” (in the sense of

9

Mere, 158. In Great Divorce, he likewise, speaking through the mouth of one of the “bright
spirits,” refers to God as “…Eternal Fact, the Father of all other facthood.” Great Divorce, 44.
10

Given the current pejorative association of this term—that of the abuse of power—a
clarification is required. Even without the benefit of Discarded Image, which was not published until four
years later, Marjorie Wright had the foresight to identify the essential role hierarchical cosmologies play in
mythic worlds (as well as the Medieval worldview). She suggests that hierarchical structures are natural
and normal, and do not, when working properly exhibit misuse of power or injustice. Rather, when the
hierarchy is working as it should, each creature finds its place and success. Whether or not she is correct in
this assertion (or whether our world is mythic in this sense), it is essential to recognize that the implied
beneficence was central to Lewis’ understanding and use of it. Marjorie Evelyn Wright, “The Cosmic
Kingdom of Myth: A Study in the Myth-Philosophy of Charles Williams, C. S. Lewis, and J. R. R.
Tolkien.” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, 1960), 65-93.
11

See in particular chapter 4 of Miracles; and the more abbreviated “Miracles,” 25-37.

116
external) to one another—“…like different novels by a single author…,” with the
author’s reality, of course, standing over all of them.12
Speaking thusly, it is fitting that throughout his fiction, particularly the Space
Trilogy, he constructs his own imaginatively hierarchical realities.13 The world of “deep
heaven,” where the eldila (angelic powers) dwell, is distinct from and superior to the
“worlds,” which themselves are divided into the “high worlds” and the “low worlds,” all
under the direction of Maleldil.14
In asserting a multi-storied universe-reality, Lewis is embracing his identity as an
“Old Western man.”15 On display is his background in and love for the medieval view of
the universe with its “…splendour, sobriety, and coherence…”16 Throughout all his
writings and despite its lack of correspondence to external Reality, Lewis shows a greater
love for the Ptolemaic view of the universe than for the Copernican-Newtonian one.

12

Miracles, 9.
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For a breath-taking treatment of the ontology of the universe Lewis therein constructs, see
Robert E. Martin, “Myth and Icon: The Cosmology of C. S. Lewis' ‘Space Trilogy’” (PhD dissertation,
Florida State University, 1991). He argues that the literary ontological architecture at work in the Space
Trilogy is of similar kind and quality to what Dante employed in The Divine Comedy, of course, on a
reduced scale.
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Similar structures can be seen in Narnia, with its hypostasized celestial star-persons, diverse
conscious fauna, sea kingdoms, and even “the deep realms” of Bism. In a more mythological manner,
Faces likewise rests on interwoven levels of reality, turning on questions of who is the “real” Shadowbrute,
Ungit, and Psyche.
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“De Descriptione,” 25.

Discarded Image, 216. It is interesting to note that throughout Starr’s sustained effort to show
that Lewis is not a “Platonist” (on the assumption that the word is unredeemably pejorative) because of his
commitment to “levels of reality,” it is exactly this step that he fails to take. Starr, 79-90.]He works entirely
from Lewis’ apologetic words, such as Mere, Pain, Malcolm. C. S. Lewis, Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on
Prayer (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1991). And he only incidentally mentions Discarded Image, which
makes profoundly clear where and why Lewis thought as he did. Lewis was no more or less “platonic” than
were the Middle Ages.
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Knowing External Reality—Nature and Supernature
“Truth is always about something, but reality is that about which truth is.”17
“Truth” for Lewis is a term denoting the mind’s ability to conform itself to Reality.
“Truth” is a proposition held by the intellect (that is, reason) that corresponds with the
way things objectively are. Says Lewis in a paper read at Manchester University prior to
1939, “I am a rationalist. For me, reason is the natural organ of truth…”18 This is only a
fragment of a key passage which will have to be dealt with more thoroughly later on, but
it is sufficient to show Lewis’ commitments. Starr’s synthesized definition of Lewis’ idea
of “truth” is insightful: “Truth is abstract, objective, known by reason, and discernible
from fact in that truth refers to statements we make about reality, and fact consists of that
concrete reality about which we make statements.”19
This introduces the traditional question of epistemology—how does the mind
achieve knowledge, or in Lewis’ terms, how can the intellect construct propositions that
correspond to objective external reality? For that is, to be sure, the duty of the mind if it
wishes to have knowledge. For any proposition to be “true,” it must conform to the
“facts” of “reality.” While this may be the primary question of epistemology, it is not
quite the question at work in this chapter. At concern here will be the particular subquestion of knowing that level of reality Lewis calls “higher.” Thus his larger
epistemology will only be briefly treated before turning to this more central question.
General Epistemological Challenges
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“Myth Became Fact,” 66.
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C. S. Lewis, “Bluspels and Flalansferes: A Semantic Nightmare,” in Rehabilitations and Other
Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 157.
19

Starr, 29.

118
Lewis was not ignorant of the epistemological challenges Modern thought had
encountered. While he held to an objective external reality, he was under no illusion
about the impossibility of being a fully objective knower. It was a thing observed in his
youth from his father, who seemed unable to conform his mind to any set of given facts,
but spun meaning out of own mind like a spider. He admits, “Sometimes, indeed, he took
in the facts you had stated; but truth fared none the better for that. What are facts without
interpretation?”20 This question is telling. Lewis latently acknowledges the implications
of Kant’s “Revolution” on the role of the mind in synthesizing knowledge.21
In a Time and Tide essay as insightful as it is incidental, Lewis used the image of
an evening at the theatre to discuss the epistemological situation. One meets the
“appearance” of things on the stage—actors in costume, the props, and backdrop, but
their “reality” is something else—something off stage. In applying this image to the
“universal drama,” he says humans have a great complication. Unlike in the theatre, no
possibility exists of running backstage to see what the actor is really like. Further, “We
are not even, in the last resort, absolutely sure that such things exist…They may be
assumed with great probability; but they are, after all, hypothetical.”22
General Epistemological Solutions
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Surprised, 121.
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It is a presupposition of “Bluspels,” wherein Lewis actually cites Kant as a philosopher
featuring somewhere above 95% “mere syntax masquerading as meaning.” “Bluspels,” 156f. This is not a
measure of the amount of “truth” Kant possessed, or even to what degree Kant deeply understood his own
intentions, only that he demonstrates a high degree of unawareness of the metaphorical nature of his own
speech, often claiming more “literalness” for itself than it deserved. For his own money, Lewis preferred
Plato, who was “among the masters of meaning.” “Bluspels,” 157.
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C. S. Lewis, “Behind the Scenes,” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed.
Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1970), 249.

119
Even with the above challenge, Lewis admits at least three types of argumentssolutions to the overall epistemological problem, none of which are adequate for
addressing the specific problem of Higher Reality to be outlined below.
The first and most obvious solution is the rational use of the scientific method to
interpret our physical sense data. It was shown in the last chapter that Lewis was no
enemy of science (only its worship at the hands of philosophers, journalists, and scientifictionists), calling it a “very useful and necessary job.”23 Barring disease, injury,
incapacitation, and the like, our senses are generally reliable tools by which to interact
with the natural world of sensibiles. And further, Reason is a generally reliable tool for
constructing corresponding truth statements from the received sensibiles. But therein lies
the limitation; science can only deal with things observable to the senses. To use the stage
image from above, the senses may be effective for gathering data about the actors on
stage, but ill-equipped for determining what they do once they exit-stage-left, and the
actors “…may, in their off-stage life and character, be very unlike what we suppose and
very unlike one another.”24 Thus when it comes to answering questions like, “…why
anything comes to be there at all, and whether there is anything behind the things science
observes—something of a different kind—this is not a scientific question. If there is
‘Something Behind,’ then either it will have to remain altogether unknown to men or else
make itself known in some different way.”25
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Lewis offers two such “different ways.” First of all, in Lewis’ view, Supernature
does not simply hang around hoping to be verified, rather it breaks into Nature in the
form of the miraculous. Surveying Lewis’ entire apologetic for miracles is not feasible
nor necessary here.26 While the existence of the miracle provides warrant for believing in
the existence of Supernature, being an expression of it, its content is limited due to its
infrequency and scope. The intrusion will have the qualities or the agenda of Supernature
about it, but since it will not submit to rational analysis or predictable sensory
authentication as Nature does, it is limited in the kind and amount of truth that can be
constructed from it.
This does not mean those witnessing miracles did not have a sensory experience,
but rather, that it is the nature of the miraculous, once it arrives in Nature, to cease to be
miraculous. Lewis denies that a miracle “breaks the laws of Nature.” The miracle only
feeds new material into Nature that is not causally related to the prior situation. Once the
new material is present, the “laws” of Nature act upon it immediately, embracing it,
conforming all other facts to it—in short, incorporating it into the cause-effect stream
flawlessly. He says,
If events ever come from beyond Nature altogether, [Nature] will be no more
incommoded by them [than by natural causes]. Be sure she will rush to the point
where she is invaded, as the defensive forces rush to a cut in our finger, and there
hasten to accommodate the newcomer. Miraculous wine will intoxicate,
miraculous conception will lead to pregnancy, inspired books will suffer all the
ordinary processes of textual corruption, miraculous bread will be
digested…[Nature] is an accomplished Hostess.27
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Miracles, 59f.

121
Reason may be able to contemplate a miracle’s significance, but it cannot predict
or repeat it. Thus while the miraculous is not to Lewis contrary to reason, what reason
can actually do with it is limited by the super-natural origin of its causality.
A final means exists of connecting Supernature to Nature—the human mind. That
the reasoning mind cannot be explained by natural causes (or Lewis did not believe it
so),28 means that it must participate in some real sense in what is beyond nature. This
provides the foundation for a somewhat Kantian Moral Argument for the existence of the
noumenal realm. Lewis argues frequently that the sense of “ought” common to all people,
which cannot be explained in terms of natural causality or “laws of nature,” establishes
warrant for asserting a “something” beyond nature—at least an objective Moral Law and
its subsequent Lawgiver.29 This, as it was for Kant, is not an argument from pure reason,
but from practical reason, which Lewis believed must be embraced as having “absolute
validity” or all discussion of values was rendered hollow.30
The difficulty, to this chapter’s purpose, is that the argument is still one guided by
reason.31 That is, it is derived in terms of practical reason’s intellectual reflection on the
natural order. Given the use Lewis puts it to, this is no deficiency. For the purpose here,
however, it will not serve. For even practical reason, for all its virtue, has two great
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See “Poison,” 72; Miracles, 34-38; Mere, 31-35; and “Is Theology Poetry?,” 135f.
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Lewis hints at the dependence of moral choosing on reason in Screwtape Letters, when
Screwtape admits that there was once a time when the intellect was still capable of producing changes in a
person’s will, “At that time the humans still knew pretty well when a thing was proved and when it was
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deficiencies built into it that drive right to the center of this dissertation. The first is a
problem inherent in the rational intellect’s dependence on discursive language, the second
one of existential condition. To these we now turn.
The Dominion of Metaphor: The Problem of Propositions
As much as Lewis was a man of his time, he was also a man born too late. He
called himself a “dinosaur,” a “specimen” of an age long past.32 He never learned to
drive, thought human space travel a misguided travesty, and still believed the chivalric
code was the best hope for mankind.33 It is almost certain that when he looked up at the
stars on a dark night, he did not feel it the vast emptiness of Newtonian “space,” but
rather beheld “the heavens”—that great dance of holy life from which terrestrial
humanity was excluded.34 But Lewis’ revolt against the modern age was not uncritical.
His critique was always strategic and value driven. Lewis believed that the Modern
intellectual ethos included a series of fundamental mistakes that came in part from its
“chronological snobbery”—that is, “the uncritical acceptance of the intellectual climate
common to our own age and the assumption that whatever has gone out of date is on that
account discredited.”35 This problem can be discussed under a three-fold heading.
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The Tyranny of Abstraction: Severing the Mind from the Concrete
Throughout his life Lewis expressed gratitude to Owen Barfield for shaping his
views of language, history, and imagination.36 He was, to be sure, suspicious of
Barfield’s embrace of Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophy. The mark of influence, however,
is undeniable.
A Taste for Abstraction: Modernity’s rejection of the Concrete
In brief, Barfield argued that a deleterious process of increasing abstraction has
been at work in human language since the beginning. Barfield called it an “evolution of
consciousness”—the movement of language from originally a concrete experience in the
ancient mind to modern humanity’s extreme divorce of language from reality by means
of abstraction.37 By way of illustration, a consistent semantic overlap exists between
‘spirit’ and ‘breath,’ as seen in Sanskrit, Hebrew, Greek, Latin and many other languages.
The modern scholar presumes the etymology consists of an original concrete meaning—
“exhalation”—that came later to incorporate the more abstract “spirit” only as
humanity’s linguistic and mental capacities for abstraction evolved. Modern humanity
sits at the zenith of this linguistic evolutionary trajectory, understanding them as two fully
distinct concepts, one concrete, one abstract, related perhaps only by allegory.38
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Barfield argues this is not the actual history. The ancients were not so naïve.
Kuteeva offers an excellent summary of Barfield’s idea:
Once myth, language, and human perception of the world were inseparable. Thus
one can trace the plurality of meanings of a word back to the stage when the word
had all its present meanings in one. All diction was literal, and there was no
distinction between concrete and abstract meanings. Humans perceived the
cosmos as a whole, and themselves as part of it. In our age, on the contrary,
humanity distinguishes itself from the rest of nature, and words and myths are
looked at from the point of view of abstraction.39
Thus the ancient mind did not feature two concepts—one concrete and one abstract—but
a single symbolic unity without concern about being literal or metaphorical. Says
Barfield, modern humanity, with its a priori preference for abstraction, has torn the two
asunder and in its folly reaped only skepticism and ignorance about the world of Spirit.
While Lewis was only partially persuaded that “etymological change revealed an
historical evolution of consciousness,”40 he did agree that modernity had
presuppositionally ballooned the value of the abstract above the concrete.41 As early as
1936, when tracing the movement from Rome’s belief in the gods to the middle ages’
allegorical use of them in poetry, he identified a conflict in the Roman treatment of the
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gods that marked a foreshadow of the coming allegorical use. First, they worshiped
things which seem like abstractions to us, building temples to deities like Fides,
Concordia, Mens, and Salus. But at the same time, names that seem like concrete deities
are often used as abstract nouns, like aequo marte, and per veneris res.42 Thus, he says,
“we are forced to the conclusion that a distinction which is fundamental for us—the
distinction, namely, between an abstract universal and a living spirit—was only vaguely
and intermittently present in the Roman mind,” much like the way the term “Nature”
might today appear “in the mind of an imaginative but un-philosophical person who has
read many books of popularized science.”43
A few years later he wrote Perelandra, which Wolfe insightfully recognizes as a
study in the unified mind. Whatever else the story is saying, the Green Lady seems to be
a picture of Barfield’s pre-discursive mind. Gregory Wolfe says, “…the Green Lady has
a perfect ‘intuition of being.’ That is why she can even take the evil thoughts of the Unman and find in them something that bespeaks the goodness of Maleldil. She is able to
revel in the created order because she understands it to be contingent on the will of
Maleldil. Diametrically opposed to this is the gnosticism of the Un-man, who is always
trying to get her to ‘see through things.’”44
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Near the end of his life, Lewis reaffirmed this idea in Reflections on the Psalms.45
When speaking of “seeing the Lord” at the temple celebration [Psalm 68], the psalmist
does not mean that “he sees the festival of the Lord” as we might if we were there. He
may not even mean that he “felt” the presence of God, nor had a “spiritual vision or even
a ‘sensible’ love of God,” as though the celebration and the presence were two distinct
things. Lewis argues, “the ancient worshipper would have been aware of no such
dualism…I suspect that the poet of that Psalm drew no distinction between ‘beholding
the fair beauty of the Lord’ and the acts of worship themselves.” It is the modern
tendency toward abstract reasoning that separates the two things. “…no sooner is it
possible to distinguish the rite from the vision of God then there is a danger of the rite
becoming a substitute for, and a rival to, God himself.” In fact, young children often
cannot differentiate between the “religious” and the “festal” character of Christmas or
Easter—“Chocolate eggs and Jesus risen” mean the same thing. A time, however, will
come when the maturing child can no longer so easily enjoy that unity.
The message here is clear. While the capacity for the abstract is a developmental
reality, the preference for the abstract over the concrete must be taught, and modernity
has been a diligent teacher of all her young. But it is not a choice between two equal
goods. The maturing child is now faced with a choice, “If he puts the spiritual first he can
still taste something of Easter in the chocolate eggs; if he puts the eggs first they will
soon be no more than any other sweetmeat. They have taken on an independent, and
therefore a soon withering, life.” This then is one aspect of the problem. The modern
mind had an unwarranted preference for abstraction over concreteness.
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Lewis saw the effects of this shift within his own field. In his analysis of Sir
Walter Scott, he identifies the “bloated” and abstract nature of English literature during
the nineteenth century, saying of the period, “The word farthest from the soil is liked
best; we find personage or individual for man, female for woman, monarch for king.
Hence Wordsworth, even in poetry, will have his itinerant vehicle, female vagrant, and
casual refreshment. Scott, I am afraid, nearly always called food refreshment, and is
among those who have helped to spoil that potentially beautiful word for ever.”46 Lewis
also saw this trajectory played out in the theological world. A favorite example is Mark’s
account of the ascension of Christ, wherein he was “caught up into the sky” and “sat
down to the right hand of God.”47 The modern mind snobbishly assumes its superiority to
the ancient mind for its recognition of the figurative and non-literal aspects of the
passage. But Lewis probes into what an early Christian would have actually believed
about this passage. In a Barfieldian manner, he says, “The answer is that the alternative
we are offering them was probably never present to their minds at all. As soon as it was
present, we know quite well which side of the fence they came down.”48 Hence the early
church stiffly rejected all anthropomorphic views of God. Lewis expands,
There is no more tiresome error in the history of thought than to try to sort our
ancestors onto this or that side of a distinction which was not in their minds at all.
It is very probable that most Christians never thought of their faith without
anthropomorphic imagery, and that they were not explicitly conscious, as a
modern would be, that it was mere imagery. But this does not in the least mean
that the essence of their belief was concerned with details about a celestial throne.
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Any one of them who went to Alexandria and got a philosophical education
would have recognized the imagery at once for what it was, and would not have
felt that his belief had been altered in any way that mattered.”49
In a similar vein, Lewis offers a rather snarky reply to Bishop Robinson’s Honest
to God.50 He assures the Bishop that the average lay person will not be offended by his
demand that the laity stop thinking of God as sitting on a throne in a localized heaven, but
rather think of God as being “outside space time.” The reason for this is that lay persons
have always known this was not a literal image. 51 He says that in fact, “We have always
thought of God as being not only ‘in’ ‘above’, but also ‘below’ us: as the depth of
ground. We can imaginatively speak of Father ‘in heaven’ yet also of the everlasting
arms that are ‘beneath’. We do not understand why the Bishop is so anxious to canonize
the one image and forbid the other.” To those who cynically argue that the hope of
Heaven is ridiculous because no one would want to spend eternity “playing harps,” Lewis
caustically replies, “if they cannot understand books written for grown-ups, they should
not talk about them.”52
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Accounting for Taste: Why Modernity Prefers the Abstract
Although Lewis never considers it, some effort might here be spent on explaining
modernity’s preference for the abstract over the concrete. A complete treatment of this
question is far beyond the reach of this work, but a few thoughts will be helpful in
establishing Lewis’ epistemological context.
Lewis asserts that as soon as the distinction between abstract and concrete was
present in the ancient mind, it understood the symbolic and metaphorical nature of
transcendent religious imagery. If it were true that God was “Father,” who sat on a
“throne,” and “came down to earth,” this could only mean that, in these finite and
concrete images, greater and unimaginable things were being expressed or pictured. Thus
understanding them to be metaphors, they knew that they were not the things themselves,
but—Lewis’ larger point—such a distinction did not generally occur to them. A form of
univocation existed between symbol and referent. Thus they claimed to know something
of Reality—nature, of course, by means of the senses, but super-nature by means of this
symbolic participation (later on, the term “sacramental” will be used). The insistence on
the exclusive distinction is uniquely modern.
In the wake of the skepticism of such as Descartes and Hume, however, the claim
to experience and know external reality in any absolute sense (natural or otherwise)
begins to sound unreasonably idealistic. Even Kant’s sturdy rehabilitative effort leaves
the noumenal world as more “warranted” than “known” in the old sense.
The Modern preference for the abstract may, then, stem from a belief that
abstraction comes closer than concreteness to expressing the inexpressible nature of
reality. It possesses, in its definitional lack of concreteness, a hint of that mysterious
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quality reality itself has, a humility born of known limitation. If metaphors derived from
the concrete make the presumptuous claim of speaking of reality as it really is, the
abstract more reverently preserves the numinous quality of reality by removing concrete
metaphors derived from the natural world. Thus, in almost apophatic fashion, to not
speak in concrete terms is to actually affirm positively the intangible quiddity of things in
themselves. The result is that, rather than saying “God comes down from heaven to
earth,” it is better to use the less concrete, “God enters history.” Whatever the piety of
such an approach, Lewis thought it profoundly and myopically flawed for reasons that
must now be examined.53
The Metaphorical Nature of All Language and the Changing Nature of Models
The problem with modernity’s attempt to speak of the highest things while
avoiding imagery drawn from the natural world is simply that it is impossible. Abstract
language does not bring one any closer to Reality in se than does concrete language, for it
is dependent on the same tool—metaphor. It is, however, less compelling. Lewis
observes,
To say that God ‘enters’ the natural order involves just as much spatial imagery as
to say that He ‘comes down’; one has simply substituted horizontal (or undefined)
for vertical movement. To say that He is ‘re-absorbed’ into the Noumenal is better
than to say He ‘ascended’ into Heaven, only if the picture of something dissolving
in warm fluid, or being sucked into a throat, is less misleading than the picture of
a bird, or a balloon, going up. All language, except about objects of sense, is
metaphorical through and through. To call God a ‘Force’ (that is, something like a
wind or a dynamo) is as metaphorical as to call Him a Father or a King. On such
matters we can make our language more polysyllabic and duller; we cannot make
it more literal.54
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This is a lesson Lewis learned in his pre-Christian days as a philosophy tutor at
Oxford, in the midst of what he calls his “watered Hegelianism.”55 He found that such
abstractness simply did not work if one wished to communicate effectively to others:
A tutor must make things clear. Now the Absolute cannot be made clear. Do you
mean Nobody-knows-what, or do you mean a superhuman mind and therefore
(we may as well admit) a Person? After all, did Hegel and Bradley and all the rest
of them ever do more than add mystification to the simple, workable theistic
idealism of Berkeley? I thought not. And didn’t Berkeley’s ‘God’ do all the same
work as the Absolute, with the added advantage that we had at least some notion
of what we meant by Him?56
But theologians are not the only ones with this difficulty. It applies equally to
scientists, poets, psychoanalysts, and metaphysicians.57 Further, the more truly scientific
persons are, Lewis observes, the more likely they are to recognize and admit this
rhetorical conundrum.58 Both the ancient philosopher poets and the modern scientists
know that reality in itself is unknowable, accessible only through metaphor and teaching
models. Modern scientists use metaphors such as “the curvature of space,” “natural
selection,” and the Bohr model of the atom to provide pictures of the reality, but they
know that reality is not really like the model. Further he says in reference to Jeans’ The
Mysterious Universe,59
We have recently been told by the scientists that we have no right to
expect that the real universe should be picturable, and that if we make
mental pictures [aka. models] to illustrate quantum physics we are moving
further away from reality, not nearer to it. We have clearly even less right
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to demand that the highest spiritual realities should be picturable, or even
explicable in terms of our abstract thought.”60
But herein lies a subtle difference between the ancients and the moderns.
Under the influence of concrete modes of thought, the ancients (as well as
Renaissance and even early moderns like Copernicus and Newton) believed they were
building models of reality in miniature. Even the defunct Ptolemaic hierarchical view of
the universe was thought to express the universe as was seen, so to speak, from God’s
own perspective. In his most sustained consideration of this subject, Lewis argues that
even the thinkers of the nineteenth century, “…still held the belief that by inferences
from our sense-experience (improved by instruments) we could ‘know’ the ultimate
physical reality more or less as, by maps, pictures, and travelbooks, a man can ‘know’ a
country he has not visited; and that in both cases the ‘truth’ would be a sort of mental
replica of the thing itself.”61 Mathematics was a language to describe the real external
world. Through math we gained knowledge of more than just numbers—like a person
studying a contour map could come to know the terrain of the land.
In Lewis’ own lifetime, however, he noted growing commitments within science
that the map contours are all there really were. “All those ideas about ‘real’ rocks and
slopes and views are merely a metaphor or a parable; a pis aller, permissible as a
concession to the weakness of those who can’t understand contour lines, but misleading if
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taken seriously.”62 Mathematics was now as close as one could get. Therefore, when we
speak of models, one is not speaking (as the ancients thought) of small scale replicas of
the real thing, but only an “analogy” or a “suggestion… like the sayings of the mystics.”
Thus in the language of absolute abstraction (mathematics), the real step made by the
twentieth century is revealed to be ultimately an agnostic one. This is the substantive
difference between the medievals and moderns, “Part of what we [now] know is that we
cannot, in the old sense, ‘know what the universe is like’ and that no model we can build
will be, in that old sense, ‘like’ it.”63
It must be clearly understood here, that this dissertation is not interested in whose
view of things, the ancients or the moderns, is actually true. Lewis readily admits that for
all the virtues of the Ptolemaic cosmos, its greatest flaw was that it was not true—that is,
did not correspond to reality.64 Understanding the nature and use of models—all models,
ancient and modern—was more to his point. But this issue has been belabored here for
two reasons—first, to further clarify what Lewis himself thought of the underlying values
dominant in modern thought, and second, that by this clarification one might better
understand the nature of Lewis’ particular contribution to them (yet to be unfolded). To
that end, it is necessary here to introduce an image so central to Lewis’ own perspective
that without it everything to come could have the virtue of being “what Lewis thought,”
but have little in common with “the way Lewis thought it.”
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The Problem Stated Positively: The Toolshed Factor
The idea, which Lewis called “an indispensible tool of thought,”65 will be
presented first by means of illustration before it is laid out propositionally. This approach
has the virtue of modeling the substance of the idea not only in content but in its very
method of execution.
The Principle Introduced
In July, 1945, Lewis published a short reflective piece in The Coventry Evening
Telegraph that may, for its brevity, be one of the most important things Lewis ever wrote
for disclosing how he interpreted the world. He begins, “I was standing in the dark in the
toolshed. The sun was shining outside and through the crack at the top of the door there
came a sunbeam. From where I stood that beam of light, with the specks of dust floating
in it, was the most striking thing in the place. Everything else was almost pitch-black. I
was seeing the beam, not seeing things by it.”66 Then stepping into the sunbeam so that it
fell upon his eye, the whole toolshed disappeared from view. What’s more, looking along
the sunbeam caused it to disappear as a visible object as well. From here he now saw
trees outside and even the sun itself. By means of this simple illustration, Lewis presents
a concept familiar to anyone willing to think about it—the difference between “looking
at” and “looking along.” It presents the difference between the perspective of a young
man in love with a girl and a scientist’s efforts to describe what the young man is
experiencing. Lewis presents a number of other examples—the mathematician thinking
deeply of “timeless and spaceless truths about quantity” and the physiologist describing
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what is going on inside the mathematician’s head; or the dancing savage believing he is
helping the crops grow versus the anthropologist’s view that “he is performing a fertility
ritual of the type so-and-so;” or even a little girl crying over her broken doll versus the
psychologist assertion that “her nascent maternal instinct has been temporarily lavished
on a bit of shaped and coloured wax.”67
This distinction, however, has a more important explanatory feature. It represents
the trajectory of modern thought. Modernity has a proclivity for “looking at”—standing
outside a phenomenon and examining it from that perspective. In religion, modernists
tend to trust the anthropologist over the pious; in love, the psychologist over the lovers; in
any “ideology,” the sociologist over the people actually living there. Lewis is careful to
say that there is nothing wrong with “looking at,” for it may be true that the girl one loves
may be “very plain, stupid, and disagreeable” and it seems certain that the savage’s dance
does not in fact make the crops grow. But one must not, for that, assume that the “looking
along” view is expendable, and for two reasons.
First, “looking at” is not sufficient. For example, a person studying “pain” would
always be inadequate to the task if they have never experienced pain (which is unlikely,
but one could easily go a whole life without experiencing religion, love, morality, or
honor). They would be talking about a nothing—“all the apparatus of thought busily
working in a vacuum.”68 Second, if “looking along” is discounted as “just a perspective,”
then one must remember that “looking at” is also a perspective. “You can step outside
one experience only by stepping inside another. Therefore, if all inside experiences are
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misleading, we are always misled.”69 Thus we must “on pain of idiocy” deny that
“looking at” is by nature “truer” than “looking along,” for by stepping inside, one may
find that “the things that look to you like instincts and taboos will suddenly reveal their
real and transcendental nature.” The a priori prejudice for one over the other is deadly.
No one knows beforehand who speaks the truth in matters of love, the psychologist or the
lover. Consider a few examples of the dominance this distinction held in Lewis’ thought,
favoring sometimes one perspective, sometimes the other.
The Principle Illustrated
This distinction was central in his debate with E. M. W. Tillyard on, what he
called, the “personal heresy,” regarding the degree to which the reader ought to try to
attend to the poet qua poet while reading a poem. Lewis believed that to “look at” the
poet was to miss the point. The poet was a finger pointed at something else, inviting you
to look where s/he looked. Lewis says,
Let it be granted that I do approach the poet, at least I do it by sharing his
consciousness, not by studying it. I look with his eyes, not at him. He, for the
moment, will be precisely what I do not see, for you can see any eyes rather than
the pair you see with, and if you want to examine your own glasses you must take
them off your nose. The poet is not a man who asks me to look at him; he is a man
who says ‘look at that’ and points; the more I follow the pointing of his finger the
less I can possibly see of him.70
He then proceeds to the next logical question (noting here, not the question itself,
but the terms in which he asks it), “What is the nature of this consciousness which I come
to share but not to study, to look through but not look at, in appreciating a poem?”71
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A few years later in his Preface to Paradise Lost, Lewis complained about the
modern notion of the “unchanging human heart” for its assumption that our view of
reality is essentially common to all people at all times. In fact, the idea does little more
than project modern perspectives of humanity onto a past where they clearly had no
place. Much then like the aforementioned poet,
instead of stripping the knight of his armour you can try to put his armour on
yourself; instead of seeing how the courtier would look without his lace, you can
try to see how you would feel with his lace; that is, with his honour, his wit, his
royalism, and his gallantries out of the Grand Cyrus. I had much rather know
what I should feel like if I adopted the beliefs of Lucretius than how Lucretius
would have felt if he had never entertained them. The possible Lucretius in myself
interests me more than the possible C. S. Lewis in Lucretius.72
In 1955, he asked the readers of Twentieth Century to consider the way a
“refined” person looks from within and from without.73 The cynic “looking at” such a
person sees affectation and pretense, but this is not what refinement looks like to the
person who truly has it. He argues that, “From within, it [refinement] does not appear as
refinement; indeed, it does not appear, does not become an object of consciousness at all.
Where it is most named it is most absent.”74 So too with the truly religious person,
“Almost by definition, a religious man, or a man when he is being religious, is not
thinking about religion; he hasn’t the time. Religion is what we (or he himself at a later
moment) call his activity from outside.”
Similarly in Mere Christianity he makes a series of such comparisons. Sleep
cannot be considered while it is being enjoyed, but only upon waking. Drunkenness too

72

Preface, 64.

73

C. S. Lewis, “Lilies that Fester,” in The World's Last Night and Other Essays (New York:
Harcourt, Inc., 1973), 31-50.
74

“Lilies,” 32.

138
can only be analyzed when sober. Bad people, he argues, cannot even understand their
badness while they are doing it; only a good person can truly understand badness because
they do not stand within it.75
Consider Lewis’ explanation from Miracles for why the existence of the
Supernatural often requires so much rational apologetic,
When you are looking at a garden from a room upstairs it is obvious (once you
think about it) that you are looking through a window. But if it is the garden that
interests you, you may look at it for a long time without thinking of the window.
When you are reading a book it is obvious (once you attend to it) that you are
using your eyes: but unless your eyes begin to hurt you, or the book is a text book
on optics, you may read all evening without once thinking of eyes. When we talk
we are obviously using language and grammar: and when we try to talk a foreign
language we may be painfully aware of the fact. But when you are talking English
we don’t notice it...
All these instances show that the fact which is in one respect the most
obvious and primary fact, and through which alone you have access to all the
other facts, may be precisely the one that is most easily forgotten—forgotten not
because it is so remote or abstruse but because it is so near and obvious.76
In his essay entitled Myth became Fact, he says similarly, “you cannot study
Pleasure in the moment of the nuptial embrace, nor repentance while repenting, nor
analyse the nature of humour while roaring with laughter…‘If only my toothache would
stop, I could write another chapter about Pain.’ But once it stops, what do I know about
pain?”77
Finally, it is a distinction within his fiction as well, showing up latently
throughout John’s search for the island and its ultimate revelation in Pilgrim’s Regress.78
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Screwtape repeatedly advises Wormwood to keep the “patient’s” perspective focused on
religion as seen from without.79 In Perelandra Ransom experiences “myth” from inside
instead of the external terrestrial perspective.80 In Voyage of the Dawn Treader, the
retired star Ramandu responds to Eustace’s assertion that in our world a star is “a huge
ball of flaming gas” with “Even in your world, my son, that is not what a star is but only
what it is made of.”81 It further makes up the backdrop of Puddleglum’s defense of the
existence of Overworld to the Witch-Queen of the cavernous Deep Realm.82 Finally, it is
one of the central interpretive principles in Orual’s (mis)understanding of the gods and
her half-sister Pysche’s involvement with them in Till We Have Faces.
The Principle Explained
The sheer frequency of this “looking along/looking at” device demands some
account. Thankfully Lewis himself provides it in his autobiography. Early in his
academic career,83 Lewis encountered Alexander’s recently published Gifford Lectures
from 1916-1918,84 with its famous distinction between Enjoyment and Contemplation.
The usefulness of this distinction can best be stated in Lewis’ own words,
These are technical terms in Alexander’s philosophy; ‘Enjoyment’ has nothing to
do with pleasure, nor ‘Contemplation’ with the contemplative life. When you see
a table you ‘enjoy’ the act of seeing and ‘contemplate’ the table. Later, if you took
up Optics and thought about Seeing itself, you would be contemplating the seeing
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and enjoy the thought. In bereavement you contemplate the beloved and the
beloved’s death and, in Alexander’s sense, ‘enjoy’ the loneliness and grief; but a
psychologist, if he were considering you as a case of melancholia, would be
contemplating your grief and enjoying psychology. We do not ‘think about
thought’ in the same sense in which we ‘think that Herodotus is unreliable.’ When
we think a thought, ‘thought’ is a cognate accusative (like ‘blow’ in ‘strike a
blow’). We enjoy the thought (that Herodotus is unreliable) and, in so doing,
contemplate the unreliability of Herodotus.85
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the event of Enjoyment and that of
Contemplation are mutually exclusive. We cannot both attend to a reality and examine
our attention of it at the same moment. Lewis notes this principle is true in every matter
of life, “The surest means of disarming an anger or a lust was to turn your attention from
the girl or the insult and start examining the passion itself. The surest way of spoiling a
pleasure was to start examining your satisfaction.”86 But the same is true of introspection
itself. All other mental activity stops when the mind turns to consider it itself. What it
then finds in this act is not the experience itself, but “mainly mental images and physical
sensations.” The great error then is for one to mistake this “mere sediment or track or
byproduct” for the realities themselves that caused it. If it is not an overly crass analogy,
what Lewis is describing may be thought of as a psychological version of the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, wherein the act of carrying out the experiment itself affects the
subject and changes the outcome.
The crucial realization that this gave to Lewis about his own mental life, as well
as the issues from the last section, will be addressed in a future section, but here its
implications on the problems themselves are clarifying.
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The Principle Applied
The applicable point of the device is that the abstract language preferred by
modernity assumes at its center the “looking at” perspective. It is the language of reason
and science, observational and propositional, and when pushed to its limits, terminates in
the quintessentially abstract language of mathematics. This is both its glory and its
liability. Reason, as the “organ of truth,” can speak “about” the object, but cannot enjoy
the thing in itself, for the moment it begins to contemplate the object, it has ceased to
enjoy it. It can thus provide a model of the thing, but not the thing itself. In a sense, after
Reason has done all the work it is able to do, one still experiences a poignant divorce
from the Reality one has just contemplated. It remains ever external as an object of
rational contemplation. Says Meilaender, “…the spell [for overcoming this divorce], if
there is one, is not available in abstract, theoretical reasoning. Built into our thinking is a
kind of frustration: A gap always exists between experiencing a thing and thinking about
that thing. In thinking ‘about’ anything we abstract ourselves from it, begin to separate it
into its parts, and lose it as an object of contemplation. That is, while thinking about it we
are cut off from experiencing it.”87
Herein the central problem begins to crystallize. For all the importance of
“looking at,” it fails to address the key issue of Supernature or Higher Reality—that
practical reason may be able to speak discursively about the nature of the noumenal, but
is this enough? Are we as human creatures content to know “about” Higher Reality? Is
contemplation sufficient to our needs, or more poignantly to our desires? And “Desire”
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is the central problem that prevents this from being just a philosopher’s discussion. The
divorce from Higher Reality with which abstracting reason leaves us was for Lewis a
deeply personal crisis—one of insatiable longing. As Starr notes, our interests are not
ultimately in knowing “about Reality” but knowing “Reality itself.”88 This brings us to
the final and more existential leg of the problem.
The Domination of Longing: The Problem of Being
The Nature of Longing
From his earliest youth Lewis was seized with an inescapable desire for
something he could not define or express. For lack of any better word, he called it Joy,
and he framed his entire autobiography in terms of the attempt to satisfy the longing for
it.89 So dominated was he by this longing that he made it the subject of his first extended
foray into fiction, Pilgrim’s Regress. Therein John is compelled to begin his search by a
vision of a wood,
and he remembered suddenly how he had gone into another wood to pull
primroses, as a child, very long ago—so long that even in the moment of
remembering the memory seemed still out of reach. While he strained to grasp it,
there came to him from beyond the wood a sweetness and a pang so piercing that
instantly he forgot his father’s house, and his mother, and the fear of the
Landlord, and the burden of the rules. All the furniture of his mind was taken
away. A moment later he was sobbing, and the sun had gone in…But even while
he pictured these things he knew, with one part of his mind, that they were not
like the things he had seen—nay, that what had befallen him was not seeing at all.
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But he was too young to heed the distinction: and too empty, now that the
unbounded sweetness passed away, not to seize greedily whatever it had left
behind…and presently he went home, with a sad excitement upon him, repeating
to himself a thousand times, ‘I know now what I want.’90
Lewis believed this longing, this Sehnsucht, for something beyond current
experience represented an ubiquitous feature of being human. He describes it in Mere
Christianity:
Most people, if they had really learned to look into their own hearts, would know
that they do want, and want acutely, something that cannot be had in this world.
There are all sorts of things in this world that offer to give it to you, but they
never quite keep their promise. The longings which arise in us when we first fall
in love, or first think of some foreign country, or first take up some subject that
excites us, are longings which no marriage, no travel, no learning, can really
satisfy. I am not now speaking of what would be ordinarily called unsuccessful
marriages, or holidays, or learned careers. I am speaking of the best possible ones.
There was something we grasped at, in that first moment of longing, which just
fades away in the reality. I think everyone knows what I mean. The wife may be a
good wife, and the hotels and scenery may have been excellent, and chemistry
may be a very interesting job: but something has evaded us.91
It is the feature of this longing only to tantalize. It does not come for the asking,
but arrives unexpectedly. Lewis records his first memory of experiencing it as a child in
relation to a toy garden his brother made.92 It may thus manifest itself as an aesthetic
experience in a sunset, a piece of music, or a lover’s embrace, but before one can begin to
contemplate it, it has departed—like a bird from a trap. Elsewhere, Lewis reflects on the
nature of this chase in a telling essay that will need to be readdressed later,
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In life and art both, as it seems to me, we are always trying to catch in our net of
successive moments something that is not successive. Whether in real life there is
any doctor who can teach us how to do it, so that at last either the meshes will
become fine enough to hold the bird, or we be so changed that we can throw our
nets away and follow the bird to its own country, is not a question for this essay.93
It was, however, a driving concern for Lewis throughout his youth, and he finally found a
means of expressing the problem in Alexander.
Longing and the Toolshed
Lewis indicates that he was finally able to explain the illusive nature of Joy when
he met Alexander’s Enjoyment/Contemplation distinction. All attempts to rationally
manufacture or contemplate these moments of Joy were no good, representing nothing
more than “a futile attempt to contemplate the enjoyed…I knew now that they [the
sensations that accompany Joy] were merely the mental track left by the passage of Joy—
not the wave but the wave’s imprint on the sand.”94
Further, the reason that nothing in the wide world could be depended upon to
permanently offer up the desired experience is because they were never intended to. They
were only meant to teach, to press one on to Joy’s true referent. “…for all images and
sensations, if idolatrously mistaken for Joy itself, soon honestly confessed themselves
inadequate. All said, in the last resort, ‘it is not I. I am only a reminder. Look! Look!
What do I remind you of?’”95
If this is the nature of all pleasures, what then is one to do? Meilaender draws the
issue to a head, “The crucial question, of course, is whether such a creature [who
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experiences Sehnsucht] is an absurdity or whether this desired fulfillment is attainable. If
fulfillment of the longing which is integral to our being is impossible, then we really are
absurd creatures—and we would be better simply to acknowledge the search as futile and
endless…”96 What did Lewis believe the options were?
Dealing with Longing—Bad, Better, Best
In Mere Christianity, Lewis identifies three possible ways of dealing with the
phenomenon of longing. The first is “The Fool’s Way.” This person “…puts the blame on
the things themselves. He goes on all his life thinking that if only he tried another
woman, or went for a more expensive holiday, or whatever it is, then, this time, he really
would catch the mysterious something we are all after. Most of the bored, discontented,
rich people in the world are of this type.”97
The second way is that of “the Disillusioned ‘Sensible’ Man.” This person
“…soon decides that the whole thing was moonshine. ‘Of course,’ he says, ‘one feels like
that when one’s young. But by the time you get to my age you’ve given up chasing the
rainbow’s end.’ And so he settles down and learns not to expect too much and represses
the part of himself which used, as he would say, ‘to cry to the moon.’”98 This is, of
course, preferable to the first option, in that, while making one a “prig,” one will not be
so much of a nuisance to society as the aforementioned fool.
The Christian way, however, is different:
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The Christian says, ‘Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for
those desires exists. A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. A
duckling wants to swim: well, there is such a thing a water. Men feel sexual
desire: well, there is such a thing as sex. If I find in myself a desire which no
experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was
made for another world. If none of my earthly pleasures satisfy it, that does not
prove that the universe is a fraud. Probably earthly pleasures were never meant to
satisfy it, but only to arouse it, to suggest the real thing.99
“Joy,” like all desires, has the form of the thing desired. Lewis had by then tried every
physical and mental pleasure he could think of and found that none had the right shape.
Only one possibility was left, and this realization brought Lewis into “the region of awe.”
And that is why we experience Joy: we yearn, rightly, for that unity which we
can never reach except by ceasing to be the separate phenomenal beings called
‘we.’ Joy was not a deception. Its visitations were rather the moments of clearest
consciousness we had, when we became aware of our fragmentary and
phantasmal nature and ached for that impossible reunion which would annihilate
us or that self-contradictory waking which would reveal, not that we had had, but
that we were, a dream.100
The referent for Joy was, then, the Absolute, “which is the utter Reality.”101 This
argument from longing, claims Peter Kreeft, is, next to Anselm’s ontological argument,
“the single most intriguing argument in the history of human thought,” standing as a kind
of proof for both the existence and nature of God and heaven.102
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In what is surely one of the finest sermons of the twentieth century, Lewis
explained this reality eschatologically. A man’s physical hunger does not prove he will
get any bread; he may in fact die of starvation. But surely his hunger proves he comes
from a land where people eat and bread exists—and that he was made for such a place.103
To end all doubts, Lewis wrote a whole story about the eschatological fulfillment of this
longing—The Great Divorce. Moans one distraught ghost therein, “I wish I’d never been
born…What are we born for?” The reply, “For infinite happiness.”104
Says Lewis in his sermon, “At present we are on the outside of the world, the
wrong side of the door. We discern the freshness and purity of morning, but they do not
make us fresh and pure. We cannot mingle with the splendours we see. But all the leaves
of the New Testament are rustling with the rumour that it will not always be so. Some
day, God willing, we shall get in.”105
So on Lewis’ account, our very being testifies that humanity was made for a
genuine experience of Higher Reality. In relation to the possibility of eschatological
fulfillment, Lewis says in Problem of Pain, “There have been times when I think we do
not desire heaven, but more often I find myself wondering whether, in our heart of hearts,
we have ever desired anything else.”106 This then is the particular hope of Christianity,
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that Higher Reality will one day break in and destroy the enjoyment-contemplation
dichotomy—we shall behold the face of God and live.
Now were this a sermon, this would be the place to conclude. For the Christian
hope of heaven is (both to Lewis and this writer) intellectually and emotionally
satisfying.107 One could joyfully endure great burdens in life with the knowledge of such
a future beatitude…if this were a sermon. But as a dissertation, certain pragmatic
questions press down immediately.
Is Lewis then saying that we have no hope of addressing the enjoymentcontemplation dilemma here and now? Can the glimpses of “utter Reality” not be
contemplated with any immediacy at all? Must the experience of it remain only a “kind
of copy, or echo, or mirage” 108 of the Absolute from which humanity is, under the
tyranny of the present, existentially excluded? If humanity desires, not simply to “look
at” Higher Reality, but to participate in it, how can we “look along” a reality we cannot
see? How can one contemplate a reality that is resistant in the very act of contemplation?
It seems that another capacity is needed; a mode of thought other than the
rational; a mode of language other than abstract proposition; a vehicle for knowing in
addition to reason. In short, it is time to turn from questions to answers.
The Form of Things Unknown—the Language of Myth
The fulfillment of the human longing to be one with Reality must, in Lewis’
perspective, wait until the Christian eschaton. That does not mean, however, that
humanity is without recourse now. Lewis believed that modern modes of thought,
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dominated by philosophy and the sciences, suffered from an unwarranted preference for
abstraction, opposing the more concrete imagery used by the ancients. Further, the lack of
warrant exists because both abstract and concrete modes of discourse are equally
dependent upon the use of models and metaphors to express ideas about Reality. Thus
neither can fulfill the claim to be a “literal” or “final” description of Reality in se. The
germane difference is that abstract metaphors tend to be more prosaic and less vivid
(which is admittedly to define them as simply being less concrete).
In order to frame the question more precisely, Lewis’ various taxonomies must
now be synthesized. The scientific mode of discourse exhibits the qualities of
Alexander’s “contemplation.” Science and philosophy, in their employment of the
discursive and propositional intellect (reason), excel in the examination of things from
the perspective of the external observer—akin to Lewis’ “looking at.”
The other side of the taxonomy, however, has some holes. If Alexander’s
enjoyment is related to Lewis’ “looking along,” which seem reasonable, two questions
arise. First, what mode of discourse can be said to reflect the “looking along”-enjoyment
perspective? Second, what faculty can serve as the vehicle for apprehension? The
remainder of the chapter focuses on Lewis’ answer to these two questions.
The complexity of the answer requires that it be given up front. Lewis believed
that the missing mode of discourse was the poetic, and the faculty responsible for its
apprehension and interpretation was the imagination. Further, Lewis believed the poetic
mode pressed to its distal end resulted in a type of story, which, when received by a
willing imagination, could actually overcome in some degree the contemplationenjoyment dilemma, allowing expression in a concrete form of what would otherwise
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remain an abstract concept. Table 4.1 lays out the synthesized taxonomy that will be used
throughout the rest of the chapter.
Table 4.1. Synthesis of Epistemological Taxonomies
(Thesis)*

(Antithesis)*

Alexander’s Taxonomy

Contemplation

Enjoyment

Lewis’ Taxonomy

Looking At

Looking Along

Attributes

Abstract, Rational, Discursive,
Propositional

Concrete, Imaginative, Nondiscursive, Non-propositional

Mode of Discourse

Scientific, Philosophical

Poetic, Narrative

Distal End of Mode

Mathematics

Unknown

Interpreting Faculty

Intellect (Reason)

Imagination
(Synthesis)*
Myth

*The Hegelian taxonomy is used here only for clarity of the table’s elements, does not form part of the
argument, and is not intended to be pressed.

Mere Language—Poetic versus Scientific Discourse
Lewis’ most complete expression of his theory of poetry takes place in his debate
with E. M. W. Tillyard over the “personal heresy.” The nature of that debate does not so
much concern here, but through it Lewis was goaded into offering up his own positive
construction on the nature of poetry and language. The distinction he draws in this debate
will give a new frame to all the categories discussed so far.
Lewis argued that poetry represented one of a number of particular uses to which
language could be put. If conversation is the common base, scientific-philosophical
language and poetical language are each alternate improvements aiming at alternate kinds
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of efficiency.109 He offered the following example, with conversational or common
speech holding the middle point (statement 2):
1. “This is twice as cold as that” < 2. “This is cold” > 3. “Ugh! It’s like a smack in the face.”

Statement 1 turns the sensation expressed in 2 into a quantity. Statement 3, on the
other hand, communicates “…with the aid of an emotive noise and a simile just that
quality which the other neglects.”110 Thus a continuum of language is established. The
left side of the continuum express a scientific or philosophical statement that, when
pushed to its absolute end, terminates in that purely abstract language of mathematics.111
If one, however, travels right, one produces poetry, which “exploit[s] the extra-logical
properties of language.”112 Whether or not an absolute end exists in this direction—a
“pure poetry”—Lewis does not consider here.
The crucial point of difference between scientific-philosophical language and
poetical language is “…emphatically not that the first utters truths and the second
fancies.” Both are true “improvements” to common speech, but they aim at different sorts
of improvements—namely the abstract and the concrete.
The language of science and philosophy is necessarily abstract. Lewis
demonstrates this by reminding that they never speak of “real things” in the popular
sense—things that occur in space and time. They speak of “organisms,” but the world
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actually consists of only “mere vegetables, only trees, flowers, turnips, etc.” Further,
there are no “trees,” but only beeches, elms, oaks, and so on. There are not even “elms,”
only “this elm, in such a year of its age at such an hour of the day, thus lighted, thus
moving…and [to the point] the man a thousand miles away who is remembering it.”
Science has no power here. This elm as it is in all its particularly can only be presented in
a poem. “The sort of things we meet in poetry are the only sort we meet in life—things
unique, individual, lovely, or hateful.”
This is not a flaw of science, rather it is precisely its glory, for only science has
the power to tell us whether or not this particular elm exists outside the mind of the poet.
Thus, “in order to assert facts, i.e. to predict experiences, she [science] must infer; in
order to infer she must abstract. Only science can tell you where and when you are likely
to meet an elm; only poetry can tell you what meeting an elm is like. The one answers the
question Whether, the other answers the question What.”
Dabney Adams Hart contemplates the movement from sixteenth century modes of
thought to the scientific ones that dominate modernity. She concludes, whatever the
virtues of the scientific mode of thought, the older mode is the more natural for humanity.
“Scientific thinking must be learned, superimposed on man’s deepest instincts, which are
the soundest guide to what is truly significant.”113
Lewis, however, means no deprecation of the particular good that the scientific
mode of speech offers. His point is more nuanced. The true problem is the one Barfield
articulated—that humans cannot now be both poetic and scientific at the same time. In
the spirit of Alexander’s dichotomy (which he has already referenced earlier in the
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debate114), he mourns, “The fact that we cannot be philosophic and poetic in any high
degree at the same moment is, I take it, an unmitigated evil.” He then wonders whether
there might not be creatures as far above us as we are above dogs, whose language
“combines at every moment the clarity and cogency of Euclid with the warmth and
solidity of Shakespeare.” But sadly we are not them.
In the end, Lewis says that what modernity lacks in its abstractions can be found
in the poetic mode of discourse, for “…poetry presents concrete experience (which we
have every day) and, in so doing, gives us an experience of the concrete, which is a very
different matter. To find out what our experience has, all along, been really like, is to
remake experience.”115 In short, poetry moves in the direction of the “looking along”
perspective.
Further up, Further in: From Poetry to Myth
Lewis suggests that the poetic mode of discourse holds a counterbalancing
position in human language to the abstracting intellect, being more concrete in its
orientation. In Personal Heresy, however, Lewis beggars out of the question of what
exists at the distal end of the poetic trajectory. While he never returns to this point
anywhere else in his writings by name, strong suggestions exist of what kind of country
he thought dwelt behind the sun in that direction. As a form of story, it does lie on the
poetry end of the spectrum, but expresses its content without propositions at all; even the
words in which it comes are negotiable. Says Lewis, “There is, then, a particular kind of
story which has a value in itself—a value independent of its embodiment in any literary
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work…To think about it and be moved by it is not necessarily to think about those poets
or to be moved by them. It is true that such a story can hardly reach us except in words.
But this is logically accidental.”116 Lewis refers to “myth.”117 Later in the chapter, the
exact nature of how myth accomplishes this incredible feat will be discussed, but given
the contentious nature of the term in the twentieth century, Lewis’ own ideas on what it
means must first be presented.
Slaying the Northern Dragon: What is Myth?118
When considering Lewis’ ideas on myth, John Stahl argued that, “In Lewis’
view… myth is simply a literary genre, like allegory, fable, or fairy tale. That is, it has to
do with the form of the literature, not with its facticity or its subject matter.”119 Now
saying that myth is “simply a literary genre” to Lewis contains as much technical truth as
saying the Apocalypse of John is “simply a dream.” Insofar as it was a dream (or may
have been), it is true, but almost entirely misses the point. The role myth plays in Lewis’
epistemology is so fundamental that without it, one is no longer thinking of C. S. Lewis.
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That caveat expressed, Stahl is formally correct that myth is at least a genre, insofar as it
has a particular character that makes it distinct from other narrative forms. So it is a
permissible place to begin.
First of all, not all stories that an anthropologist would call “myth” would fit
Lewis’ definition (and vice versa). Given the ambiguity that surrounds it, Lewis is not
fond of the term, but since the only alternative is to coin a new one, he attempts to work
within it.120 He identifies six characteristics of the particular stories he would so label.
1. The story is “extra-literary.” It is not tied to a particular version or preset
words. It may possess such a codification as part of its history of transmission, but that is
not what makes the story what it is. Says Lewis, “if some perfected art of mime or silent
film or serial pictures could make it clear with no words at all, it would still affect us in
the same way.”
2. The pleasure it gives is not dependent upon narrative elements such as suspense
or surprise. Elsewhere Lewis actually argues that narratives that are driven solely by the
bald excitement of surprise may in fact be “hostile to the deeper imagination.”121 The best
stories do not depend upon excitement qua excitement for their effect, but an exclusive
kind of excitement—that given by the uniqueness of “giants” or “pirates” or
“suffocation.” Myth, however, seldom trades on surprise. Even upon the first hearing, the
events possess a perceived inevitability. Lewis describes the feeling by example,
“Reading Buchan [a non-mythic writer], he asks ‘Will the hero escape?’ Reading
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Haggard [a mythic writer], he feels ‘I shall never escape this. This will never escape me.
These images have struck roots far below the surface of my mind.’”122
3. Human sympathy is at a minimum. Little drive to empathize with the characters
presents itself. “They are like shapes moving in another world.” We recognize that their
experiences have a “profound relevance” to our life, but we do not ourselves enter into
theirs. In other contexts Lewis uses the term “Fairy Story” to speak of this type of
literature, and, describing his own attempts in the Narniad to produce it, offers this
clarifying comment,
As these [mental] images sorted themselves into events (i.e., became a story) they
seemed to demand no love interest and no close psychology. But the Form which
excludes these things is the fairy tale. And the moment I thought of that I fell in
love with the Form itself: its brevity, its severe restraints on description, its
flexible traditionalism, its inflexible hostility to all analysis, digression, reflections
and ‘gas.’123
4. It is fantastic, in that it deals with “impossibles and preternaturals.” Here,
Lewis is in sympathy with the higher critics like Gunkel who said myths were “stories of
the gods, in contradistinction to the legends in which the actors are men.”124 Wright
considered this an aspect of the “numinous” as seen below in #6, saying of the mythic
frame, it “…implies the existence of divine or at least superhuman beings whether central
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or at the fringes of the story. It is not enough simply that the other characters believe in
these beings; they must be capable of walking into the story at any time.”125
5. While the story may be sad or joyful, it is “always grave.” There is no Comic
myth. Lewis is simply unclear at this point whether he means “comic” in the sense of
simply “farcical” or in the Aristotelian sense of fitting the comic (versus tragic) narrative
arc, but it is probable he means both.
6. The experience it gives, however, is always grave; it is “awe-inspiring,” that is,
“numinous.”126 That it is so is demonstrated by the repeated efforts of the mind to
“conceptualise” the “something,” often by means of allegorizing. And yet, “…after all
allegories have been tried, the myth itself continues to feel more important than they.”
This list is not intended to be criteria by which to classify stories as mythical or
non-mythical. Such an attempt would be “fatal,” for Lewis’ prime concern (and it is the
context in which the above taxonomy is found) is “the effect of myths as they act on the
conscious imagination of minds more or less like our own…” Lewis is defining myths in
terms of their effect on the reader. Because of this subjective definition, what constitutes
a myth for one reader may not do so for another.127 Says Ziegler, “Myth, according to
Lewis, cannot be defined structurally. It is, rather, defined functionally; that is, any work
is a myth if it is received as mythic by those responding to the work.”128
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The above enumerated definition then is not really a definition. It is an a
posteriori description of the effect a myth has on the reader. The implication then is
something like, if one has need of this discursive criteria in advance like a ruler to
measure whether a particular story really is myth, then it probably is not. But having
enjoyed a good myth, contemplation of the experience will affirm that these criteria were
indeed present and at work.
“Here, There be Dragons”: Ancient Myths and Christianity
Lewis shows in numerous places that the ancients were not as ignorant as many
moderns presuppose. Discarded Image is a veritable catalog of refutations of many
popular ideas such as that the ancients believed in a flat world (with dragons at the
rim),129 believed that the great size of the Ptolemaic earth dominated the heavens,130 were
ignorant of the laws of nature,131 possessed an anthropomorphic monotheism,132 and
many others. Even with these misconceptions debunked, however, the fact remains that
they also held to fantastically incredible mythologies (though even this, may not have
been as universal as might once have been thought). How then do these stories stand in
relation to Christianity, which rests on similarly incredible stories?
Lewis makes it clear that ancient pagan myth—particularly those of the Corn
King, with its dying god returning to life and bringing life to the world—were a
preparatio evangelica, “a divine hinting in poetic and ritual form at the same central truth
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which was later focused and (so to speak) historicized in the Incarnation.”133 In fact,
seeing this connection between Balder, Adonis, Osiris, and Christ was one of the key
elements in his own conversion to Christianity. He describes the event in a letter to
Arthur Greeves in 1931,
Now what [Hugo] Dyson and [J. R. R.] Tolkien showed me was this: that if I met
the idea of sacrifice in a Pagan story I didn’t mind it at all: again, that if I met the
idea of a god sacrificing himself to himself…I liked it very much and was
mysteriously moved by it: again, that the idea of the dying and reviving god
(Balder, Adonis, Bacchus) similarly moved me provided I met it anywhere except
in the Gospels. The reason was that in Pagan stories I was prepared to feel the
myth as profound and suggestive of meanings beyond my grasp even tho' I could
not say in cold prose ‘what it meant.’134
Starr helpfully interprets this event: “So the fact of the crucifixion did not
communicate any meaning to Lewis, but the myth of it did, and that was enough to
convert him.”135 This was an epiphanic moment in a journey that had begun much earlier.
One of the key moments in the rising action of his conversion is of similar accent. Lewis
records the devastating effect of an overheard conversation, “…the hardest boiled of all
the atheists I ever knew sat in my room on the other side of the fire and remarked that the
evidence of the historicity of the Gospels was really surprisingly good. ‘Rum thing,’ he
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went on. ‘All that stuff of Frazer’s about the Dying God. It almost looks as if it had really
happened once.’”136
Without tracing the full history of this development on Lewis’ thought, the
conclusions he finally reached on the matter were that the ancient mythologies, at their
best, were able to capture something real of what God was doing historically
(“accommodation,” as Reilly calls it137). In a sense God was preparing humanity for the
moment when all this mythological speculation would come into focus as the historical
event of the incarnation—Myth would become Fact.
Just as, on the factual side, a long preparation culminates in God’s becoming
incarnate as Man, so, on the documentary side, the truth first appears in mythical
form and then by a long process of condensing or focusing finally becomes
incarnate as History. This involves the belief that Myth in general is not merely
misunderstood history (as Euhemerus thought) nor diabolical illusion (as some of
the Fathers thought) nor priestly lying (as the philosophers of the Enlightenment
thought), but, at its best, a real though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on
human imagination.138
Stated similarly elsewhere, one is dealing with “a real event on the one hand [Christ] and
dim dreams or premonitions of that same event on the other [Balder and Osiris]. It is like
watching something come gradually into focus; first it hangs in the clouds of myth and
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ritual, vast and vague, then it condenses, grows hard and in a sense small, as a historical
event in first century Palestine.”139 And finally from his most focused work on the idea,
The old myth of the Dying God, without ceasing to be myth, comes down from
the heaven of legend and imagination to the earth of history. It happens—at a
particular date, in a particular place, followed by definable historical
consequences. We pass from a Balder or an Osiris, dying nobody knows when or
where, to a historical Person crucified (it is all in order) under Pontius Pilate. By
becoming fact it does not cease to be myth: that is the miracle.140
The combined force of these three citations is that the presence of “pagan christs”
in the history of culture does not show Christianity to be false, but is exactly what one
should expect to be the case if it were true. It would be more problematic if they were not
there. Concludes Lewis, “If God chooses to be mythopoeic—and is not the sky itself a
myth—shall we refuse to be mythopathic? For this is the marriage of heaven and earth:
Perfect Myth and Perfect Fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our
wonder and delight, addressed to the savage, the child, and the poet in each one of us no
less than the moralist, the scholar, and the philosopher.”141 Note that the list of persons he
presents ranges the spectrum of language from the scientist to the poet, from the ancient
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to the modern. While a full treatment of how the Gospel story reconciles myth to history
is not possible at this moment, McMillan offers a sufficiently concise summary of its
implications for the needs at hand: “As God raised man to a new dignity by taking on his
form in the supreme act of reconciliation, so myth assumes a new dignity and
significance as God’s chosen language for revealing Himself to man. Just as God became
man without ceasing to be God, so Lewis says that in Christianity the myth of the ‘dying
god’ becomes fact without ceasing to be myth.”142
The implication is clear: this thing called “myth” is an irreducible category if one
wishes to properly understand the currents of history—that is, it is tightly related to
“Reality.” This relationship of ancient myth to Biblical narrative will be a key factor in
the interpretation of the Genesis Fall in the next chapter.
Modernity has Dragons Too
To draw the above discussion back into the larger point of this chapter, because of
modernity’s preference for the abstract language of science and philosophy, and its belief
that such language is capable of speaking more sincerely about reality, the default
assumption is that a myth, because of its poetical character, must be false. Lewis sees this
played out whenever Christianity is compared to earlier “savage” religions. Since much
in those earlier religions seem “poetical” and are known to be false (note the a priori at
work), something like the resurrection of Christ, which sounds equally “poetical” must be
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equally false. But Lewis notes that syllogistically this is to say little more than “both are
poetical, therefore both are false,” which is question-begging.143
As discussed in the previous chapter, however, Lewis believes the modern view
of the world is deeply poetic and mythical in its total view of reality. He is not referring
to what real scientists mean in their precise and mathematical statements about the world
(to which Lewis shows the deference of a non-scientist), but to the artificial narrative of
Progress that is built upon it by the pseudo-scientist and popular author. Without
disputing Darwinism as a scientific theory of change, the idea of Inevitable Progress or
Scientism is “simply a myth, supported by no evidence whatsoever…What I want to
point out is the illegitimate transition from the Darwinian theorem in biology to the
modern myth of evolutionism or developmentalism or progress in general.”144
In the face of this, Lewis desired to show that the Christian view of the world,
whether ancient or Medieval, was not abandoned because modern science proved it
untrue.145 For one thing the developmental view of the universe preceded Darwin by a
generation being present already in Keat’s Hyperion and Wagner’s Ring cycle.146 Darwin
only gave this preexisting myth “the scientific reassurances it required.”147
Does scientific evidence then play no role in casting down one mythical universe
for another? Certainly not, says Lewis. A tipping-point does exist when the amount of
effort it takes to resolve scientific discrepancies with the prevailing model becomes too
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laborious or difficult. When this happens the mind or the culture will cast around for
another model that may have been around for a long time that will embrace more of the
data. But every age is influenced in its choice by the prevailing mindset. “No model is a
catalogue of ultimate realities, and none is a mere fantasy.”148 Each is attempting to deal
with all the phenomena in a way that “reflects the prevalent psychology” of the age. For
example, “Hardly any battery of new facts could have persuaded a Greek that the
universe had an attribute so repugnant to him as infinity; hardly any such battery could
persuade a modern that it is hierarchical.”
Thus Lewis argues that the old view was not “shattered by the inrush of new
phenomena,” but the reverse. “…When changes in the human mind produce a sufficient
disrelish of the old Model and a sufficient hankering for some new one, phenomena to
support that new one will obediently turn up. I do not mean at all that these new
phenomena are illusory. Nature has all sorts of phenomena in stock and can suit many
different tastes…Nature gives most of her evidence in answer to the questions we ask
her.”149 Stated differently, “If you take nature as a teacher she will teach you exactly the
lesson you had already decide to learn; this is only another way to say that nature does
not teach.”150
Lewis even suspects he understands the nature of the “disrelish” that provided
room for the Myth of Progress to cast aside the Myth of Christianity—the rise of the antisupernatural mood that he critiques in Miracles. There he argues that scientism and the
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modern mood exclude the possibility of the miraculous not on the basis of the evidence
(which as stated above is equally useful to various myths), but as an a priori assumption.
In fact, in another place Lewis practically throws up his hands in lament, crying out, “Has
it come to that? Does the whole vast structure of modern naturalism depend not on
positive evidence but simply on an a priori metaphysical prejudice? Was it devised not to
get in facts but to keep out God?”151 The answer to such a question is, of course,
unknowable, but it helps explain the depth of Lewis’ conviction on the matter.
If, in the final telling, all grand explanatory narratives end up being mythical, the
question may then become, why? Why does every age (including our own apparently)
insist on selecting particular sympathetic observations from science and history and
packaging them in such explanatory stories—that is, myth?
Myth: The Hardness of the Concrete
The answer to the question closing the last section contains a grand surprise that
will take the rest of the chapter to unpack. Until now “myth” has been understood as
existing on the poetic end of the language scale (opposite the language of science,
philosophy, and mathematics), and this is true so far as it goes. Like poetic narrative,
myth speaks with a concrete voice—virtuous and vicious people and dangerous beasts;
apples, bread, and stones; roads, mountains, and the sea. In it, even the gods take human
form. But the real potencies of myth are found beyond the poetic horizon, for Lewis
suggests that the language spectrum may in fact come full circle—that in great myth the
abstract has actually been presented by means of the concrete. In a sense the spectrum
itself is transcended. He says, “Of this tragic dilemma [the mutual exclusivity of the
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abstract and the concrete] myth is a partial solution. In the enjoyment of a great myth we
come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only as an
abstraction.”152 The next section will lay bare how Lewis thinks it does this, but it must
be clear here what he is actually asserting.
When confronted with a great myth, the hearer is not being exposed to “truth” per
se—that is, a propositional statement about Reality—but to an accommodated form of
Reality itself. The bird of longing is caught, or very nearly, for a moment—in the net of
story.153 The abstract has been translated into a concrete for both enjoyment and
contemplation. Thus myth transcends the abstract-concrete dilemma: “Myth is the
isthmus which connects the peninsular world of thought with that vast continent we really
belong to. It is not like truth, abstract; nor is it, like direct experience, bound to the
particular.”154
In myth then one tastes of a universal principle without stating it. The
enchantment, however, can last only so long as its mythical form is maintained. To
translate a myth into propositional speech by intellectual scrutiny will yield only abstract
propositions; “The moment we state this principle, we are admittedly back in the world
of abstraction. It is only while receiving the myth as a story that you experience the
principle concretely.”155 Starr sums this up brilliantly,
Myth communicates holistic meaning to our immediate perceptions. It bypasses
the abstracting reason and linear (time bound) language (which is to say it
bypasses the cognitive space between sign and signified) and enters immediately,
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intuitively into our understanding so that it is not an object containing meaning,
but rather is the concrete meaning itself. Myth allows subject to commingle with
object with greater immediacy and intimacy, and it allows thinking and
experiencing to occur simultaneously.156
The reader can actually experience the force of this principle by means of a
particular myth.157 Orpheus, son of Apollo and Calliope, is bereaved of his new wife
Eurydice. In great mourning he comes before the under-throne of Pluto and Proserpine to
beg for her release. It is granted for him to lead her back to the surface on the condition
that he not look upon her until they reach the upper air. With great joy, he leads her forth
until they have nearly reached the outlet, then, in a forgetful moment, he turns to make
sure she is still following. At the glance she disappears and is lost. So too with myth.
What is more, it transcends even the words in which it comes. Argues Lewis,
“The man who first learns what is to him a great myth through a verbal account which is
badly or vulgarly or cacophonously written, discounts and ignores the bad writing and
attends solely to the myth. He hardly minds about the writing. He is glad to have the
myth on any terms.”158
In Lewis’ densest literary tome, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, he
illustrates the manner in which even semi-mythic language can affect the reader. He
summarizes a passage about the sunrise in the translation style of Douglas, “Saturn draws
off into dim distances behind the circulat world of Jupiter—Aurora opens the window of
her hall—crystalline gates are unfolded—the great assault is ready and marches forward
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with banners spread, ‘piercing the dark rampart of night.’”159 Comments Lewis, “This is
not simply a better or worse way of describing what we see. It is a way of making us see
for always what we have sometimes felt, a vision of natural law in its angelic
grandeur…of the pomp and majesty mingled even in the sweetest and most gracious of
Nature’s workings.”
Thus, for Lewis, myth offers the promise, not only of providing the needed
“looking along” perspective for which modernity is so starved, but of actually
transcending both “looking at” and “looking along” to offer real knowledge of Higher
Reality in se. The means by which it does so is the remaining question.
Past Watchful Dragons: How Myth Works on the Imagination
In his youth Lewis’ suffered from a sort of “divided mind.” He was on one side a
rationalist, with a strong belief in the utility of the human intellect and the necessity of
reason as a guide to coherent thought. Yet he was also an idealist or romantic,
experiencing all the emotional yearnings of the Blue Flower, and delighting in the
existential search for ultimate meaning. His insistence on holding together these two
incongruous traits has earned him epithets like “romantic rationalist.”160 His growing up
has been expressed as a journey to unify these two “hemispheres” of his conscious life.161
McMillan extends this attempt to what he considered the struggle of Lewis’ entire
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generation—the attempt to heal “the division between the spiritual and physical that
characterizes the minds of most modern men.” 162 McMillan argues that the possibility of
healing for both lies in the restoration of the “sacramental imagination.”
It is well known how at nine years old, Lewis picked up a copy of George
MacDonald’s Phantastes at a train station bookstall and found that his imagination had
been “baptized.”163 While his journey need not be chronicled here, it is sufficient to say
that he ultimately found in myth the unifying principle he had sought in order to unite his
imagination and his reason, poetry to science, subjective experience to objective reality.
The discovery consisted in his realization, growing over many years, that he loved and
even in some sense embraced many ideas that his intellect actually rejected as
unreasonable or incredible. As already mentioned, he loved the death-resurrection myths
of Balder and Osiris, but recoiled at the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The difference was
that the former stories were not being attended to by his intellect at all, but were passing
directly into his mind via his imagination. Yet the claims of Christianity, in part because
of childhood churchgoing, had always been addressed primarily to his intellect as
propositions to be believed as true or rejected as false. As such, he did his rational duty
and rejected them as incredible. In short, the demand for reverence had actually shortcircuited his ability to embrace the stories.164
He began to realize that a certain kind of story might overcome this dilemma.
“…supposing that by casting all these things into an imaginary world, stripping them of
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their stained-glass and Sunday school associations, one could make them for the first time
appear in their real potency? Could one not thus steal past those watchful dragons?”165
The “dragons” here mentioned seems to be the abstracting intellect outlined previously,
and mythic storytelling (as reflected here in Fairy Story) is the mode of delivery he
discovered. The manner in which the mythic mode succeeds will here be discussed under
two heads, which cover the same material, but in two different rhetorical forms.
Myth and Imagination—Echo and Response
Lewis gathered from his own personal and literary experiences the idea that the
primary appeal of mythic stories was not to the scrutinizing intellect but the faculty of the
imagination.166 Simply defined, the imagination was, for Lewis, the “cause[ing] to exist
the mental pictures of material objects, and even human characters, and events.”167 The
interpretation Schakel gives this is instructive: Lewis’ corpus-wide use of the term
“emphasizes imagination’s involvement with the concrete in contrast with reason’s
concern with abstractions; with fiction rather than fact; with making up, ‘creating,’ rather
than observing, with integration rather than analysis and identification.”168
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Imagination Trumps Intellect
In deference to the watchful dragons, imagination’s relationship to the intellect
may be best illustrated by an example that does not involve Christianity. Lewis identifies
this imaginative factor at work in modernity’s preferred myth—the Myth of Inevitable
Progress. In offering an explanation for the myth’s vast popularity, he offers two concrete
images from the external world that are used to establish the credibility of the myth.169
First, while one does not see “things” becoming other “things,” one does see organisms
doing so—acorns become oak trees; eggs become chickens. Second, one also sees
machines progressing through constant stages of improvement. “These two apparent
instances are quite enough to convince the imagination that Evolution in a cosmic sense
is the most natural thing in the world. It is true that reason cannot here agree with
imagination,” since these instances consist only in a kind of “sleight of hand.” The acorn
was dropped by a full-grown oak, the egg by a full-grown chicken. Likewise, every
invented machine, traced back to its crudest ancestor, came from a much more advanced
thing—the mind of a human genius. “In other words, all the immediate plausibility of the
Myth has vanished. But it has vanished only because we have been thinking it will
remain plausible to the imagination, and it is the imagination which makes the Myth: it
takes over from rational thought only what it finds convenient.”170 It would seem that the
imagination’s threshold of assent is more easily passed (or passed in a different way) than
the intellect’s. But this ability of the imagination to apprehend something that the
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intellect, in its own proper function, cannot embrace allows the mythic story to “sneak
past the watchful dragons.”
Turning to the Christian myth, and assuming also that it is true, one is not merely
dealing with a myth—but the myth. This myth originates in the same Creator who made
the very organs that were meant to receive them. As the pilgrim John in Pilgrim’s
Regress struggles to navigate the dark passages of the mountain beyond the chasm of
Paccatum Adae, Mr. Wisdom’s voice comes to him telling that what he is doing could
only be mythology. But another voice (presumably that of his Creator) answers saying,
“Child, if you will, it is mythology. It is but truth, not fact: an image, not the very real.
But then it is My mythology…this is My inventing, this is the veil under which I have
chosen to appear even from the first until now. For this end I made your senses and for
this end your imagination, that you might see My face and live.”171
By way of example, Lewis illustrates myth’s operation on a most difficult
theological question—the freedom-determinism debate—using the Oedipus myth. He,
who was prophesied would murder his father, is subsequently exposed, adopted, and, in
ignorance of his true parentage, is thereby enabled to fulfill the prophecy. Says Lewis,
“We have just had set before our imagination something that has always baffled the
intellect: we have seen how destiny and free will can be combined, even how free will is
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the modus operandi of destiny. The story does what no theorem can quite do. It may not
be ‘like real life’ in the superficial sense: but it sets before us an image of what reality
may well be like at some more central region.”172Smith has well summarized Lewis’
intentions here,
He [Lewis] was concerned to dispel the popular notion that whatever is
imaginative is, by its very nature, false or nonexistent. What the ordinary person
fails to perceive is that there are some aspects of reality that can be conveyed in
no other way than imaginatively. Inasmuch as reality itself transcends the most
abstract language, the imagination can offer, when properly focused, higher
integrative levels, helping to lead the receptive mind toward a supraverbal
apprehension of reality that draws upon the mind’s innate capabilities of
recognizing truth when presented with it. Thus by imagination Lewis meant
something far more important than the aesthetic experience of the fabrication of
fantasies.173
Myth’s ability, then, to bypass the intellect and speak directly to the imagination, which
is itself capable of holding mythic images without reducing them to propositions, creates
the possibility of a non-discursive, non-propositional aspect of knowledge.
Imagination Serves Intellect
A danger may exist at this point of thinking that Lewis is downgrading the
epistemological role of the intellect. Lewis makes very clear, however, that this is not his
intent:
But it must not be supposed that I am in any sense putting forward the
imagination as the organ of truth. We are not talking of truth, but of meaning:
meaning which is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood, whose
antithesis is not error but nonsense. I am a rationalist. For me, reason is the natural
organ of truth; but imagination is the organ of meaning. Imagination, producing
new metaphors or revivifying old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition.174
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Now the argument comes full circle. Given that all language about non-physical
objects must be metaphorical (including the scientific), Lewis identifies the imagination
as the faculty capable of absorbing metaphorical speech and assigning to it “meaning,”
thereby allowing the intellect to construct propositional truth from it and test it. This act
of propositional construction, of course, ends the mythic quality of the language, but it
seems to be, for Lewis, the only means the intellect has for addressing metaphor—it must
first come through the imagination and be given meaning by it, for without a “meaning,”
no evaluation of truth or falsity can be made. Thus the opposite of meaning is not
falsehood but nonsense. To bring it first to the intellect, however, would result in its
immediate dismissal as non- or sub-rational, and hence meaningless. In this then, the
imagination serves the intellect by granting meaning to metaphorical language, which is
exactly the thing the intellect cannot on its own terms do. He thus speaks of the
imagination as a “maid” and reason as a “mother.”175
Lewis has made this kind of argument before regarding the faculty of
“sentiment.”176 Lewis argues in Abolition of Man that external reality, due to its
particular nature, can warrant particular sentiment—the waterfall truly merits the epithet
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“sublime.” Such sentiment is not merely a reflection of the speaker’s internal subjective
mood, but rather represents the point of connection between the intellect and the
passions. “The head rules the belly through the chest—the seat…of Magnanimity—
Sentiment—these are the indispensible liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral
man. It may even be said that it is by the middle element that man is man: for by his
intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.”177 The relationship of the
intellect to imagination may bear a strong resemblance to that of the intellect to
sentiment. The difference is that sentiment serves as “the chest,” mediating between the
head and viscerals, whereas the imagination mediates between Higher Reality and the
finite intellect by means of its non-discursive story-shaped interpretive capacities. The
intellect may then contemplate it by means of its discursive propositional language
faculties (admitting the loss that comes with the translation of myth into propositional
speech).
This sentiment-imagination analogy is enhanced by what Lewis says in Preface to
Paradise Lost:
Certain things, if not seen as lovely or detestable, are not being correctly seen at
all. When we try to rouse some one’s hate of toothache in order to persuade him
to ring up the dentist, this is rhetoric; but even if there were no practical issue
involved, even if we only wanted to convey the reality of toothache for some
speculative purpose or for its own sake, we should still have failed if the idea
produced in our friend’s mind did not include the hatefulness of toothache.
Toothache, with that left out, is an abstraction. Hence the awakening and
moulding of the reader’s or hearer’s emotions is a necessary element in that vision
of concrete reality which poetry hopes to produce.178
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This is not then an act of mere rhetoric, for rhetoric evokes the imagination
merely for the sake of arousing passions necessary for persuasion. But poetry
(specifically epic or mythic poetry) arouses passion for the sake of imagination.179
Some judgments—whether “sentimental” or “imaginative”—are warranted as part
of the epistemological process and the objective nature of reality, but cannot arise within
the intellect qua intellect, due to its own abstracting nature. In the end, whether
discussing Sentiment or Imagination, both serve the intellect but do not dethrone it.
The Overthrow of Both in Myth
One further comment must be made before leaving for the next heading. Starr
correctly argues (and it is one of the pivotal distinctions in his analysis) that much of the
tension between imagination and intellect—between myth and truth—arises because of
humanity’s placement in the hierarchy of reality. As seen earlier in the chapter, Lewis
believed in an hierarchical universe—more specifically the universe asserted by
Christianity. Humans are both earth-bound and fallen.180 As such in the muddled sublunar fog, imagination and intellect appear to be in competition, but no reason exists for
believing this is how it is beyond “the veil.” One of the great achievements of the Space
Trilogy (and in particular Perelandra) is the offering up of an imaginative construction
whereby, in the Higher Trans-lunar Realities, these distinctions fall away.
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As Ransom argues with the darkness on the eve of his battle with the Un-man, he
comes to a patent realization of what has been latently bouncing around in him during his
entire adventure. He initially resists the idea of crass monomachy, because
it would degrade the spiritual warfare to the condition of mere mythology. But
here he got another check. Long since on Mars, and more strongly since he came
to Perelandra, Ransom had been perceiving that the triple distinction of truth from
myth and both from fact was purely terrestrial–was part and parcel of that
unhappy division between soul and body which resulted from the Fall. Even on
earth the sacraments existed as a permanent reminder that the division was neither
wholesome nor final. The incarnation had been the beginning of its
disappearance. In Perelandra it would have no meaning at all. Whatever happened
here would be of such a nature that earth-men would call it mythological.181
Thus, in Lewis’ presentation of a fictionalized adaptation of the Christian
universe, the very borders of myth and truth are breached. On earth “Myth” (imagination)
and “Truth” (intellect) are competing windows by which to see “Fact.” Yet in Higher
Reality, this competition is overthrown. As was seen earlier, the great Myth itself has
broken into time and become Fact. Thus in the Incarnation, that central myth of
Christianity, the thesis of Reason and the antithesis of Imagination find their Aufhebung.
Of course, the only earthly application of the above (as opposed to Lewis’ fictional use of
it) is to once again thrust it forward as an eschatological possibility. Yet, according to
Christianity, Myth’s work now is a foretaste of that reality that humanity was created for
and will one day both enjoy and contemplate. Starr summarizes this well,
Lewis’s definitions of truth and myth were refined based on his hierarchical and
sacramental understanding of reality. On earth, truth is abstract; in heaven it is
concrete. On earth, myth is divorced from history…except in the single instance
of the Incarnation of Christ–when ‘myth became fact.’ In heaven, myth is reality,
but it is also the source of abstract truth in the ‘valley of separation’ here below…
In our world they [truth, reason, and language] are tools for knowing; in
heavenly realms they are personifications: Truth, Reason, and Language Himself.
As such, what are abstracting tools for knowing on earth are concrete realities in
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heaven. On our silent planet, truth is merely a correspondence between reality and
mind…But when Language Himself…affects us [as through myth], we are
connected so perfectly to reality that abstract truth is transcended and fact
becomes so completely known as not to be object but meaning itself.182
It is now time to explore this “sacramental” aspect of reality.
Higher Reality in a Minor Key: Transposition and the Sacramental Nature of Nature
The operation of myth can also be described under a second heading. It does not
exclude the above discussion, but simply exists alongside it—or perhaps it may be
thought of as a “model” for expressing it. As has been seen already, Lewis was at least a
metaphysical dualist, believing in both a Nature and a Supernature. Myth presented a
means of using the concrete imagery from Nature to communicate something of
Supernature. Myth, however, is only a unique subset of things possessing this power.
Lewis believed this ability was a property of all of Nature in varying degrees.
In his sermon entitled “Transposition,” Lewis attempts to offer an explanation of
glossolalia.183 While the concern here is not “tongues,” Lewis’ method of explanation is
important. He considers how it could be possible for higher natures to manifest
themselves within or even by means of lower natures—that is, how is it that a simple
hyper-ecstatic fit and true speaking in tongues can be indistinguishable to the skeptical
observer? The question may be asked of many things: how a Sacrament can look so much
like simple eating of food, or the enraptured state of the mystic can be expressed in much
the same language as erotic love. Or stated on the terms of the skeptic, what difference
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can there be between love and lust since they both result in the same act, or revenge and
justice since the result for the criminal is the same?
Lewis’ answer is his theory of “Transposition”—that reduction or accommodation
that occurs when something from a higher reality is “transposed” into a lower reality. He
explains the problem in terms very similar to “looking along/looking at,” “For myself, I
find that if, during a moment of intense aesthetic rapture, one tries to turn round and catch
by introspection what one is actually feeling, one can never lay one’s hand on anything
but a physical sensation.”184 He offers as an example the nausea one feels from a rocking
ship and that associated with falling in love. Despite the similarity (identity, even) in the
biological sensation, one is pleasurable and the other is not. For Lewis, “introspection can
discover no difference at all between my neural response to very bad news and my neural
response to the overture of The Magic Flute. If I were to judge simply by sensations, I
should come to the absurd conclusion that joy and anguish are the same thing, that what I
most dread is the same with what I most desire.”185 This, of course, is not so.
Now on the assumption that the emotional life is richer or higher than the life of
the sensations (not in a moral sense, but only that it is “richer, more varied, more subtle”)
the follow three things can be noticed:
1. Sensatory nerves do respond to emotions both “adequately and exquisitely.”
2. The available responses of the nerves are more limited than are the emotions
(so defined in their more rich and subtle nature).
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3. Sensory nerves compensate for their inadequacy by using the same sensation
for multiple emotional states.186
Examples for this process abound in every area of life. When translating from a
language with a large vocabulary into a language with a smaller one, some words will
have to hold multiple meanings; when transcribing an orchestral piece for the piano,
limited piano keys will have to stand for a diversity of instrumentation. Even attempting
to reduce a three dimensional landscape to two will require artistic “perspective.” Many
times throughout his writings Lewis uses Abbott’s Flatlanders to illustrate various
points.187 Creatures (Flatlanders) who exist only in a flat two dimensions could
understand a line (one dimension) and a square (two dimensions), but a cube could only
represent itself to them in their own perspective as just another square.
From all these examples Lewis derives two conclusions. First, one’s ability to
understand the lower medium is fully possible only by understanding the higher one.188
The pianist who knows the orchestral score has the advantage of someone who, knowing
only the piano score, doubts the existence of other instruments. So too with the picture,
we understand “perspective” because we exist in three dimensions. Now it is true that the
two-dimensional skeptic can always claim that one is simply making things up—that the
picture really is only lines in two dimensions—but Lewis’ response to such a skeptic will
have to wait for the next section, for his answer rests upon the kind of person the skeptic
is—or is unwilling to be.
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Second, while Lewis uses the word “symbol” for this manifestation in lower
reality of the higher, not all such “symbols” are adequate in all cases of transposition. For
example, hand writing communicates by a simple sign the much more advanced reality of
spoken language. But no real relationship exists between the sign and the reality other
than convention. Not so of a picture. “Pictures are part of the visible world themselves
and represent it only by being part of it. Their visibility has the same source…in it the
thing signified is really in a certain mode present.”189 The best word for this, says Lewis,
is “sacramental.” The relationship is one of correspondence—not one-to-one
correspondence—but of degrees of correspondence that are both true and meaningful. His
clearest example of this may come from Mere Christianity, where he compares the maplike role of Theology to one’s private religious experience:
The map is admittedly only coloured paper, but there are two things you have to
remember about it. In the first place, it is based on what hundreds and thousands
of people have found out by sailing the real Atlantic. In that way is has behind it
masses of experience just as real as the one you could have from the beach; only,
while yours would be a single isolated glimpse, the map fits all those different
experiences together. In the second place, if you want to go anywhere, the map is
absolutely necessary. As long as you are content with walks on the beach, your
own glimpses are far more fun than looking at a map. But the map is going to be
more use than walks on the beach if you want to get to America.190
The point here is that the map is useful because it actually participates in the
reality of the ocean, while never ceasing to be “only coloured paper.” The end result for
Lewis seems to be that the entire natural order is potentially revelatory—not discursively
or propositionally (or even abstractly). But in its very concreteness, it plays out with
varying degrees of completeness the greater symphonies of Higher Reality—the higher
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mind on the lower body, higher spiritual nourishment on the lower bread and wine, even
the much higher three-personed God in the concrete terms of lower human personhood,
image bearing, and even marriage.191 “Everywhere the great enters the little—its power to
do so is almost the test of its greatness.”192 And the ultimate Higher Reality—God’s own
self—intends that the natural world should so speak:
Everything God has made has some likeness to Himself. Space is like Him in its
hugeness: not that the greatness of space is the same kind of greatness as God’s,
but it is a sort of symbol of it, or a translation of it into non-spiritual terms…In the
higher mammals we get the beginnings of instinctive affection. That is not the
same things as the love that exists in God: but it is alike it—rather in the way that
a picture drawn on a flat piece of paper can nevertheless be ‘like’ a landscape.193
Of course, all this background leads to the germane question: How is myth a form
of transposition? Or how is myth thusly sacramental?
Hearing the Call: Longing Knows the Tune Myth Plays
Now when it comes to works of literature, the principle of transposition still
applies but with a uniquely existential twist. While even scientific language is inherently
metaphorical, literature, and specifically poetic literature, is more at home in its
metaphorical skin. For a sense of contrast, Lewis outlines in Allegory of Love two
possible literary methods by which to express the relationship between things material
and things immaterial—Allegory and Symbolism.194
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These two methods stand in reverse direction to one another. A writer employs
allegory when s/he starts with an immaterial fact (like Courage, Chastity, or Love) and
“then invent[s] visibilia to express them.”195 It is a personification of our passions,
exhibited in classic works like Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress and The Holy War,
Guillaume de Lorris’ Roman de la rose, and even Lewis’ own Pilgrim’s Regress. But if
allegory is possible, then “it is possible that our material world in its turn is the copy of
an invisible world.”196 This world may in fact be a copy or a picture of something else.
And therein lies the difference between allegory and the symbolic-sacramental use of
language, “The allegorist leaves the given—his own passions—to talk of that which is
confessedly less real, which is a fiction. The symbolist leaves the given to find that which
is more real…For the symbolist it is we who are the allegory.” Starr admirably gets to the
pith of Lewis’ point, “…whereas allegory contains meaning, myth simply means.”197
One will recall from the earlier discussion on longing, that in the experience of
Joy, however fleeting, the reception is akin to remembering. This is the existential
problem, “we grasp at a[n imaginative] state and find only a succession of events in
which the state is never quite embodied.”198 In this state, Myth finds us, and serves as a
“net” to snare, if only for a few minutes, some piece of Reality that our intellect cannot
seem to organize, reduce, and grasp. Ziegler draws the connection between imagination’s
work and existential longing, “Imagination is an individual’s mental activity which
metaphorically interprets sensibiles or expresses insensibles, the activity often inciting
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the experience of Sehnsucht.”199 Thus by myth’s operation on the imagination, the reader
has the emotional experience of “coming home,” having the longing satisfied, of entering
the mystery—the itch scratched. Reality presented by the myth is received as something
familiar, something already loved and sought. The longing exists prior to the myth, but it
is that longing which recognizes itself in the myth. The reader has the profound
emotional response, again fleetingly, but genuinely of Joy, for the net of myth has snared
the bird of Reality for a moment.
This, Lewis apparently believed, was the point and goal of the art of storytelling,
“Art, indeed, may be expected to do what life cannot do: but so it has done. The bird has
escaped us. But it was at least entangled in the net for several chapters. We saw it close
and enjoyed the plumage. How many ‘real lives’ have nets that can do as much?”200 So
committed was Lewis to this singular value of literature, that Hart can conclude,
“Deploring the kind of academic classification which tends to equate seriousness and
difficulty with merit, Lewis affirms that any piece of writing, serious or frivolous,
complex or simple, is good if it creates an image which impresses and haunts the mind of
the reader as an incarnation of reality, in other words if it is mythic.”201
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Suspending Disbelief: The Role of the Reader in Myth
When speaking of mythic storytelling, Lewis makes an important comment that
both summarizes what has been said already and suggests the final component of the
equation:
If it [mythical discourse] is well used by the author and meets the right reader, it
has the same power: to generalize while remaining concrete, to present in
palpable form not concepts or even experiences but whole classes of experience,
and to throw off irrelevancies. But at its best it can do more; it can give us
experiences we have never had and thus, instead of ‘commenting on life,’ can add
to it. I am speaking, of course, of the thing itself, not my own attempts at it.202
It seems that the success of a myth is in some way dependent upon the nature of the
reader who receives it…or fails to.
In Experiment, Lewis lays out the precondition of being an effective recipient of
any story or art—a willingness to receive it. Most people merely use a story, that is, they
want to “do things with it.” They desire that it be a “self-starter for certain imaginative
and emotional activity of [their] own.”203 But this, says Lewis, is the way one treats a toy
or an icon, not a piece of art. When it comes to truly engaging any artistic artifact, “We
must begin by laying aside as completely as we can all our own preconceptions, interests,
and associations. After the negative effort comes positive. We must use our eyes. We
must look, and go on looking till we have certainly seen exactly what is there. We sit
down before the picture in order to have something done to us, not that we may do things
with it. The first demand any work of any art makes upon us is surrender.”204 This is not
to be confused with passivity. It is rather a form of active obedience. That Lewis
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considers this a “demand” demonstrates how sincerely he takes the role of the reader in
the equation.
At this point perhaps more than any other in this dissertation, Lewis presents
himself as an academic authority. Nearly half of his academic writings wrestle with the
question of the reader’s role in establishing the meaning and value of a story.205 An
exposition of Lewis’ entire of theory of literature is beyond the scope of this work, but
insofar as that theory impinges upon the reception of mythic literature, some account of it
must be made. Ziegler gives an adequate summary of the crucial relationship between the
reader and myth, “Myth, according to Lewis, cannot be defined structurally. It is, rather,
defined functionally; that is, any work is a myth if it is received as mythic by those
responding to the work.”206 Given the necessity of the reader’s proper response, it is
surprising how little is said in secondary literature about it. To the best knowledge of this
writer, the following taxonomy of reader-oriented problems has not been developed
anywhere in the secondary literature.
Faith Like a Child: How the Adult Kills Myth
Lewis believed that the ultimate meaning or value of a book, poem, or story did
not reside where many of the critics of his day put it. It did not lie in the background story
of the author’s life and influences which produced the book,207 nor did it ultimately lie in
the critical scholar’s response to it insofar as it reflects the dominant literary values of the
time. The final meaning of a story did not even rest in the author’s original intention.
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While the author is certainly a sui generis authority on its content and further knows what
s/he intended to mean, when it comes to meaning no author is in a position to judge the
meaning of the work.208 Lewis rather, after defining “meaning” as —“the series or system
of emotions, reflections, and attitudes produced by reading it,” goes on to say,
The ideally false or wrong ‘meaning’ would be the product in the mind of the
stupidest and least sensitive and most prejudiced reader after a single careless
reading. The ideally true or right ‘meaning’ would be that shared (in some
measure) by the largest number of the best readers after repeated and careful
readings over several generations, different periods, nationalities, moods, degrees
of alertness, private pre-occupations, states of health, spirits, and the like
canceling one another out when (this is an important reservation) they cannot be
fused so as to enrich one another.209
Now since a story is judged to be a “good one” based on the pleasure it produces,
the literary critic does not necessarily have an advantage over the lay reader, nor even the
adult reader over the child. A later section will concern itself with the particular
difficulties of the critical reader, for the moment it is interesting to note that Lewis
believed that children may actually have an interpretive advantage over the adult reader,
who has the habit of throwing stumbling blocks in his own way.
Just Like a Grownup: The Problem of Myth as Children’s Story
Lewis points out that, to Modern Man, outgrowing fairy tales is a mark of
maturity and social development. To call literature “adult” is not just a term description,
but of approbation. To desire the fantastic literature of one’s youth is marked by the
pejorative term “childish,” and considered to be a case of “arrested development.”210
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Lewis, however, rejects this notion on three grounds. First, that of simple tu
quoque. To blush at a label such as “childish” or take pride in a label such as “adult” is
itself a mark of immaturity and adolescence. For the young to possess this urge in
moderation is healthy; young things ought to want to grow, but to be overwhelmed by a
fear of being childish or a desire to be “very grown up” shows a lack maturity.211
Second, Lewis argues that the modern view involves a false conception of growth,
for “surely arrested development consists not in refusing to lose old things but in failing
to add new things.”212 “Growth” should instead be understood as enrichment—“before I
had only one pleasure, now I have two.” Thus modernity’s insistence on the loss of the
one before the gaining of the other is not growth, it is simply change. If this were growth,
argues Lewis, then why stop at adulthood? Senility ought to be more highly valued still.
Third, Lewis argues that the association between fairy tales and children is only
accidental. After all many children do not like fairy stories, whereas many adults do.213 In
fact the aversion to fantastic tales is entirely a modern phenomena, “just as unfashionable
furniture gravitated to the nursery in Victorian houses,”214 so modernity relegated all
stories of the fantastic and preternatural to the children’s section of the library. It is a
function of cultural value, not absolute value. And as is clear throughout this chapter,
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Lewis believed modernity gets this wrong. He adds, “I am almost inclined to set it up as a
canon that a children’s story which is enjoyed only by children is a bad children’s story.
The good ones last. A waltz which you can like only when you are waltzing is a bad
waltz.”215
By way of defense, he offers the following example, “Consider Mr Badger in The
Wind and the Willows—that extraordinary amalgam of high rank, coarse manners,
gruffness, shyness, and goodness. The child who has once met Mr Badger has ever
afterwards, in its bones, a knowledge of humanity and of English social history which it
could not get in any other way.”216 Note that this apologetic comes in identical terms to
that which has already been used for myth. Clearly Lewis thought myth stands at this
point in common with all such stories of the fantastic. As such this serves as the first
preconception that a reader must abandon if s/he is really going to make the necessary
“surrender” to the story—that such a story is beneath their dignity, age, or status.
The Deceptive Tyranny of “Real Life”
Lewis wrote a little piece for Time and Tide in 1945, recalling a train ride into the
country that had filled him with an inexpressible joy. In spite of the fact that he knew
intellectually that the London suburbs were just as filled with jealousy, weariness, ill
temper, and anxiety as anywhere else, “…I could not help it—the clicking of all those
garden gates, the opening of all those front doors, the unanalysable home smell in all
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those little halls, the hanging up of all those hats, came over my imagination with all the
caress of a half-remembered bit of music.”217
He recognizes that he could have ignored the feeling had he chosen and focused
instead on his own trouble. But here is identified by analogy a second mistake a reader
can make. This so-called “real life” and this “unreasonable happiness” are usually
running side by side in life. In the very midst of all the cares of “real life,” like a “ghostcompartment which we see through the windows of a train at night, there runs something
else. We can ignore it if we choose; but it constantly offers to come in. Huge pleasures,
never quite expressible in words, sometimes (if we are careless) not even acknowledged
or remembered, invade us from that quarter.”
But within each of us abides an “inner wiseacre,” a “jailor” who wants us to
decline the offer. He advises us to worry instead or not to be selfish or complacent or that
we are being “adolescent” or that it is all illusion. But take note, says Lewis, “…he is
only trying to muddle you. The pleasure involves, or need involve, no illusion at all.
Distant hills look blue. They still look blue even after you have discovered that this
particular beauty disappears when you approach them. The fact that they look blue fifteen
miles away is just as much a fact as anything else. If we are to be realists, let us have
realism all round.” Herein is the lesson: the appearance of things is often the point— their
intended telos. The freshness and glory in the world is, in Christianity, what the Creator
made it, and this same Creator made the eyes to behold it. It is just possible then that the
stuff of creation was so made, simply to be met in the glory of its existential phenomena.
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The tendency of Modernity, however, is to probe the intangibles that stand behind
these experiences, calling these abstractions the “realities.” Lewis expresses the danger of
Modern Man’s position as the “disastrous discovery that we exist…I mean, it is
disastrous when instead of merely attending to a rose we are forced to think of ourselves
looking at the rose, with a certain type of mind and a certain type of eyes. It is disastrous
because, if you are not very careful, the colour of the rose gets attributed to our optic
nerves and its scent to our noses, and in the end there is no rose left.”218
Lewis, however, would remind that, “In the theatre…the play, the ‘appearance,’ is
the thing. All the backstage ‘realties’ exist only for its sake and are valuable only in so far
as they promote it.”219 In this, Lewis was clearly influenced by George MacDonald, for
Lewis selected the following penetrating thought for inclusion in his anthology:
In what belongs to the deeper meanings of nature and her mediation between us
and God, the appearances of nature are the truths of nature, far deeper than any
scientific discoveries in and concerning them. The show of things is that for
which God cares most, for their show is the face of far deeper things than they…it
is through their show, not through their analysis, that we enter into their deepest
truths. What they say to the childlike soul is the truest thing to be gathered of
them. To know a primrose is a higher thing than to know all the botany of it—just
as to know Christ is an infinitely higher thing than to know all theology, all that is
said about His person, or babbled about His work. The body of man does not exist
for the sake of its hidden secrets; its hidden secrets exist for the sake of its
outside—for the face and the form in which dwells revelation: its outside is the
deepest of it. So Nature as well exists primarily for her face, her look, her appeals
to the heart and the imagination, her simple service to human need, and not for the
secrets to be discovered in her and turned to man’s further use.220
Thus, returning to Lewis’ train ride, this “jailor” within every person seeks to
spoil all possible joys gleaned from meeting the world as it presents itself. Specifically in
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relation to myth, this mindset of taking-things-at-face-value is of absolute necessity when
encountering a myth. It must be embraced in its phenomena, not intellectually parsed for
its credibility. This would be to submit to the jailor, whom Lewis reminds,
is a sham realist. He accuses all myth and fantasy and romance of wishful
thinking: the way to silence him is to be more realist than he—to lay our ears
closer to the murmur of life as it actually flows through us at every moment and to
discover there all the quivering and wonder and (in a sense) infinity which the
literature that he calls realistic omits. For the story which gives us the experience
most like the experiences of living is not necessarily the story whose events are
most like those in a biography or a newspaper.”221
Now the critical scholar performs a particularly specific version of this mistake,
which will be outlined in the next major section, but given the ubiquitous application of
Lewis’ description here, it seemed to warrant its own place.
Horrid Red Things: Mistaking Images for Thought
One final roadblock that the modern mood casts in front of the average reader. It
consists of that tendency to assume the ancients were only capable of a literal
understanding of images like heavenly thrones, a divine Son ascending and descending
like a balloon, and a benevolent Father in a sky-palace (an assumption which Lewis has
already critiqued). The modern mind finds such belief repugnant, for science has shown
the universe to be different than this picture. Further whenever modern theology answers
by hedging and redefining these stories in non-supernatural ways, the modern man cries
foul. “Of course, he says, ‘Once the doctrines are there, clever people can invent clever
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arguments to defend them…,’”222 but it would be better simply to admit the error and
start over. Lewis believes this to be a fallacy that confuses the operation of the
imagination with that of the intellect, and his response further highlights their
relationship. Lewis proceeds by illustration to construct a three-point argument.
First, whenever he thinks about London the mental picture that accompanies it is
that of Euston Station. He knows that this image is false insofar as Euston Station is not
the whole of London. But the real London, due to its size, cannot be imaginatively
pictured in its entirety. Yet this does not make his knowledge of London false. Similarly
too with large numbers, “…when we say that the Sun is ninety-odd million miles away,
we understand perfectly clearly what we mean by this number; we can divide and
multiply it by other numbers and we can work out how long it would take to travel that
distance at any given speed. But this clear thinking is accompanied by imaging which is
ludicrously false to what we know that the reality must be.”223 Thus his first conclusion:
Thought is distinct from the imaginative mental pictures that accompany it and may be
true even when the pictures are false.
Second, he once knew a lady who told her daughter that taking too many aspirin
would be poisonous. The girl disagreed because, when crushing an aspirin, one does not
find “horrid red things” inside. The girl clearly had a mental picture of “horrid red things”
when she thought of poison. This picture was false, but unlike the Euston Station
example, she believed it to be true. Still, says Lewis, this does not mean her thinking
about the deadly nature of poison is false simply because it also includes a false mental
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picture. If she told you something was poison, you would be foolish to reject her
statement simply because you knew “this child has an archaic and mythological idea of
poison as horrid red things.”224 Thus Lewis concludes that: Thought may be sound when
the images accompanying it are false, even if they are believed true.
Third, a language component intrudes that is reminiscent of discussions already
offered on the metaphorical nature of language. One may speak of London or poison
without mentioning Euston Station or horrid red things because these are both objects in
the world of senses, but “…very often when we are talking about something which is not
perceptible by the five senses we use words which, in one of the meanings, refer to things
or actions that are,” such as the following example: “I grasp your point”, “I see your
point”, “I follow you” all of which attempt to communicate the same intangible meaning
by the operations of hands, eyes, and feet. Poets, economists, and psychologists all
“…must talk of ‘complexes’ and ‘repressions’ as if desires could really be tied up in
bundles or shoved back; of ‘growth’ and ‘development’ as if institutions could really
grow like trees or unfold like flowers; of energy being ‘released’ as if it were an animal
let out of a cage.”225 Thus as has been argued several times already, such metaphors are
unavoidable when speaking of “supersensibles.”
Based on this argument, absurdity of mental images does not necessarily mean
absurdity of doctrine. Lewis has already argued that the ancient mind did not always
feature the material/immaterial distinction that is ever-present to the modern, but as soon
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as it was (say, by means of an Alexandrian education), they knew which one to choose.226
Thus, while it is almost impossible that the disciples could mistake the blue sky for the
throne room of God,
a man who really believes that ‘Heaven’ is in the sky may well, in his heart, have
a far truer and more spiritual conception of it than many a modern logician who
could expose that fallacy with a few strokes of his pen…[for] the huge dome of
the sky is of all things sensuously perceived the most like infinity. And when God
made space and worlds that move in space, and clothed our world with air, and
gave us such eyes and such imaginations as those we have, He knew what the sky
would mean to us. And since nothing in His work is accidental, if He knew, He
intended.227
The points to be gathered here are first, that the imagination miscarries less often
than the modern mind supposes, but, second, even when it does, it may still be framing its
images in a way compatible with the truth the intellect seeks.
Oh Ye of Little Faith: How the Critical Skeptic Kills Myth
Lewis thought the modern literary and theological critic often showed a particular
and multifaceted disregard or ignorance for the intrinsic nature of myth. This section in
some ways picks up where chapter 2’s critique of modern theology leaves off and
examines how it fairs particularly in relation to myth. Chapter 5 will bring this thread of
the discussion to a close by using much of the following to compare and contrast Lewis’
thought with trajectories in modern theology.
Anti-Supernaturalism: A Precluding Prejudice
Lewis’ polemic against anti-supernaturalism as laid out in his monograph
Miracles and the short essay in God in the Dock by the same name need not be rehearsed.
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It is sufficient to note that, given myth’s intention to bring the reader into contact with
Higher Reality, its success is contingent on the willingness of the reader to admit the
possibility of such a Higher Reality. This act of “surrender” to the nature of the medium,
however, is exactly the step the modern skeptic refuses to take. What demands
explanation here is why even the well-intentioned and honest skeptic (less reputable
kinds need not be dealt with) can always with integrity deny the Higher Realm on the
basis of the very evidence presented for it.
As the reader will recall in the above section on Transposition, when faced with
three dimensional figures manifesting themselves in two dimensional worlds, a Flatlander
skeptic could always say with integrity:
You keep on telling me of this other world and its unimaginable shapes which you
call solid. But isn’t it very suspicious that all the shapes which you offer me as
images or reflections of the solid ones turn out on inspection to be simply the old
two-dimensional shapes of my own world as I have always known it? Is it not
obvious that your vaunted other world, so far from being the archetype, is a dream
which borrows all its elements from this one?228
In similar fashion, in the underworld of The Silver Chair, the Witch-Queen, aided
by enchantment, argues against Aslan’s travelers that the overland does not exist because
all the evidence for it they can offer—a superlative light called the sun and a superlative
cat called a Lion—are nothing more than fictional enhancements of things in her “real”
world of lamps and house cats.229 On the basis of the material evidence presented, her
argument seems unanswerable. So too with the skeptic who seems able to account for
every offered evidence of the Higher Realm in terms of the material of the Lower.
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This, however, says Lewis, is exactly what one should expect. Recall that only the
one who knows the higher medium (the person in three dimensions) can understand the
lower (two dimensions). The person who looks only at the evidence “from below” will
only and always see “the square” and not “the cube”:
The brutal man never can by analysis find anything but lust in love; the Flatlander
never can find anything but flat shapes in a picture; physiology never can find
anything in thought except twitching of the grey matter. It is no good browbeating
the critic who approaches a Transposition from below. On the evidence available
to him his conclusion is the only one possible.230
Here Lewis offers an almost Anselmian fides quaerens intellectum—an understanding
that can only come after assent has been given. So long as one demands understanding
before belief, one will never see the Higher manifested in the Lower. It is precluded by
prejudice.
Lewis says that a myth to the modern critical skeptic is like a pointing finger to a
dog. To the dog, it can never be more than a finger. This is the problem with the
abstracting intellect in isolation; all evidence indicates and can only ever indicate a
finger, and the symbolic nature of the finger—that of pointing—is lost for lack of
evidence. Continues Lewis, “…in a period when factual realism is dominant we shall find
people deliberately inducing upon themselves this doglike mind. A man who has
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experienced love from within will deliberately go about to inspect it analytically from
outside and regard the results of this analysis as truer than his experience.” 231
This is in fact Lewis’ preferred explanation for why Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin did
not find God in outer space. Lewis suggests, “The Russians did find God in space without
knowing it, because they lacked the requisite apparatus for detecting him.”232 The
missing apparatus being roughly that lacked by an “idiot,” who denies the existence of
Shakespeare on the grounds that he has studied the plays and not found him a character in
any one of them.
The argument here is not that the skeptic must believe in the supernatural before
s/he can understand myth, but only that to understand the myth, s/he must be willing to
suspend disbelief and meet the myth on its own terms, without prejudice. Unless s/he
engages in this “act of surrender,” s/he will, with good conscience, find nothing in the
myth but incredible fantasy or perhaps an abstracted moral.
Myth and History: The Quest for Historie
The last major section outlined the flaw of how trying to get “back stage” can
destroy the meaning of the play, because it is unwilling to met the play in its
“appearance.” Instead it roots around in the wings of the theatre looking for something
more “real.” Lewis believed that modern critical scholarship often expressed a similar
desire to get behind the myth. In this case the desire was for the natural origins of the
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myth—that is, the historie. The idea is that the myth’s value is found in discovering the
historical and psychological events surrounding its origination.233
Lewis’ critique is not a denial that myth may have historical rootedness, but that a
tendency often exists to substitute the “cause” of a thing for its “explanation” or truth
value. It grows out of the idea that once causally explained, a belief becomes illegitimate.
In humorous fashion, Lewis calls this fallacy a “Bulverism” after the hypothetical Ezekiel
Bulver, “whose destiny was determined at the age of five when he heard his mother say
to his father—who had been maintaining that two sides of a triangle were together greater
than the third—‘Oh you only say that because you are a man.’”234
The preceding paragraph contains two moving parts—Lewis’ thoughts about both
the historicity of myths and what modernity does with the historical background.
Regarding the first, “history” and “myth” were not antagonistic categories for Lewis.
While he admits a general lack of interest in the history behind any given myth,235 he
does not deny that historical connections may exist. He admits, “I believe that in the huge
mass of mythology which has come down to us a good many different sources are
mixed—true history, allegory, ritual, the human delight in story telling, etc.”236 A myth
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may historically represent the beliefs of ancient peoples, be genuine history
accommodated to moral or pedagogical purposes, or be simply imaginative moralizing.
Lewis believed the strategy of many modern critics (and this will be discussed
more thoroughly in chapter 5) is to seek the history behind the narrative in conjunction
with the anti-supernatural assumption discussed above, believing that the myth’s
relevance lay in the history stripped of its mythological or fantastical components.
Contrary to this, Lewis believed that, whatever historical events exist that give
rise to a myth, their discovery is not the key to interpreting a myth. Regarding Old
Testament myths in particular he argues that, “If we could sort out all the fabulous
elements in the earlier stages and separate them from the historical ones, I think we might
lose an essential part of the whole process.”237 Returning again to the theatre image, he
identifies the modern trajectory in the study of Milton’s epic poetry,
To look away from the effect which the poem might be expected to produce, and
was calculated to produce, on the ordinary educated and Christian audience in
Milton’s time, and to consider instead all the connexions it may have had in
Milton’s private thinking, is like leaving the auditorium during a tragedy to hang
about the wings and see what the scenery looks like from there and how the actors
talk when they come off the stage. By doing so you will find out many interesting
facts, but you will not be able to judge or to enjoy the tragedy.238
When Lewis does express interest in a myth’s origination, he takes the “from
above” look discussed earlier, not the “from below” of the anthropologist. Lewis believed
ancient myths stood as early evidences of God’s speech to the pagan mind—that is, a
means of revelation. When addressing a question of whether ancient peoples were less
intelligent and therefore more easily religious, he suggests, “As to the fabulous events of
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the Old Testament, I very much doubt if you would be wise to chuck it out. What you get
is something coming gradually into focus…Then, in the New Testament the thing really
happens.” 239
To the point, Lewis does not deny that historical and psychological originating
factors exist or have intellectual value. But he reminds that, so long as one is more
interested in analyzing the anthropological components as an end—perhaps, best stated in
terms of “looking at”—one will be blinded to the work the myth is trying to do within the
reader by means of its own structure. The reader then has a responsibility to make an
initial “surrender of disbelief” to “looking along” the myth on its own terms.
Reductions: The Quest for Propositions
Another manifestation of the problems modern critics create for themselves in
approaching myth lies on the interpretive side. One may confuse the originating
principles for the value of the myth as suggested above, or one may attempt to exegete
the meaning of the myth in terms of discursive statements—that is, to reduce it to a moral
gleaned by the intellect. Lewis admits the intellectual reduction to a moral is possible and
even permissible, but it is a different and lesser good than what the myth offers. The
imagination craves different food than the intellect. Myth’s primary fruit is exactly that
kind the imagination loves best—things like, “irony, heroism, vastness, unity in
multiplicity, and a tragic close,”240—none of which are as easily apprehended by the
intellect. To do their work, myths must be lived with imaginatively in their totality and
wholeness, and not reduced to abstract principle.
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Lewis gives numerous examples of this process. In Discarded Image, he works
with the mythological implication of the planetary names in connection with their Roman
deities (Mars, god of war; Venus, goddess of love; and so on). While a few are
imaginable to the modern mind, most seem arbitrary or simply incoherent. Part of the
problem is the attempt to intellectually appropriate them. Rather “…the planetary
characters need to be seized in an intuition rather than built up out of concepts; we need
to know them, not to know about them, connaître not savoir.”241 Likewise, on the effects
of the four Medieval personality “Complexions” (the blood dominated Sanguine, the
phlegm dominated Phlegmatic, and so on), “Like the Planets, the Complexions need to be
lived with imaginatively, not merely learned as concepts. They do not exactly correspond
to any psychological classification we have been taught to make. But most of those we
know (except ourselves) will illustrate one or the other of the four tolerably well.”242
Similarly, in Four Loves, he speaks of the value of patriotic stories for youth,
The stories [of the great heroic acts of the past] are best when they are handed on
and accepted as stories. I do not mean by this that they should be handed on as
mere fictions (some of them are after all true). But the emphasis should be on the
tale as such, on the picture which fires the imagination, the example that
strengthens the will. The schoolboy who hears them should dimly feel—though of
course he cannot put it into words—that he is hearing saga. Let him be thrilled—
preferably ‘out of school’—by the ‘Deeds that won the Empire’; but the less we
mix this up with his ‘history lessons’ or mistake it for a serious analysis—worse
still, a justification—of imperial society, the better.243
This last quotation demonstrates the whole process rather well. Myth can be
presented and received; it cannot be analyzed without a kind of loss. It may be fully
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historical, vaguely historical, or non-historical without compromising its work on the
imagination. The point is that if the reader rushes into the myth with the intellectual
desire to “get the point,” s/he will certainly find an abstract intellectual conclusion that
may even be true, but it will have forced myth to undergo a kind of “humiliation” or
“degrading” analogous to the “emptying” Christ endured in the incarnation.244 The
“surrender” of the abstracting demands of the intellect is required in that moment so that
the imagination may be nourished by the concrete imagery presented.
Lewis’ Theory Considered
So far little critique has been offered of Lewis’ thoughts. They have been
presented entirely with the goal of understanding. Questions have been generally
suspended out of a desire to test Lewis’ theory even in the methodology of the document.
Lewis claimed that the first step to understanding an artifact is the willing “surrender” of
the observer’s own prejudices and opinions to the degree that they can experience the
work on its own terms and not merely as a useful “toy” or “icon.” So here the attempt
was made to get at exactly what Lewis thought, and as much as is possible on his own
terms, prior to allowing the critic to speak.245 The time has come, however, to voice a few
questions and apprehensions with the goals of concluding the discussion and laying
ground work for the next chapters.
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The Malfunctioning Imagination: The Problem of False Pictures
Lewis has argued that myth aims at the imagination, which is the primary faculty
of meaning. The imagination embraces the mythic narrative in its totality and
concreteness and derives a meaning from it that is non-discursive and non-propositional.
If the imagination’s work is primarily pictorial in nature, what happens if the imagination
constructs the wrong pictures? Lewis has already acknowledged that this happens in his
“London as Euston Station” illustration. Recall that he argued there that “thoughts” may
be true even when accompanied by “images” the person knows to be false or inadequate.
He further asserts that the “thoughts” may continue to be true even when accompanied by
false “images” that the person believes to be true (as with horrid red things as poison).
But what does this do to the reliability of Lewis’ model? If the imagination is the
key faculty that suggests meaning for a myth, and that myth is trying to present some
aspect of Higher Reality that humanity is desperately seeking, then it seems of great
importance the degree to which the imaginative faculty can be trusted. How can one have
confidence that what is apprehended by the imagination is really Higher Reality and not
simply imaginative, or even flawed, picture making? Does not Lewis himself draw a
most dramatic picture of the threat in Perelandra? Therein, the largest and most effective
aspect of the temptation of Tenedril is the Un-man’s attack upon her imaginative faculty.
If she is to Fall, it will be facilitated first by imagining non-lawful possibilities.246
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By way of answer, Lewis nowhere asserts that the imagination is infallible any
more than any other human faculty.247 The intellect, under the burden of illness,
weariness, or injury, may get wrong sums when doing math. Tired eyes do not see well,
and the faculty of memory muddles the past. Not to mention (primarily because it is
addressed in the next chapter) human sin and fallenness also affects every human faculty
in varying degrees.
Yet despite the known deficiencies in all our capacities, humans continue to trust
their eyes, their intellects, and their memories. The imagination is subject to all the flaws
common to our other faculties, plus a few unique to its own nature, and yet in the end,
one is still faced with the choice of Ramandu’s table.248 Presented with a great magical
feast of unknown origin and unknown effects, Caspian and his crew are told by a strange
woman that the food is good. Yet because they have had “a lot of queer adventures,” they
resist and ask, “How are we to know you’re a friend?” She replies simply, “You can’t
know…You can only believe—or not.”
There lies the imperfect choice as Lewis might have put it. One can either be a
complete skeptic of the imagination and have in return… nothing, or one can believe that,
like the other faculties, it is generally trustworthy under the conditions for which it was
generally made, and generally enjoy the glories it offers. If one requires infallibility of a
faculty before putting any in trust in it, one is quickly reduced to a lone Cartesian mind
sitting in a dark boiler room wondering if it even exists.
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Belief or Something Like It: The Problem of Belief
The question presented in the last section regarding “Truth” in the face of false
“images” believed true, raises a second question. What exactly is the role of belief in
Lewis’ model? But what does Lewis mean by “believed true?” Does he mean: 1. Belief in
the correspondence between the image and historical space-time (as in, the technical term
historie)—“I believe this myth ‘really happened’ more or less as imagined.” Or 2. Belief
in the profound meaning of the myth regardless of its relationship to history?
Lewis has already argued that either case can still result in intellectual “truth.” His
example of Euston Station as London would be an example of 2, while the little girls
“horrid red things” would be an example of 1. Whether or not Lewis is correct in this, it
does not answer the exact question here. Can one deny, say, that Icarus’ wings or Jonah’s
Whale ever existed or ever could exist, and still have the myth work? Must one believe
Noah’s flood “really happened” before receiving anything from the story beyond banal
moralizing?
Lewis’ whole life is a testimony to the short answer—No. All the Joy he
experienced at the hands of Norse mythology as a youth came in the face of clear belief
that the events “never happened.” Likewise, Lewis denied seeing any correspondence
between scientism’s myth of Progress and history. Yet he considered it a very potent
myth—better even than Christianity, which has “…neither the monolithic grandeur of
Unitarian conceptions nor the richness of Polytheism.”249 He has even offered already
that the demand for belief destroyed his ability to embrace Christianity for a long time.
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Further, in Allegory of Love, Lewis claims the most beautiful mythological usages
of the Olympian gods did not come at the hands of the Romans and Greeks who believed
in them, but the Medieval poets and theologians who did not. In Rome the gods are
treated as “objects of worship, of fear, of hatred; even as comic characters,” but there is
little aesthetic contemplation of them.250 Yet the Medieval poets, who would have never
desired to worship them, spent an immense amount of time striving romantically after
their metaphysical meanings. After much consideration that cannot be summarized here,
he concludes,
No religion, so long as it [is] believed, can have that kind of beauty which we find
in the gods of Titian, of Botticelli, or of our own romantic poets. To this day you
cannot make poetry of that sort out of the Christian heaven and hell. The gods
must be, as it were, disinfected of belief; the last taint of the sacrifice, and of the
urgent practical interest, the selfish prayer, must be washed away from them,
before that other divinity can come to light in the imagination.”251
Lewis’ conclusion elsewhere is the same, “In a certain sense we spoil a
mythology for imaginative purposes by believing in it.”252 Lewis clearly denies the
necessity of a belief in sense 1 above.
Is seems that only belief in sense 2 (or something like it) is required. The required
act of “surrender” is not a belief in the historicity of the myth, but in its profound
meaning. And on this point, Lewis has been consistent—imagination is the organ of
meaning, not truth. The question of Christianity’s meaning is simply not the same
question as its truth. Many people find Christianity imaginatively meaningful who also
disbelieve its historicity—just as Lewis does for polytheism and scientism. The question
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of myth and history will need to be probed more deeply in the next chapter as it relates
specifically to the Genesis Fall.
A final point, however, can be made here. Note the “in a certain sense…” in the
above citation. Lewis acknowledges, however, that belief that a myth is grounded in
history does change the aesthetic nature of its experience. An historically true story
provides an additional and unique satisfaction. Both the Trojan and the Napoleonic wars
produce aesthetic effects, but “a believed idea feels different from an idea that is not
believed. And that peculiar flavor of the believed is never, in my experience, without a
special sort of imaginative enjoyment.”253 The conclusion for him then is that Christians
(like adherents of all great controlling mythologies from Scientism to Polytheism) do
experience imaginative enjoyment from their world pictures once they have accepted
them as true; the enjoyment, however, is not necessarily the reason it is believed.
He Said/She Said: The Problems of Verifiability and Falsifiability
There remain whole classes of people who remain unmoved by myth. When faced
with Oedipus or Adam, they do not experience any of Lewis’ predictions. They simply
cannot see the story as anything other than fanciful made-up narrative, nor do they
experience any of the pleasure or Joy that Lewis claims for himself, nor do they perceive
themselves imaginatively in touch with Higher Reality. Lewis’ model simply does not
express their experience when meeting these stories. This existential reality creates at
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least two possible problems for Lewis. First, is there any way for the skeptic to falsify
Lewis’ claims, and second, is there any way for Lewis to verify them?254
The falsifiability question arises from the totalizing aspect of Lewis’ theory,
which seeks to explain not only Lewis’ experience but also the skeptic’s lack of it. Lewis
has laid out a number of self-inflicted causes to explain why a skeptic may not receive
from myth the experience he describes—such as, a lack of “surrender,” or antisupernatural bias, or over-zealous intellect. Thus even the skepticism of the honest and
honorable skeptic is included as a piece of the theory’s data. But answering the skeptic
with, “I knew you would say that, and it’s what one ought to expect if my model is true,”
seems to insulate the theory from any possible critique. This insulation from critique is a
critique question for all Anselmian fides-type arguments—“you do not see because you
are a skeptic.” In Lewis’ own terms, however, it sounds like a reverse Bulverism—that
the lack of seeing is caused, not by the truth or falsity of the arguments, but by some
biographical factor—that one is a “man” or a “republican” or, in this case, a “skeptic.”
Kreeft, however, says, yes, Lewis is engaging in a sort of ad hominem, but it is
directed against the person who refuses to admit or look, for ultimately the skeptic has
insulated their experience (or lack of it) from critique to the same degree as has Lewis.255
Such skepticism is self-imposed. Lewis never meets head-on anywhere the question of
whether his treatment of the skeptic is fair, and even his closest responses are little more
than reaffirmations of his position. In Reflections on the Psalms he reiterates the “view
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from below” argument mentioned earlier, this time with a different illustration. If a
person existed who knew nothing of handwriting or its possibility, when faced with a
poem, it would appear and could only appear to him as a series of black marks on white
paper. Such a person, says Lewis, “would be unanswerable if he addressed an audience
who couldn’t read…You will never find something over and above all the products of
analysis whereof you can say ‘This is the poem.’ Those who can read, however, will
continue to say the poem exists.”256 Kreeft paints the dilemma with equal polemic, “If
someone blandly says, ‘I am perfectly happy playing with mud pies (or fast cars or
money or political power) we can query, ‘Are you, really?’ but we can only try to
inveigle him out of his childishness, we cannot compel him by logical force.”257 Thus
Lewis places his own experience over against the skeptics as proof. That the honest and
honorable skeptic will do the same as a counter-proof is to be expected. Who then can
judge?
This then raises a question of verifiability. How can either party—Lewis or the
skeptic—prove to the other that their experience or lack of it is “real?” To begin with, it
is not a given that the burden of proof lies upon the claimant of the experience. Yes,
humans are sometimes deceived by “experiences” they are not really having. But they are
just as often deceived by real experiences they deny having—ask the drunk driver if he
thinks he is really drunk or the anorexic if she isn’t just a bit too thin already. The skeptic
can no more prove by absolutely objective criteria that s/he is not simply “listening to the
jailor” and shutting down the glory being offered. After all, St. Paul offers a very similar
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argument in Romans 1 regarding the honest skeptic who claims to have no experience of
“repressing” a divine revelation they have received in nature. The apostle’s response is a
short and circular, “that is, sir, because you have repressed it.” Cunningham admits
Lewis’ situation without hesitation, “…the only verification of the truth of mythology is
the deep, self-authenticating conviction that in the imaginative experience one has
encountered reality, reality that cannot be defined, put into words, or grasped by the
intellect.”258 The skeptic, however, is in the same boat. This is simply the nature of
competing experiences.
One additional factor, however, ought to be considered before hands are thrown
up in frustration. Lewis is not claiming a private experience contra mundum, or even one
that is unique to Christians. Rather he calls this longing for Joy “common, commonly
misunderstood, and of immense importance.”259 Summarizes Cunningham, “Lewis
assumes that the desire for God is smoldering in the breast of every man—as aching,
longing, wanting; as joy or, equally, unhappiness or grief; as an indescribable sense of
estrangement—and that the desire is often fixed on false objects that leave it
unsatisfied.”260 And to the degree that this experience and claims of its importance are
wide spread throughout the philosophers, poets, saints, and commoners of the whole race,
one must either conclude that the race is under a mass deception or that Lewis’ theory (or
something like it) is at least credible. While this is not the kind of empirical evidence that
would satisfy the hard sciences, insofar as arguments from warrant are legitimate, it does
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not require a sacrificium intellectum to assent. If the “truth” demand is set aside for the
moment, one will realize that the theory has high explanatory value and therefore cannot
simply be dismissed out of hand as “unverifiable” by anyone other than a logical
positivist, and even they, only with some peril.
In the end, it may really come down to something as unscientific as this: Those
who have felt the longing Lewis speaks of, heard it answered by fleeting Joy, and
subsequently found it incarnated in a grand story will need no other proof. Those who
have not, if such really exist, will simply have to do with it what they can.
When All Else Fails: The Problem of Inability
The last section, however, raises a final question from the direction, not of proof,
but of justice. If this means of access to Higher Reality through myth is intended by the
God who made both humanity’s eyes and the seemingly infinite sky to suggest such
things to the imagination, does it seem quite fair then that so many people honestly claim
to be unmoved by mythic literature? And to be clear, not unmoved by choice or
resistance, but simply unmoved, desire notwithstanding. While such a reality is not a
logical defeater, it still does strike the person of good conscience as a difficulty that so
many should be excluded from so valuable a thing. What does Lewis say to such a
person?
While Lewis never tackles the pastoral angle the question presumes, a number of
possible directions are suggested by his work. First, due to the subjective nature of myth
(that it is defined by its effect on the reader), Lewis admits that what is myth to one
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person may not be myth to another.261 It is subject to all the preferences readers have
about all sorts of literature. Speaking particularly of Lewis and Tolkien’s own mythical
worlds, Wright expands on the fickle nature of myth-as-genre…
Whether or not the vision strikes the reader as having the semblance of reality
depends partly on the author’s literary skill and partly on the reader’s own notion
of what reality is like. It hardly needs pointing out that such writing is highly
charged emotionally (not necessarily in style but in subject matter) and is
therefore highly vulnerable. The reader’s response is not entirely based on
religious preference, but more on his preference for having the nature of ultimate
reality presented in imaginative form. If he does not like it, it will probably appear
to him as overgrown allegory or pseudo-mysticism.262
Second, in light of the above, that one has not heretofore experienced what Lewis
describes is no argument that it may not be experienced tomorrow—and even by a
different medium. Lewis believed that all Nature possessed this sacramental potential.263
Joy may be met around any corner and in anything, unexpectedly and by surprise. While
myth as a form of literature has a particular quality unique to it, it is but a specific
example of the larger thing called Nature, which is also inherently sacramental.
A third factor to remember is that, myth, while finding its greatest glory through
concrete embrace of the imagination, is not totally inaccessible to the intellect. It may be
stripped of much of its compelling power when subjected to the abstracting intellect, but
this is not without value. If one is unable to “look along” the myth to the aspect of Higher
Reality of which it speaks, value remains in “looking at.” To have “contemplated” Lewis’
theory of myth, even if one is skeptical of the “enjoyment” of which it speaks, is itself
valuable. As Lewis conceded regarding other kinds of disagreements, “One may still
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disagree…but one now sees for the first time why anyone ever did agree. One has
breathed a new air, become free of a new country. It may be a country you cannot live in,
but you now know why the natives love it. You will henceforward see all systems a little
differently because you have been inside that one.”264
One final comment can be made on this point that is relevant for the next chapter.
None of the above thoughts reflect the clear and parallel fact that that all good capacities
from athletics to music are distributed unequally over the human family. That this is so,
is, in some cases simply a matter of diversity, but it also may reflect a consequence of
human rebellion against that God who (we presume) does desire these experiences for all
people. That some people do not perceive the power of myth may simply be an evil that a
certain segment of humanity endures, like color-blindness, tone-deafness, and eczema.
That humanity may have brought this condition on itself, however, is a subject better
treated in the next chapter.
Conclusion
The content of this chapter has not been presented for its own sake, but has served
as an overview of what Lewis meant by “myth” and its function. This material will be
brought to bear on Lewis’ interpretation of the Genesis Fall in chapter 4, and by way of
comparison to his theological contemporaries in chapter 5. By way of making this
application easier for the reader, the chapter has been summarized below as nine
propositions that outline humanity’s existential condition, myth’s role in addressing it,
and modernity’s particular difficulties with it.
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1. Higher reality or Supernature exists, that is, a reality beyond that of sensory
experience that can only be spoken of in metaphorical language.
2. Humanity has been made for enjoyment of this Higher Reality, hence it is haunted
by a longing (Sehnsucht) which cannot be satisfied by anything in Nature.
3. The sacramental nature of Nature allows humans to periodically interact with
Higher Reality, producing the emotional recognition of having the longing
satisfied—that, is “Joy.”
4. Joy, however, cannot be fully possessed. It is fleeting, for it is impossible to both
“enjoy” and “contemplate” it at the same time.
5. As an act of Divine revelation in concert with some historical process, some
aspects of Higher Reality are embodied in great mythic pictures/stories.
6. This myth conveys Higher Reality to the reader non-discursively and nonpropositionally by means of the narrative and totalizing capacities of the
imagination, rather than the abstracting intellect.
7. The imagination meets, in the concreteness of the myth, some aspect of Higher
Reality that could only otherwise be expressed as an abstraction.
8. Since myth, like Nature, possesses a sacramental quality, it brings the reader into
touch with Higher Reality and the possibility of Joy, thereby working against the
reader’s separation from Higher Reality.
9. Modernity’s preference for abstract thought over concrete and its resistance to the
supernatural and necessary intellectual “surrender of disbelief” tends to thwart
myth’s work, robbing humanity of the possibility of knowing both Higher Reality
and great Joy.
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As a final attempt at clarity, Table 4.1 is here reproduced.
Table 4.1. Synthesis of Epistemological Taxonomies
(Thesis)*
(Antithesis)*
Alexander’s Taxonomy

Contemplation

Enjoyment

Lewis’ Taxonomy

Looking At

Looking Along

Mode of Discourse

Abstract, Rational,
Discursive, Propositional
Scientific, Philosophical

Concrete, Imaginative, Nondiscursive, Non-propositional
Poetic, Narrative

Distal End of Language

Mathematics

Unknown

Interpreting Faculty

Intellect (Reason)

Attributes

Imagination
(Synthesis)*
Myth

*The Hegelian structure is used here only for clarity of the table’s elements, does not form part of the
argument, is not intended to be pressed.

CHAPTER 4
LEWIS’ TREATMENT OF THE FALL NARRATIVE
The previous chapters stand as preparation for this and the final chapter. The goal
of this chapter is to reflect specifically on Lewis’ understanding and interpretation of the
Genesis Fall in three ways—historically, theologically, and mythologically. It is thus
easily seen how the previous chapters have set the stage for this task. Chapter 1
established a theological environment for the discussion—that of the mid-twentieth
century. Chapter 2 set Lewis into this context by outlining his general responses to such
issues as evolutionary Darwinism, the Bible and history, and various manifestations of
higher criticism. Chapter 3 rehearsed Lewis’ understanding of myth as a kind of
literature. Insofar as the Genesis 3 Fall intersects with all of these discussions, they
become preparatory for the discussion of this chapter. Chapter 5 then will place the
conclusions of this chapter into the theological context of Chapter 1 to examine where
Lewis may contribute to the question of a “mythical Fall.”
Lewis himself patently establishes the three levels of analysis in a single location.
In Problem of Pain, he makes the following statements, “The story in Genesis is a story
(full of the deepest suggestion) about a magic apple of knowledge; but in the developed
doctrine the inherent magic of the apple has quite dropped out of sight, and the story is
simply one about disobedience,”1 and a few pages later, “What exactly happened when
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Man fell, we do not know; but if it is legitimate to guess, I offer the following picture—a
‘myth’ in the Socratic sense, a not unlikely tale.”2
These two citations identify the three levels for discussion. First, by “the magic
apple,” Lewis is referring to the mythical nature of the story. Second, he formally
distinguishes this from “the developed doctrine”—that is, its theological treatment in
church history. Third, he identifies the category of “what exactly happened,” wherein he
is asking the historical question, what might have actually happened? This chapter will
explore what Lewis meant at each of these three levels.
Finally before the analysis begins, four topic limitations must be drawn due to
space. First, while gender questions are unavoidable given the respective roles Adam and
Eve qua male and female play in the story, no attempt will be made to enter or moderate
the seasonal storm of “Lewis on gender.” The topic is too significant to tackle partially
here. Interested readers can see its complexities for themselves by consulting the squall
that consumed Christian Scholars Review in 2007 as well as the monographs and articles
to which it gave birth.3
Second, a significant portion of Lewis’ perspective is gleaned from his work on
Milton’s Paradise Lost. Lewis notoriously took up a contrary position to many of his
literary peers on Satan’s character and role in the epic poem. While this material is of
some importance to understanding Lewis on the Fall, no attempt will be made to
determine whether Lewis’ read of Milton is superior to that of other literary theorists.
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How Lewis understood Milton is an important question, but not as much so here as the
question of how Milton affected Lewis.
Third, while any consideration of the Genesis Fall is bound to raise questions of
theodicy and the problem of evil (and Lewis has something to say on both), this chapter
will not treat it. It simply is not the topic at work here. These questions will be allowed to
intrude only insofar as they directly relate to Lewis’ treatment of the narrative.
Finally, in recent years the agnostic scholar and story-teller Phillip Pullman has
been a vocal critic of Lewis’ alleged low view of humanity, even offering a Lewis-like
trilogy of fantasy books that offer a functional critique of established religion.4 Some of
his belief that Lewis’ worldview is “life-hating” is rooted in Lewis’ belief in a human
Fall from grace. This chapter will not enter into this debate, first because it has been well
considered by others,5 but more importantly because of this writer’s profound lassitude
toward it. Pullman’s ultimate complaint is against Christianity (or religion) in general,6
and Lewis only insofar as he is an effective literary voice that chafes Pullman’s more
metaphysically reductionistic and “source-of-life-hating” perspective.
“What Really Happened”: Lewis and the History behind the Fall
Given the mythic status Lewis grants the Fall narrative, combined with Lewis’
own discussions on the impossibility of the search for the history behind a myth, it is
remarkable how thoroughly he ruminates on the historical events that might stand behind
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the Genesis story. It is further remarkable that to date almost nothing has been written in
secondary literature specifically aimed at Lewis on the historical question. As shall be
seen, nearly all reflection on Lewis on the Genesis Fall consists of his doctrinal or
mythological understanding of it. Yet, insofar as the historical status of the narrative is a
dominant question, Lewis’ thoughts on it must be laid out.
Lewis’ earliest and most complete discussion of what he believes the history
behind the story might have been is contained in Problem of Pain, published in 1940.7
Indeed, with the exception of Reflections on the Psalms and a number of personal letters,
nearly all of Lewis’ reflection on the history question takes place in the decade of the
1940s. Given Problem of Pain’s dominant place in the topic, it will serve as the initial
skeleton for Lewis’ ideas with his other works muscled in where needed.
On Human Origins
The first part of chapter 2 of this dissertation demonstrated that Lewis did not
believe the Genesis story reflected an unaccomodated historical account of the events.
The primary thrust of that discussion was to demonstrate that Lewis was not an enemy of
modern science or even Darwin’s theory, insofar as they were free of cult-like scientism
or the myth of inevitable progress. In addition, chapter 2 presented a possible history as
Lewis conceived it that led up to the subject in focus here. The discussion here picks up
in that wake—the Fall understood as “what happened next.”
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To summarize the germane elements of chapter 2, Lewis’ structure in Problem of
Pain 8 involved a theistic evolutionary approach whereby God guided a sub-human
mammalian creature over a long period of time to a place where it could then be endowed
with the special and supernatural gift of “human nature.” To use Aristotelian taxonomy,
God used evolution to produce the “animal” and a miracle to make it “rational.”
Such creatures (and there may have been many so endowed) may have still been
“primitive” in terms of their technology and society [79] but, because of the divine
endowment, would have also exhibited the following remarkable characteristics. They
would have possessed complete mastery of their physical organisms down to even the
level of “digestion and circulation” [77f.]. This capacity would have likewise expressed
itself outwardly toward the rest of creation in a priestly mastery over the physical and
animal world—“the mediator through whom they [the creatures] apprehend so much of
the Divine splendor as their irrational nature allows” [78]. Further, they would have
experienced “rich and varied” relationships with their fellow-humans dominated by
“charity and friendship and [even] sexual love” [78]. And most importantly, they would
have been perfect in “obedient love and ecstatic adoration” of God, “perfectly enacting in
joy and ease of all the faculties and all the senses that filial self-surrender...” which Christ
would perfectly picture later on [78f.] .
To this picture rehearsed from chapter 2 should also be added the following
suggestions from a later chapter in Problem of Pain. In his discussion on animal pain,
Lewis says, “The origin of animal suffering could be traced by earlier generations, to the
Fall of man—the whole world was infected by the uncreating rebellion of Adam. This is
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now impossible, for we have good reason to believe that animals existed long before
men. Carnivorousness, with all that it entails, is older than humanity” [133]. It is clear
from this that Lewis was committed to an old earth with extensive animal history prior to
the arrival of humanity on the scene. With careful caveats on what constitutes “pain” for
a non-rational animal and what sort of animal might be expected to experience it, Lewis
assumes (without actually saying it) that a state in which animals experience predatory
suffering cannot have justly been their original state. This assumption is the basic premise
that drives the whole book—the existence of meaningless pain (for animals as well as
humans) is an evil, not attributable to the Creator, whose presence must be explained or
else become a defeater for the Christian story. This, however, creates a problem for
Lewis. If suffering is not a part of the animal’s original nature and state, but something
that came as a disruption of it and yet preceded the creation of humanity, what can be its
historical origin?
Lewis’ suggests that the theological tradition of the prior Fall of a rebel angelic
power would explain this disruption in the animal kingdom. In his words, “it seems to
me, therefore, a reasonable supposition, that some mighty created power had already
been at work for ill on the material universe, or the solar system, or, at least, the planet
Earth, before ever man came on the scene...” [134]. This then raises the possibility that
humanity may have arrived in a world already in need of some redemption at humanity’s
own hand.
If it seems illegitimate for Lewis to insert such a mythological solution into what
is suppose to be a reconstruction of possible history, Lewis reminds, “…the doctrine of
Satan’s existence and Fall is not among the things we know to be untrue: it contradicts
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not the facts discovered by scientists but the mere, vague ‘climate of opinion’ that we
happen to be living in” [134]. In short, Lewis, the stalwart apologist for the miraculous,
believes that the Fall of Satan (or something like it) is not necessarily contradictory to the
historical record—it is one of the things that “might have happened” in space-time. Thus
Lewis attempts to harmonize modern science’s view of an extended terrestrial history and
the church’s tradition on the Fall of Satan.
The History Behind the Fall
One discovers in Problem of Pain that the only reason Lewis has delved into the
question of origins at all is to set the backdrop for his apologetic on human falleness.
Lewis admits at the outset, “What exactly happened when Man fell, we do not know; but
if it is legitimate to guess, I offer the following picture—a ‘myth’ in the Socratic sense, a
not unlikely tale” [77]. By “what exactly happened” Lewis surely means “the actual
historical events.” As mentioned in chapter 2, his use of the term “Socratic myth” is
highly distracting, even given his clarifying footnote that he does not mean by it what
Reinhold Niebuhr does. The use of the term “myth” here has thrown off the scent such
immanent scholars as Cunningham and Knickerbocker, who both claim that Lewis is
saying that the actual Genesis story is nothing more than a “Socratic Myth.”9 Nothing
could be further from Lewis’ meaning. He is here contrasting both the doctrinal use and
mythological meaning with his own teaching picture of a possible history behind them
both. By “not unlikely tale,” Lewis really intends “that which could have possibly
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happened as history,” thus it is a guess at historical possibility, not a doctrinal or
mythological interpretation.
Now it is true by definition that Lewis can offer no evidence for this history. No
one possibly could, and Lewis does not pretend to speak better than he can know. It is
“historical” only in the sense of being “historically possible.” It is a story which includes
the sorts of events that might have been, such that its content might serve as a backdrop
for what became the Genesis myth. More must not be claimed of it than this, and Lewis
makes clear repeatedly that the history behind a myth is its least important aspect.
Nevertheless, Lewis plows ahead with his story. It is unknown how long these
newly rational-animals maintained their perfect “Paradisal state” [79]. Lewis suggests
that at some point, “Someone or something whispered that they could become as gods—
that they could cease directing their lives to their Creator and taking all their delights as
uncovenanted mercies, as ‘accidents’ (in the logical sense) which arose in the course of a
life directed not to those delights but to the adoration of God” [79f.].
The “someone or something” is an unacceptable vagary. Since no historical data
can be cited to determine the source of such a suggestion, Lewis hazards no guess—
asserting only its non-contradictory nature. Yet the picture he paints in the following
pages gives the impression that such a suggestion could arise, not merely as an external
solicitation by a tempter-proper, but as an existential reality of creature-hood—that is, it
could arise from the internal resources of the creature in se. It does not seem then for
Lewis that an historical theory requires the identification of an external tempter. It is
conceivable purely on the basis of the existential situation of being a volitional creature.
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Guessing then at the nature of the historical act is a further difficulty. It would
have to be “very heinous” given the terrible consequences that follow, yet would have to
be something possible even for “a being free from the temptations of fallen man” [80].
Lewis believes “turning from God” fulfills both conditions. The existential situation of
being a creature with a will consists of the creaturely requirement of an act of “selfsurrender” to its Maker, rather than that of “self-idolatry.” Lewis calls this “the ‘weak
spot’ in the very nature of the creature, the risk which God apparently thinks worth
taking” [81]. Paradisal Man was called to surrender himself to God. But it is possible for
him not to do so. His failure to do so would be “heinous” because “the self which
Paradisal man had to surrender contained no natural recalcitrancy to being surrendered”
[81]. Such self-surrender would have been, says Lewis, an easy choice for the creature,
opposed by nothing in its nature10—but it is a choice nonetheless that had to be made.
Significant doctrinal and theological questions arise here regarding what it means
to “turn from God” in this sense; questions which must be postponed for a moment. But
given that such an ancient human fore-bearer (or a group of them) made such a choice at
some historical point (and Lewis admits, “For all I can see, it might have concerned the
literal eating of a fruit, but the question is of no consequence.” [80]), the question that
here follows is what the historical result of such a choice would be.
Lewis paints that result in terms of surprise. The creature must have believed that
it could rebel against God, taking ownership of its own life, and still maintain all the
benefits and capacities of its original nature. It could not. Given that God wanted to
govern the creature’s organism and its broader terrestrial environment through the
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creature’s own will, when that will rebelled, it could not retain control over any of the
areas entrusted to it. Thus God “began to rule the organism in a more external way, not
by the laws of spirit, but by those of nature” [82]. Thus physical degradation, senility, and
death enter human history.
Further, instead of the desires of the organism being ruled by the reasonable will,
the process was reversed. The will was now subjected to a physical organism dominated
by unruly passions and affections. “And the will, caught in the tidal wave of mere nature,
had no resource but to force back some of the new thoughts and desires by main strength,
and these uneasy rebels became the subconscious as we now know it” [82]. In summary,
the total organism which had been taken up into his spiritual life was allowed to
fall back into the merely natural condition from which, at his making, it had been
raised…Thus human spirit from being the master of human nature became a mere
lodger in its own house, or even a prisoner; rational consciousness became what it
now is—a fitful spot-light resting on a small part of the cerebral motions. [83]
The end result then was that the loss of this “original specific nature” was passed
on to all future generations. Being more than a biological variation, it was the emergence
of a new kind of human—“A new species, never made by God, had sinned itself into
existence” [83].
Lewis on History Analyzed
A number of interpretive observations should be made at this point. First, while it
does seem ironic that Lewis offers this analysis despite his antipathy toward sourcecriticism, a subtle distinction may exonerate him. Lewis is not arguing from history to
myth, but the reverse. Given both the mythic form of the narrative and current scientific
assessments of terrestrial history, he asks what might an underlying history look like.
Thus in this historical construction, Lewis is attempting to maintain both a sympathy with
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the dominant science of his day and Christianity’s long-held belief in humanity-asspecial-creation and its unique status within creation.
Second, it seems then that the chief value of this theory is not doctrinal or
theological, but apologetic. Lewis believes that the existence of a coherent historical
possibility removes warrant for disbelieving the claims of Christianity. “Our present
condition, then, is explained by the fact that we are members of a spoiled species” [85—
italics added]. He is not here asserting that humanity is suffering divine punishment—a
decidedly theological claim. Rather he is offering an explanation of the atrocious and
verminous conduct of the human race toward itself and its world. His summary makes
this clear, “the thesis of this chapter is simply that man, as a species, spoiled himself, and
that good, to us in our present state, must therefore mean primarily remedial or corrective
good” [88]. His goal (as it is throughout the whole of Problem of Pain) is to offer a
compelling argument to the reader that the Christian idea of the human fallenness (and its
accompanying suffering and pain) is intellectually tenable, not just to the fideist, but to
any person of rational mind.
In terms of coherence, Lewis succeeds in his limited task. If this history or
something comparatively similar did occur, it would very easily explain both the
fractious nature of humanity as witnessed everyday on the world scene, as well as our
loathing of that reality. It is also conceivable that such an history might eventually be
codified into literary form bearing a similarity to the Genesis story. At the level of an
internally coherent possibility, it is plausible.
Yet, as an apologetic aimed at the modern mind, it would still founder at the level
of presupposition. While such a story would have all these explanatory benefits, the
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modern mood would reject the very assumption that it is possible. It is very much not “a
not unlikely tale;” but an impossible one. His theory makes no attempt to avoid the
miraculous. On the contrary, it embraces it at every turn. From a divinely-guided
evolution, to a preter-human Fall of Satan, to a supernaturally dispensed endowment, to a
divine rulership of the animal organism via the creature’s own will, Lewis’ “not unlikely
tale” contains exactly that material the modern mood finds incredible.
At the very least such an argument would need to be preceded by the apologetic
for supernaturalism offered in the broadcast talks (eventually Mere Christianity) and
Miracles, neither of which had yet appeared. Thus Lewis does not seem to succeed in this
place in offering a possible history that, when used as an apologetic, would be compelling
to the modern skeptic. Of course, its merits might change upon appropriation of his later
defense of the miraculous, but that is a question beyond the scope here.
On the other side, to the person already amenable to the possibility of miracles,
the theory may meet one of two responses. First, to the person who believes the Genesis
story must tightly reflect historical events (in the manner chapter 1 presented), Lewis’
explanation would fail from the opposite direction. The distinction between Lewis’ “not
unlikely story” and the Genesis text is of sufficient difference as to reduce the narrative to
a parable containing a kernel or moral to be extracted from the story. Lewis’ use of the
Fall of Satan, the pre-human animal kingdom, and multiplicity of early-men would likely
seem to such a reader as incompatible with a literal reading of the Genesis story.
Second, to the person who does not require a strong relationship between the
Genesis text and history, Lewis’ theory becomes merely interesting—a curiosity of little
importance—and for exactly the reasons Lewis outlined. Understanding the historical
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events behind a myth is abstractly interesting, but does not answer the more pressing
questions of meaning and appropriate response. To this person, the myth itself or perhaps
the resulting doctrine is that with which one has to do, not the history behind it.
Thus from all directions, Lewis’ possible history behind the Fall seems to be
either unconvincing or insignificant, even if it should happen to be true. As Kilby rightly
observes (although not about Lewis), “the great historians quite agreed that to state the
facts of history may be to leave out its essence, since history is made up both of
objective, overt actions and also the joys, agonies, and deep motives of the human
soul.”11 Lewis of course agreed and admits in the chapter’s conclusion that this
interpretation of the events is “a shallow one,” and that both the mythological and
doctrinal aspects of the story are more significant. But in the context of Problem of Pain
he does not feel capable of tackling either of these.
The History’s Relation to the Story
The germane question here then becomes what is the relationship of the extant
story of the Fall to any possible history Lewis can envision? The question will take on its
fullest color later in this chapter when the mythic implications of the story are discussed.
It must be clear here, however, that Lewis did not see myth and history as incompatible.
Myths rather can provide deep meaning for historical events long after the details are lost.
Thus the loss of the historical detail is of negligible concern because the events are given
their most substantial interpretation in the myth. As Wright reminds, history is not just an
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event, it is event plus interpretation.12 Having this status, then, myth can present a more
meaning-filled account than the historical events themselves would have done to an
actual observer. Hart summed this up well saying, “Myth is a story of what happens as
distinguished from, but not contradictory to, the history of what has happened. The
relationship between myth and history is complementary, in that each is a human vision
of events forming a pattern. The patterns of myth are more universal than those of
history, their appeal on a deeper level.”13
The myth of the Genesis Fall, however, has an additional feature for Lewis that
increases the reader’s confidence in this principle. Lewis believes this myth stands as a
divinely appropriated interpretation of the lost history. Says Lewis, “When a series of
such re-tellings turns a creation story which at first had almost no religious or
metaphysical significance into a story which achieves the idea of true Creation and of a
transcendent Creator (as Genesis does), then nothing will make me believe that some of
the re-tellers, or some one of them, has not been guided by God.” 14 Thus, unlike
comparable myths among the nations, a compilation like early Genesis is not “merely
natural,” but has been “raised by God above itself, qualified by Him and compelled by
Him to serve purposes which of itself it would not have served…all taken into the service
of God’s word.” This is the practical outworking of the idea of transposition discussed in
the last chapter and something very akin to divine inspiration by means of appropriation.
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The story’s value or message therefore cannot be judged by its historical
relationship to prior stories and their historical status. Regardless of the relationship of
the Genesis text to the historical events that inspired them, something miraculous has
now occurred. God has “raised” the story up, embraced it, made it worthy and capable of
being divine Word. It is an analogous journey to what Lewis has already argued occurred
for humanity itself. From its bestial status, formed and guided over long ages, God
worked a miracle, endowing it with the glorious capacity to be imago.15 And in a further
image, just as human life was taken up as a vehicle for divine life in the incarnation, so
too were the stories of Genesis taken up as a vehicle for divine Word. “If the Scriptures
proceed not by conversion of God’s word into a literature but by taking up of a literature
to be the vehicle of God’s word, this is not anomalous.”16
Thus the Genesis Fall is historical in the sense of being rooted in human history as
a datable event in principle, but the historical event itself has become inscrutable to the
historian. This understanding of Lewis is widely recognized within the scholarship.17
Carnell draws out the further point that in Lewis the human tendency to set
history and mythology into dichotomy is itself something enabled by the Fall.18 The
concern over whether myth is historically false is a product of the inability to believe that
“Arch-nature” can impinge upon “Nature” by means of fantastic narrative. Although
Carnell does not make the connection, his analysis stands in harmony with Lewis’
“Barfieldian” commitments as seen in chapter 3.
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“What to Believe”: Lewis and the Doctrine of the Fall
This chapter intentionally treats Lewis’ understanding of the developed doctrine
of the Fall prior to his understanding of the mythological aspects of the story. A strong
case could be made that this ordering is wrong. After all, does not the myth precedes the
doctrine both logically and historically just as a text precedes a commentary on the text?
Thus the theological mind very sensibly grants the myth a preliminary status to that of the
developed doctrine. Whatever the virtues of such a method, it will not work here for one
reason—Lewis believed the primitive myth to be of greater significance than the
developed doctrine. In Problem of Pain he relates the myth to the doctrine in the
following manner:
The story in Genesis is a story (full of the deepest suggestion) about a magic
apple of knowledge; but in the developed doctrine the inherent magic of the apple
has quite dropped out of sight, and the story is simply one about disobedience. I
have the deepest respect even for Pagan myths, still more for the myths of Holy
Scripture. I therefore do not doubt that the version which emphasizes the magic
apple, and brings together the trees of life and knowledge, contains a deeper and
subtler truth than the version that makes the apple simply and solely a pledge of
obedience. But I assume that the Holy Spirit would not have allowed the later to
grow up in the Church and win the assent of great doctors unless it also was true
and useful as far as it went. It is this version I am going to discuss, because,
though I suspect the primitive version to be far more profound, I know that I, at
any rate, cannot penetrate its profundities. I am to give my readers not the best
absolutely but the best I have.19
Thus, while Lewis had great respect for the established doctrine surrounding the
Fall, he believed that the myth understood on its own terms has a deeper significance—
even if he could not penetrate it. The significance of this last clause will be dealt with in
the next section. It is sufficient here to note that by discussing the “doctrine” after the
“history” but before the “myth,” this chapter reflects the spirit of Lewis’ own priority.
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The theologian may instinctively find the mythological material anticlimactic placed after
the doctrinal, but such a structure will better represent Lewis own literary sensibilities.
That said, and while faithfulness to Lewis’ perspective possesses methodological
virtue, it is not beyond critique. As cited previously, in “On Criticism,” Lewis asserts that
when judging the meaning of a piece of literature,
the ideally false or wrong ‘meaning’ would be the product in the mind of the
stupidest and least sensitive and most prejudiced reader after a single careless
reading. The ideally true or right ‘meaning’ would be that shared (in some
measure) by the largest number of the best readers after repeated and careful
readings over several generations, different periods, nationalities, moods, degrees
of alertness, private pre-occupations, states of health, spirits, and the like
canceling one another out when (this is an important reservation) they cannot be
fused so as to enrich one another.20
This is an interesting proposal, which Lewis does not seem ready to apply to the
doctrine-myth question. Would not Lewis have to concede that a “developed doctrine”
would approach such an “ideally true or right ‘meaning?’” Surely the developed doctrine
of the Fall story at the hands of generations of the church’s most dedicated and educated
readers would approximate such a meaning if one was to be had. Thus Lewis’ preference
for the impenetrable mythology over the interpretive voice of the church may be at odds
with his own theory of literature. The point need not be pressed further. That the
theologian finds theological interpretations more vital than literary ones (and literary
scholars the contrary) is to be expected. For the theologian, however, who seeks a
profitable read of Lewis, a “surrender” of one’s preferred perspective for the duration of
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the argument is not an onerous expectation. Thus this chapter proceeds by subordinating
for the moment the doctrine to the myth.
The Doctrine and Its Proper Use
Lewis’ most direct discussion of the doctrine of human fallenness comes in the
apologetic arguments of Problem of Pain. He offers the Biblical Fall as the primary
source of human suffering. This doctrine states in fine that “…man is now a horror to
God and to himself and a creature ill-adapted to the universe not because God made him
so but because he has made himself so by the abuse of his free will.” [69] He then goes
on to assert that this is the only appropriate use of the doctrine (illegitimate uses to be
seen in the next section). Its function is to guard against two “sub-Christian” theories on
the origins of evil—Monism and Dualism.
The Monist answer to suffering asserts a single source for both good and evil—
namely, God. The Dualist asserts two independent but roughly equal powers—one for
good and one for evil. Why Lewis believes these two alternatives are inherently
problematic is a question for his larger apologetic.21 It takes little imagination, however,
to see why they conflict with the dominant vision of God in Christian thought. The first
sullies divine goodness by placing the origin of evil within God’s own being; the second
sullies divine power by inserting a true competitor to God (i.e. an evil or anti-God) into
the most fundamental level of ontology. At point here is that against both of these (and by
means of this doctrine) Christianity asserts the absolute goodness of God. Thus Lewis
asserts that the primary goal of the doctrine is as an apology for the goodness of God, not
the defunct nature of humanity per se.
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What is odd about this claim is that it stands in some tension with the very terms
of the doctrine as Lewis has already outlined them. The goal of his articulated doctrine
seems at least as well suited for bracketing away Pelagian ideas of moral fortitude or
perhaps those of innate human goodness as they were later articulated in Liberal
Protestantism. It is perhaps a small myopia, but one Lewis himself cannot maintain. The
remnant of his doctrinal discussion focuses entirely on the question of human nature, not
the divine one.
Further, it seems clear in the following discussion that Lewis thought the
developed doctrine was rather unrelated to actual narrative details, now being only a story
of “simple disobedience.” From this reductive view, the following doctrinal assertions are
made: (1) “Man, as God made him, was completely good and completely happy,” but (2)
“he disobeyed God and became what we now see.” [72]
He dismisses scientific challenges to the paradisal history that this presupposes by
noting again the difference between a “brute” in the sense of being technologically
underdeveloped and being “brutal” in the cultural and moral sense. Science can make
only very modest claims about the technological state of the first humans and is
absolutely unable to judge their spiritual and moral nature. [73f.]
He likewise brushes aside the more philosophical argument that the idea of sin
presupposes the idea of a “law” to sin against, and that the “herd-instinct” necessary for
“law” would take centuries to develop. On the contrary, says Lewis, this presupposes the
relationship between virtue and the “herd-instinct” and (more to the point) that the first
sin was social in nature. The doctrine, however, has always asserted that the first sin was
“…against God, an act of disobedience, not a sin against the neighbor.” [75] Further, if
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Augustine was right, that sin is a result of pride, the creature “requires no complex social
conditions, no extended experiences, no great intellectual development”—only an
awareness “of God as God and of itself as itself.” [75] Such a sin is committed by
children, peasants, and social recluses alike. All people everywhere all the time are
engaged in the work of forgetting that all they have and are is only so because of God.
“Thus all day long, and all the days of our life, we are sliding, slipping, falling away—as
if God were, to our present consciousness, a smooth inclined plane on which there is no
resting, and indeed, we are now of such a nature that we must slip off, and the sin,
because it is unavoidable, may be venial. But God cannot have made us so” [76].
Original Sin and How It Reveals a Central Principle in Lewis’ Method
To say the reader’s nature is “unavoidably” corrupt raises the question of
“original sin,” and Lewis admits the label, if not the usual contents…
Our present condition, then, is explained by the fact that we are members of a
spoiled species. I do not mean that our sufferings are a punishment for being what
we cannot now help being nor that we are morally responsible for the rebellion of
a remote ancestor. If, nonetheless, I call our present condition one of original Sin,
and not merely one of original misfortune, that is because our actual religious
experience does not allow us to regard it in any other way. [85]
Even if one cannot have helped arriving in the world so “spoiled,” our condition is
lamentable. That a child was made a spoiled brat at the hands of another does not make
his bullying and sneaking acceptable or lovable. He himself, if ever he mends, will
rightly feel shame over what he used to be.
Thus it seems Lewis does not argue for any sort of imputation of forensic guilt.
He limits the damage of the Fall to the imputation of a defunct nature—bad raw material,
so to speak, for which one is not culpable. But the situation is, of course, still
unacceptable to God and alienation persists. This is precisely how he treats the subject in
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Mere Christianity.22 People are born into the world with all sorts of “bad psychological
material.” This is not a sin, but a disease that must be treated by, say, psychoanalysis or
other means. What one does with what one has been given is the real issue. God alone,
who knows the innate capacity in each, can judge the merit of any good or evil act that
flows from that nature.
He confesses his inability to parse I Corinthians 14:22, “In Adam all die, so in
Christ shall all be made alive,” and casually rejects both the Patristic doctrines of seminal
(and by implication the later federal) presence of humanity in Adam as well as Anselm’s
“legal fiction.” “These theories may have done good in their day but they do no good for
me, and I am not going to invent others” [86]. On the other hand, he does not think this
“in” can be parsed in terms of “metaphor, or causality,” but must be understood “in some
much deeper fashion.” [87].
Herein a consistent picture of Lewis’ priorities begins to form. The primary
weakness of seminal, federal, or other such doctrinal models lies, to Lewis, exactly where
the last chapter predicted it would. Such models attempt to picture the unpicturable. They
produce analytical constructions which, though helpful, are certainly not the thing in
itself—the fact. By this same logic he resists identifying as adequate any particular
Atonement Theory (that is, any doctrine of the Atonement).23 The fact is what one needs
to embrace. If a particular image is helpful, use it; if not, “drop it.” He explicitly
attributes the problem of doctrinal constructions to the futile attempt to make sense of
“the highest spiritual realities…in terms of our abstract thought” [86f.].
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The source of Lewis’ antipathy to doctrinal constructs in general (and that of the
Fall in particular), in the light of the previous chapter, now becomes clear. Doctrine, by
its very nature, consists of a scientific rather than a poetic form of discourse. It is rational
and therefore abstract. These terms should not be read pejoratively, only descriptively of
the kind of things theology and doctrine are. As such, for Lewis, they will be useful in all
the ways scientific language is always useful, but they do not probe the essential quiddity
of the matter from the inside. Doctrine can only “look at” our Fallenness, not “look
along” it. From it, one may learn the definition of “fallenness,” but one does not have the
experience of what it means to be a fallen person. A poetic mode of discourse will be
needed if one wishes to understand the deepest implications of the Fall story, and, of
course, to Lewis that means myth. Before turning to that material, however, other
doctrinal aspects must be probed.
Misuses and Misunderstandings on the Doctrine of the Fall
Lewis identifies a number of theological and philosophical uses of the Fall story
he considers illegitimate. The first two are found in Problem of Pain [70f.]. “Was it better
for God to create than not to create?” Lewis wonders whether the question has any real
meaning. Earlier in the book [35f.] he identified the nonsensical nature of the question.
There he says, “I am aware of no human scales in which such a portentous question can
be weighed. Some comparison between one state of being and another can be made, but
the attempt to compare being and not being ends in mere words, ‘It would be better for
me not to exist’—in what sense ‘for me’? How should I, if I did not exist, profit by not
existing?” [36]. But if forced to answer, given the goodness of God, the answer, if there is
one, must be “Yes” [70].
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The doctrine is also misused to show that it is just to retributively punish an
individual for “the faults of their remote ancestors.” Both in Problem of Pain [93f.] and
in other contexts,24 the question is not one of the legitimacy of “retributive justice” itself.
Given the choice between “just dessert” and therapeutic rehabilitation, he vigorously
supported the former. The question rather is whether or not it is just to retributively
punish persons for the crimes of their forebearers—stated theologically, that all humans
are in a state of forensic guilt for the sin of Adam and Eve and, therefore, justly merit
punishment for it. While Lewis acknowledges that the church fathers sometimes spoke of
being punished “for” Adam’s sin, they more often spoke of us sinning “in” Adam.
Recognizing the difficulty in understanding what they intended, he says, “I do not think
we can dismiss their way of talking as mere ‘idiom.’ Wisely, or foolishly, they believed
that we were really—and not simply by legal fiction—involved in Adam’s action” [70].
Such a seminal idea may be unacceptable to modern sensibilities, but whether it is a
“confusion” or a “real insight into spiritual realities beyond our normal grasp” is a
separate question. Even if the latter, it necessary to assert it in order to make his particular
point in Problem of Pain.
Lewis mentions a third misunderstanding about the doctrine in Mere Christianity.
He says there, “Some people think the fall of man had something to do with sex, but that
is a mistake.”25 While Lewis does not identify who these “some people” might be, it
probably refers to either or both of the following. First, this motif is not infrequently
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employed by ancient Christian writers, such as Clement of Alexandria.26 Another more
proximate source, and one that better fits the immediate context of Mere Christianity, is
the Freudian Viennese schools of psychotherapy, dominant in the late 1930’s, which saw
the biblical material’s primary value as an expression of psychological evolution. It is
clear from Mere Christianity, Lewis had read something of psychotherapy, and his
feelings toward it were not wholly negative.27 Nevertheless, as to why he believes this
use of the Fall story a mistake, he says, “The story in the Book of Genesis rather suggests
that some corruption in our sexual nature followed the fall and was its result, not its
cause.”28 That the human nature would lose the faculty of constancy or chastity in its
rebellion against its Maker—that is, as a consequence, rather than a cause—is consistent
with his Socratic teaching-story as outlined in the last section.
The Effects and Consequences of the Fall as Seen in the Doctrine
With a typically provocative flourish, Lewis sums up the results of humanity’s
rebellion, “A new species, never made by God, had sinned itself into existence.”29
Humanity’s “original specific nature” was altered by the rebellion of Genesis 3. But in
what ways was this nature altered? What now constitutes “fallen human nature?” Before
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outlining Lewis’ understanding about the Fall’s affects, one particularly egregious
misunderstanding needs first to be cleared away.
Total Depravity and Lewis’ Total Misunderstanding of It
Lewis denies the doctrine of total depravity.30 To be clear, his resistance is not to
the idea of “depravity,” (which he affirms) but to “totality,” as he understands the
concept. The reason for his disbelief is as follows: “…if our depravity were total we
should not know ourselves to be depraved, and…because experience shows us much
goodness in human nature.” Further such a belief would mean that all concepts of human
goodness were absolutely incompatible with goodness as God knows it.
In such a claim Lewis demonstrates his status as a theological non-professional,31
not because he could not understand the doctrine, but simply that he has not read
thoroughly enough to correctly use it. The Dutch Reformed Synod of Dort in its
confrontations with the disciples of Jacob Arminius produced what may arguably stand as
the most forceful presentations of humanity’s depraved condition. In the third and fourth
heads of doctrine, they argued,
Article 3. Therefore all men are conceived in sin, and are by nature children of
wrath, incapable of saving good, prone to evil, dead in sin, and in bondage
thereto; and without the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, they are neither
able nor willing to return to God, to reform the depravity of their nature, or to
dispose themselves to reformation.
Article 4. There remain, however, in man since the fall, the glimmerings of
natural light, whereby he retains some knowledge of God, or natural things, and
of the difference between good and evil, and shows some regard for virtue and for
good outward behavior. But so far is this light of nature from being sufficient to
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bring him to a saving knowledge of God and to true conversion that he is
incapable of using it aright even in things natural and civil. Nay further, this light,
such as it is, man in various ways renders wholly polluted, and hinders in
unrighteousness, by doing which he becomes inexcusable before God.
The combined force of these two articles is hardly what Lewis has articulated. It
asserts humanity’s absolute inability to please or return to God of its own accord, but that
even in its miserable state, humanity retains a sufficient understanding of goodness to
render it culpable. It does not argue that no goodness is to be found in fallen humanity,
much less that humanity is utterly unable to recognize good from evil. Thus one of the
traditions most noted for “total depravity” does not, in its defining documents, frame the
topic as Lewis presumes.
That Lewis could produce some particular writer who articulates the doctrine in
the drastic terms he describes is not to be doubted. Many have said many things. But as
he never actually does, his critique feels like a castigation of a broad, though only
vaguely understood, tradition. And that tradition’s own documents seem to exonerate it in
some degree from his critique. Thus whatever the doctrine of total depravity may be (and
it is diversely understood even within the Reformed tradition), the point is that it does not
appear to be what Lewis thinks it is.
What Lewis seems to have done, as Doug Falls has correctly summarized, is
mistaken “the doctrine of total depravity for utter depravity.”32 Although generally an
affirming critic, Cunningham agrees that Lewis has missed the point here, citing it as “an
example of Lewis’ occasional insufficient grasp of the finer points of theology.”33
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Willis’ claim that Lewis affirmed “the essential goodness of people…[while] well
aware of their potential or excessive evil” seems to be an understatement of Lewis’
position in the other direction.34 He made clear throughout Mere Christianity and
Problem of Pain that he believed the human machine quite broken and corrupted—
“wicked” even—and that only an infusion of divine grace and strength will enable the
human to mirror its creator.35 What this brokenness consists of can now be treated.
Lewis’ Description of Post-Fall Human Nature
This subject was introduced in the last section while discussing Lewis’ Socratic
teaching-history. It remains here to fill out the picture. To review, the original holy
human creature was fully the master of itself, down to the biological processes. God ruled
the creature’s body through the creature’s own will. In the creature’s rebellion, it
forfeited this control, which belonged to it only through gracious gift of and free
submission to its Creator. How should the details of this forfeiture be framed?
First, and this can be seen above in Lewis’ view of total depravity, humanity’s
knowledge of what is right has been affected, but not been utterly destroyed. He believed
the scriptures speak more about humanity’s inability to obey the Law rather than a
destruction of our knowledge of it.36 The knowledge may be imperfect, but it is not
blindness. To Lewis this means that the maxims gained by practical reason—that is,
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morality in its broad strokes—maintain “absolute validity.”37 Human culpability is
established on humanity’s knowledge of the law and its unwillingness to obey it.
Second, this unwillingness manifests itself in a systemic recalcitrance to all acts
of submission, to any act that seems to jeopardize the autonomy of the self. He expresses
this in the strongest terms in Mere Christianity, where he speaks of the self as that which
refuses to die, even in the face of promised life, like the “obstinate toy soldier,” who
refuses to be brought to life because he can only conceive of it as a destruction of his tin
frame.38 He continues, “The natural life in each of us is something self-centered,
something that wants to be left to itself: to keep well away from anything better or
stronger or higher than it, anything that might make it feel small.” Here Lewis is
reflecting the Augustinian tradition of sin as pride, or as he puts it in Preface to Paradise
Lost, “incessant autobiography.”39
Third, this propensity works its way out into all human endeavors—into the
human family and human culture. Without entering the controversy over Lewis’
hierarchical view of marriage, he identified both a husband’s desire to abuse his headship
and a wife’s unwillingness to submit to it as manifestations of the same pride the Fall
produced.40 But further, the whole of the human cultural endeavor is hamstrung by
humanity’s original attempt to “set up on their own” and be like God. He continues, “And
out of that hopeless attempt has come nearly all that we call human history—money,
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poverty, ambition, war, prostitution, classes, empires, slavery—the long terrible story of
man trying to find something other than God which will make him happy.” 41
Fourth, humanity’s abdication of his original nature has furthered the destruction
of the created order.42 “Nature,” which is “partially interlocked” with the destiny of
humanity, has likewise fallen into disorder and sorrow. Says Lewis of the Fall
(particularly the angelic one), “The doctrine…helps protect us from shallowly optimistic
or pessimistic views of Nature. To call her either ‘good’ or ‘evil’ is boys’ philosophy. We
find ourselves in a world of transporting pleasures, ravishing beauties, and tantalising
possibilities, but all constantly being destroyed, all coming to nothing. Nature has all the
air of a good thing spoiled.”43
Finally, humanity has become a creature fit only for death and hell. That Lewis
believed humans could warrant the retributive punishment of hell can hardly be
doubted,44 but is not the precise observation here being made. Although Lewis speaks of
hell in terms of “just desert” or destination, just as often he speaks of it as an inevitable
consequence of the humanity’s unwillingness to submit itself to God. It is not so much a
place God sends one as it is a state of mind and being to which one consigns oneself
through the demand for autonomy. In agreement with the Milton-esque dictum “…the
doors of hell are locked on the inside,”45 Lewis repeatedly represents hell as the
(il)logical end of the road of autonomy and self-deception. From dwarfs trapped in a
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smelly stable of their own mental-making,46 to Uncle Andrew’s “making himself stupider
than he really is,”47 to the self-deception of nearly every character in The Great Divorce,
Lewis doggedly worries the idea that broken human nature loves itself and would love
itself right into nonbeing rather than submit to God. Perhaps Lewis’ most powerful
statement of this principle is found in Mere Christianity:
Every time you make a choice you are turning the central part of you, the part of
you that chooses, into something a little different from what it was before. And
taking your life as a whole, with all your innumerable choices, all your life long
you are slowly turning this central thing either into a heavenly creature or into a
hellish creature: either into a creature that is in harmony with God, and with other
creatures, and with itself, or else into one that is in a state of war and hatred with
God, and with its fellow-creatures, and with itself. To be the one kind of creature
is heaven: that is, it is joy and peace and knowledge and power. To be the other
means madness, horror, idiocy, rage, impotence, and eternal loneliness. Each of
us at each moment is progressing to the one state or the other.48
Thus the picture Lewis draws of fallen human nature is that of a self-deceived
creature on its way to misery, despair, and even nonbeing, unable to see its situation for
what it really is, terrified of anything that would question its absolute autonomy, and
willing to drag all loves, hopes, and treasures into the abyss with it in the desperate
attempt to retain them on its own terms.
Reilly’s Thesis
Robert Reilly has offered an interesting (if not finally compelling) theory on
Lewis’ thoughts on the post-fallen human nature synthesized both from Lewis’
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apologetic works and his fiction. It deserves some consideration here, if for no other
reason, its ingenuity.49
Reilly works out a possible historical implication of Lewis’ belief that pagan
mythologies become fact in Christ. He sees Till We Have Faces as a narrative
demonstration of the point. Of the book he rightly asserts that “all the characters in the
book are subject to a revision of the pattern; they are malleable, they have not hardened
yet; they are, as the title suggests, without individuality, without faces, the molten lead
not yet poured into the mould” [126]. All the pieces of the ancient human perspective are
present. They have rationality (the Fox and consequently Orual), the capacity for the
numinous (Glome and priests), as well as the felt need of religion. “The only thing
lacking is what Psyche has always felt: the longing, the desire for what she can only call
death, the wanting to be both with God and in another world” [127.] Reilly argues that
humanity itself is thus pictured in motion from mythical humanity (without faces) to
factual humanity. He thus concludes that for Lewis “man is finally created when human
consciousness is capable of not only human love, rationality, apprehension of the
numinous, and need for religious solace, but when it is capable of an intense otherworldly
religious desire which can only be comforted in monotheism” [127].
Juxtaposing the story with actual human history, Reilly suggests that the story is
historically set between Aristotle and Christ, that is, in roughly the last few centuries BC.
He continues, “If this is the case, and if the myth suggests (as I think it does) that man is
not really man until a certain religious consciousness has been reached, then man arrived
at his final stage of evolution (and really became man) only at about the time of Christ”
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[127]. Or at least, he qualifies, this is so with “western man.” Thus the ancients were in a
sort of limbo, “little bats’ voices twittering and squeaking in the shadows of the
underworld,” awaiting the restoration of human nature. The incarnation then occurred as
soon as it could, as the moment of humanity’s recreation [128]. And why re-creation?
From Lewis’ teaching-myth in Problem of Pain, Reilly notes that, having once been in
complete possession of its being, fallen humanity has lost its “original specific nature.”
From these two sources, Reilly constructs his final thesis, best read in his own words.
If I read the myth of the later book [Problem of Pain] rightly, and if I may
presume to stretch Lewis’ tentative theories of mythology, then what may have
happened at the Fall was that man lost all consciousness, so became no longer
man, and then was (so to say) recreated over aeons as consciousness returned
slowly by stages of evolution. This postulates a hiatus between the Fall and the
Incarnation if we regard both events as historical occurrences, as Lewis
presumably does: there must have been an indeterminate time when man, morally
speaking, did not exist, the time coming to an end at the Incarnation. [128]
Then the further conclusion, “…as soon as man is re-created he is in the state of original
sin and needs redemption. Orual stumbles onto her own responsibility, the fact that she
has sinned—and immediately arrives at the awareness of a single, redemptive God.”
[129] Thus Reilly uses the teaching myth from Problem of Pain and the historical context
and plot from Till We Have Faces to offer a kind of historicist construction of a
humanity, subsequently destroyed, then remade by a gradual process, climaxing in
Christ’s redemptive work.
Reilly’s Thesis Considered
Reilly’s thesis has not been considered by any Lewis scholar with the exception
of White, who merely brushes it aside with a “No, this is not what Lewis meant by the
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Fall.”50 While this chapter will ultimately agree with him, White’s dismissal is premature.
In Reilly’s favor, what he describes could also be gleaned from Perelandra, which
likewise asserts as a backdrop the “coming of age” of humanity in the Incarnation—it is
after all the “corner” of all worlds.51 Further it might posses some of the flavor of the
Apostle Paul’s “last Adam” theology from Romans. Nevertheless, it does not ultimately
work for several reasons.
First, Reilly’s assertion that at the Fall humanity lost “all consciousness” is not the
same as the loss of an “original specific nature.” Lewis does not assert that humanity
ceased to be a conscious creature at the Fall. In fact, he seems to argue the opposite—that
our conscious moral life continued, but that what was lost was the power to obey it.52
Whatever the loss of the “original specific nature” means for Lewis, it precisely cannot
mean the loss of humanity’s consciousness, as such a loss would also leave humanity
unaware of its loss by definition. Lewis describes such an un-conscious life in his
description of animal pain, and it is irreconcilable with the documented humanity of the
ancient world.53
Second, it is beyond anything Lewis even suggests to say that humanity is in a
state of “re-creation” between the Fall and Christ. Lewis speaks a great deal of humanity
being restored, repaired, and set right in Mere Christianity, but the entirety of the
discussion assumes a post-incarnation setting, which if it were to be pressed in the way
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Reilly desires would seem to imply that “re-creation” of humanity does not begin until
the incarnation.
Finally, while Reilly’s suggestion is provocative in its own way, it is itself almost
a mythological read of Lewis, assuming historical analysis from a work Lewis himself
entitled “A Myth Retold.” It is an interesting step, loosely based on Lewis, but without
question beyond his actual intention.
Lewis on the Causality of the Fall
The question of what would cause wholly good creatures to cease to be good is a
question that has consumed great thinkers long before Lewis. His answer is therefore
neither novel nor innovative, but rather wanders well-worn paths in traditional Christian
thought. If it is more compelling here than in other sources, it is so only for his style,
which is as lucid and provocative as always.
Divine Causality
What is God’s relationship to the Fall? Does God “cause” it in any efficient
sense? Is it part of the Divine Will that humanity should sin? Lewis is not to be bated into
a simple answer, but ramifies the question by noting that it is possible for something to be
in accordance with one’s will in one sense but not another. Like a mother who wants her
children to keep their room clean, but will not intervene when the children fail to do so.
“…it is her will which has left the children free to be untidy. The same thing arises in any
regiment, or trade union, or school. You make a thing voluntary and then half the people
do not do it. That is not what you willed but your will has made it possible.” 54 That
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humans would willingly rebel is a thing which God certainly knew would happen, yet
still thought it “worth the risk.” To disagree with God on the point ends in a
conundrum—to believe that the very source of one’s reasoning power is guilty of faulty
reasoning. It seems that Lewis is equivocating in a rather muddled way several different
senses of “will” from expressed preference to absolute decree. Additionally, he does not
explain how something God foreknows can still constitute a “risk.” The point he is trying
to make, however, seems to be that the evil of the Fall, although divinely foreknown and
permitted, is not efficiently caused by the divine will nor is it morally culpable for it.
Human Freedom
Here in the realm of moral freedom Lewis plants the flag of culpability. That God
gave humans the freedom to choose good or evil is as close as he comes to answering the
question of causality. He finds it incredible to assert that God could create a world with
free creatures who are yet unable to sin. “Some people think they can imagine a creature
which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be
good it is also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible.”55
Engaging again the question of why God would so endow humanity with this
ability, he replies that only such freedom makes “possible any love or goodness or joy
worth having. A world of automata—of creatures who worked like machines—would
hardly be worth creating.”56
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Temptation
A final and obvious element in the causality of the Fall is the role of temptation.
As mentioned earlier, at times Lewis suggests the temptation was grounded in the human
existential condition. That humans are volitional creatures under the requirement of
submission to their maker is sufficient to create the logical possibility of temptation. At
other times Lewis approximates the traditional idea of the external tempter—the
“someone or something [who] whispered that they could become as gods.”57
Traditionally such external temptation is attributed to the devil. Lewis did not think the
existence of fallen angels incredible on the basis of any evidence, but rather believed that
the state of the world could be more coherently explained by acknowledging them.58
Lewis on the Doctrine Analyzed
On the Basic Nature of the Doctrine
Lewis’ opening volley regarding the doctrine of the Fall is pejorative, that it has
ceased to be a story about a “magic apple” and has become one “solely about
obedience.”59 Yet chapter 1 showed how a number of church fathers (some of them
particularly central in the doctrinal development) take very seriously the narrative
issues—right down to the meaning of the two special trees (and not merely as allegory).
To say the doctrine is “solely about obedience” may confuse the conclusion for the
analysis. The story is “about obedience” insofar as it is the subject of the story. If the
myth is about “obedience” (a reasonable possibility), then would not the doctrine, seeking
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to interpret the meaning of the myth, also have to be about obedience? Lewis himself
says the meaning of the myth is too dense for him to penetrate in the context of Problem
of Pain. Why then does he presume others have not been able to and determined that the
basic issue suggested in the myth is one of “obedience?”
He ironically fails to understand the narrative possibilities inherent in doctrinal
development. Is doctrine only abstract? Now living in a period where the term “narrative
theology” has become nearly oxymoronic, it seems clear that it need not be. Yet such a
dialogue did not really exist in Lewis’ day for him to interact with.
On the Causality of the Fall
Lewis’ comments on why the Fall occurred do not seem to really answer the
question. To imply that the Fall occurred because of free will or temptation threatens to
confuse material causality with efficient causality. The argument seems to say little more
than that “Adam chose evil because he was a creature endowed with choice,” which is
only true insofar as the endowment of choice was a precondition of him making any
choice at all. Might not Adam just as (perhaps more) easily obeyed? And would not that
obedience in the same sense be “caused” by his “free will?” A will is necessary
(materially) for choice to occur, but its presence does not explain (efficiently) the
particular choice for evil—especially in the case where, as Lewis asserts, the default
position of the human will was originally one of inclination toward God.60
Whence then comes the desire to rebel? Neither does “temptation” answer the
question, except again in terms of material causality. The juiciest steak is of little
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temptation to a committed vegan, unless, of course, some deficiency in the veganism
already exists. Does not Aristotle argue that the truly virtuous person would experience
no temptation because of his overwhelming love of the good?
In the end this is not a problem unique to Lewis. The question of why a wholly
good creature would cease to be good has stymied the greatest theological minds in
history. On the question of the efficient causality of the evil will, Augustine obliquely
commented, “Let no one, then, seek to know from me what I know that I do not know;
unless, perhaps, he wishes to learn how not to know that which we should know cannot
be known.”61 If in the end it is an insoluble problem, Lewis cannot justly be faulted for
not giving a compelling answer.
On the Unsurpassed Value of Human Freedom
His statements about the value of moral freedom, however, does stand in need of
critique. His comment that a world of “automata” would “hardly be worth creating” is
simply an overstatement beyond his ken. In what balances would he weigh the value of
these two possible worlds against each other? On Lewis’ own logic, the empty millennia
before humanity appeared and where only non-volitional creatures existed would be a
world “hardly worth” existing. But this is ridiculous. The Psalmist [19:1] makes clear that
even the heavens—as “auto-matic” a creation as one could imagine—declare the divine
glory. A child’s love for its parent is hardly “freely chosen,” flowing rather from its
nature, yet no parent would on that account consider the child or its love “hardly worth
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having.” It is not obvious that any love that consumes a human was ever freely chosen—
whether of ice cream, stamp-collecting, or the tragic femme fatale.
It is reasonable to assert that volitional creatures display a different glory—that is,
a glory proper to their nature, but to say that non-volitional creatures are hardly worth
creating is sloppy and imprecise. Worse, it assumes that God’s greatest possible glory
and joy is derived only from creatures who are metaphysically humaniform—a form of
species egoism that fails to compel as soon as it is conceived.
Short of a full blown excursus on whether or not God must create the best
possible world (and assuming such a thing is conceivable at all), it is simply beyond
Lewis’ ability to assert with apologetic precision what sorts of creations are more or less
preferable to a Creator who has freely filled the world with myriads of both volitional and
non-volitional creatures. That a freely-willing creature with its accompanying risk of
privation is preferable to a non-free one who does not possess such risks might not be
obvious to those who endure atrocities at the hand of their “free” human neighbors. Many
would surely consider the non-volitional life of the beasts more glorious and preferable to
the unjust torments they consciously suffer.
Conclusion
Despite provocative and suggestive reflection on the doctrinal aspects of the story,
Lewis is clearly hampered by misunderstandings of the actual theological discussions. At
the very least, Lewis’ doctrinal consideration takes place primarily in apologetic works or
works written to lay people. As such the genre itself tends to work against clear and
precise exposition. Whatever Lewis’ greatest contribution will be on the subject, it will
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not likely be found in his doctrinal analysis. But then again, he himself recognizes and
confesses this. So then onto the area to which he was uniquely qualified to contribute.
“What of Experience”: Lewis and the Myth of the Fall
As outlined earlier, Lewis believes the meaning of the Fall narrative is most
powerfully apprehended in its mythical form. That the stories of early Genesis are
mythical in form to Lewis can hardly be questioned. He says they possess the form of a
“folk-tale,”62 contain “fabulous elements,”63 are “legendary,”64 and are the sorts of myths
“found among most nations.”65 The final section of this chapter is dedicated to teasing
out the implications of this belief. In one sense, this task must not be attempted. As laid
out in chapter 3, discussing a myth by means of the abstracting intellect will spoil the
myth for imaginative purposes, robbing it of its most valuable currency. In Problem of
Pain he confirms this difficulty by saying this narrative of “a magic apple of knowledge”
is “full of the deepest suggestion.”66 Thus the method is clarified. To get at the deepest
implications of the myth, one must not expound, parse, or ramify—one can only
“suggest.”
Lewis provides an example of this necessity in Preface to Paradise Lost. Milton
does not give a straight-forward description of the paradisal garden. He rather talks
around it, giving inference and suggestion. This is necessary, says Lewis, because,
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his own private images of the happy garden, like yours and mine, is full of
irrelevant particularities—notably, of memories from the first garden he ever
played in as a child. The more thoroughly he describes those particularities the
further we are getting away from the Paradisal idea as it exists in our minds, or
even his own. For it is something coming through the particularities, some light
which transfigures them, that really counts, and if you concentrate on them you
will find them turning dead and cold under your hands. The more elaborately, in
that way, we build the temple, the more certainly we shall find, on completing it,
that the god has flown. Yet Milton must seem to describe—you cannot just say
nothing about Paradise in Paradise Lost. While seeming to describe his own
imagination he must actually arouse ours, and arouse it not to make definite
pictures, but to find again in our own depth the Paradisal light of which all
explicit images are only the momentary reflection. We are his organ: when he
appears to be describing Paradise he is in fact drawing out the Paradisal Stop in
us.67
This indirection is nonnegotiable if one wishes to allow the imagination to feed on the
myth. This is the manner in which myth sneaks past the “watchful dragon” of the
intellect. That said, as with Milton, a dissertation cannot assume to use Lewis’ ideas
about the Fall and then say nothing in particular about them. Some dragons must be
braved, regardless of their watchfulness.
The Genesis Fall and the Incarnation: Myth Becomes Fact Again
As seen already, Lewis was a strong defender of the historicity of the incarnation
and resurrection as recorded in the gospels. Insofar as Christianity has always held that
the Genesis Fall stands in some irreducible relationship to the Incarnational work of
Christ, how can one hold to the historicity of the one and the mythical (and seemingly
non-historical) nature of the other? Can history flow coherently out of non-history?
Lewis emphatically says, “yes,” and further, it is exactly what one should expect.
That Myth should become Fact, although shocking and wonderful, is in no way
incoherent. Chapter 3 outlined Lewis’ beliefs regarding ancient dying-god myths and the
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incarnation—their function as a preparatio evangelica and as foreshadow. The mythical
content preceded that same content’s historical actualization. It was an apples to apples
comparison—how does the mythical dying god of the pagans become the historical dying
God of Christianity?
The question here is a bit more complicated. Lewis nowhere argues that the
Genesis Fall story becomes historical in the same sense as the dying-god myth does.
Myths of human failure in the ancient nations do not become fact in Christianity by being
historically actualized in the Genesis Fall event (at least Lewis does not say this). The
question here is how the mythical Fall story of Christianity is related to the historical
dying-God event in the same Christianity.
Answering this question is complicated by the fact that Lewis does not seem to
distinguish the two questions (1. mythical dying god to historical dying God, and 2.
mythical Fall to historical incarnation). He often deals with them in the same space in a
manner that suggests he did not differentiate them. When asked specifically about the
value of the “fabulous elements” of the Old Testament, he answers the question but also
lapses into the dying-god discussion in the middle of his answer by way of example.68
But if Lewis can so easily conflate the two questions in discussion, what is the link? How
can the second question be answered by discussing the first?
Even removing his insertion of the pagan dying-god aspect of his answer so to
isolate only his response to the Fall, one still finds Lewis’ suggestion to be that the
relationship between the fabulous Old Testament narratives and the historical New
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Testament is still one of “something gradually coming into focus.”69 But what is the
“something” to which he refers? Lewis does not clarify here, but a remarkable answer
arises out of a key passage in Miracles. After asserting that a non-miraculous Christianity
is simply a relapse into “mere ‘religion,’” he adds a tantalizing footnote that says in part,
“…just as, on the factual side, a long preparation culminates in God’s becoming incarnate
as Man, so, on the documentary side, the truth first appears in mythical form and then by
a long process of condensing or focusing finally becomes incarnate as History. This
involves the belief that Myth in general is…at its best, a real though unfocused gleam of
divine truth falling on human imagination.”70 Here the dying-god motif of the pagans and
the biblical documents are brought together in his answer. Yet they are not conflated, but
compared. As with the dying-god trajectory, so too with the documentary trajectory.
His following argument is key insofar as it makes no use of the dying-god motif,
but focuses specifically on the documentary material—namely the movement from a
“chosen people” (Israel) with their “chosen mythology” (that is, “divinely appropriated”
as seen earlier) to God becoming man in the incarnation. The documents themselves
proceed from the highly mythological (and historically improbable) toward the historical
incarnation in a “process of crystallization.” No clear dividing line exists between the
myth and the history—no absolute moment where the text ceases to be one and becomes
the other. David’s courtly records ring of history, while the later Jonah seems fabulous.
Thus the whole biblical narrative (in a comparable way to the dying-god motif of the
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pagans) is in movement from mythological to factual—the very text of scripture moves
from Myth to Fact.
Thus with a brilliant stroke, Lewis argues (without actually saying it) that the
whole biblical narrative follows exactly the process outlined in chapter 3 for getting past
the “watchful dragons” of the intellect. It begins in the realm of the imagination—the
poetic, the fantastic, and the concrete—that is, myth. And having drawn the reader in by
evoking the imagination, it then proceeds to gradually move toward the historical,
climaxing in the Incarnation.71 Because the process is gradual, neither the imagination
nor the intellect realizes the movement until one wakes up suddenly in the middle of the
gospels with the shock that God has indeed become Man. Myth has become Fact at the
very level of the canon.
Such a literary vacillation between what the imagination can embrace and what
the intellect can concede is a feature of the greatest literature in history. Lewis identifies
something similar at work in Homeric poetry to enlightening effect:
The general result of this [the use of permanent phrase repetition] is that Homer’s
poetry is, in an unusual degree, believable. There is no use in disputing whether
any episode could really have happened. We have seen it happen—and there
seemed to be no poet mediating between us and the event…[consider a girl
impregnated by Poseidon, who has said,] ‘Lo, I am Poseidon, shaker of the earth’.
Because we have had ‘shaker of the earth’ time and again in these poems where
no miracle was involved, because those syllables have come to affect us almost as
the presence of the unchanging sea in the real world, we are compelled to accept
this. Call it nonsense, if you will; we have seen it. The real salt sea itself, and not
any pantomime or Ovidian personage living in the sea, has got a mortal woman
with child. Scientists and theologians must explain it as best they can. The fact is
not disputable.”72
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This movement from myth to history explains for Lewis why the New Testament
“is, and ought to be, more prosaic, in some ways less splendid, than the Old Testament;
just as the Old Testament is and ought to be less rich in many kinds of imaginative beauty
than the Pagan mythologies.”73 This is how, says Lewis, the story of Christ is able to
satisfy not only the reader’s religious and historical expectations, but the imaginative
ones as well. He concludes the footnote with, “One of its functions is to break down
dividing walls.” Here, “walls” seems to serve the same rhetorical function as “watchful
dragons.” The movement from the mythic to the factual breaks down the walls the
intellect raises when being told it has to embrace the incredible.
Thus the Genesis Fall, standing near the head of the biblical metanarrative, serves
by means of its mythical form to draw readers into the narrative and set them on a road
that will end with the imaginative and intellectual embrace of the Christ of the gospels. It
is therefore (as with the dying-god motif among the pagans) a preparatio evangelica in
the grandest sense. Beyond whatever its content may be, its very style, voice, and genre
are central and nonnegotiable to its religious function within the canon.
Lewis’ Exegesis and His Lack Thereof
This is actually the most deficient and disappointing aspect of Lewis’ treatment.
Nowhere in his corpus does he present an exegesis of the actual narrative in Genesis 3.
Such an absence would seem at first blush to torpedo any attempt to locate “Lewis on the
Genesis Fall.” Yet it may not be so. One must remember that Lewis is not an exegetical
commentator—he does not pretend to be. He authored no commentary on Genesis. Nor
has he been presented herein as an exegetical authority, a claim he would have denied.
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His primary contribution to discussion on the Genesis Fall is exactly not as an exegetical
commentator. To expect it of him is to misunderstand his program.
His interest is in how the text works—specifically how this mythical text goes
about achieving its desired end and what that end is. He speaks, not on what the myth
means (how could he, given his beliefs about how myth function?), but rather how it
ought to be treated and used—what manner of thing this myth wants to do in the reader.
He trusts, with frightening consistency to his presupposition, that the honest,
open-minded, and intelligent reader will get the “subtler and deeper” meaning from the
story. It will do its proper work. What must not be done, when desiring to understand its
mythical content, is to exegete it by means of the abstracting intellect. As such, that
Lewis offers no direct exegesis is what one ought to expect from him.
That said, Kilby has probably provided as succinct a interpretation of Lewis as
any. He draws together all three planes of discussion here (history, doctrine, and myth),
when he says, “The historical correlative for something like the Genesis account of the
Creation and Fall of man may be disputed. But the theological validity of the myth rests
on its uniqueness as an account of real creation (out of nothing), on its psychological
insight into the rebellious will of man, and on its clear statement that man has a special
dignity by virtue of his being made in God’s ‘image.’”74
Lewis’ Own Mythic Interpretations of the Event
What Lewis lacks in straight-forward exegesis he compensates for in his own
imaginative exploration within his literature. Rather than arouse the skepticism of the
abstracting intellect by expounding exegetically the meaning of the biblical story, Lewis
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rather follows his own method and offers his own mythic material, intending that the
imagination will appropriate the truth suggested therein. Of course, caution is called for
here because it is dangerous to assert the author’s perspective based on those held by his
characters. Additionally, Lewis’ own literary images have the same problem as the
biblical ones—they must not be parsed too directly lest they lose their own mythic power.
That said, Lewis repeats the themes so often, it would be incredible to believe that he did
not intend them to speak en masse to the same body of human experience that the
Genesis Fall is meant to address. The following does not represent an exhaustive list of
Lewis’ use of the Fall theme, but is sufficiently illustrative to establish his trajectory of
thought. Identifying the same three texts here dealt with, Cunningham, by way of
preview, offers the following summary of their overriding message, “The very diversity
of Lewis’ myths of the Fall indicates that, whatever the particular act or series of acts, the
Fall was prompted by the Paradisal Man’s desire to become a god, to mark off a corner of
the universe for his own, to turn from adoration and obedience to God to himself. Pride,
then, is the great sin, and all other sin flows out from it.” 75
The Pilgrim’s Regress
As Lewis’ only true allegory, The Pilgrim’s Regress is both the most direct and
most misleading source of Fall consideration. It is the most direct insofar as narrative
details are intended to represent specific things external to the story; in addition it
possesses an “autobiographical component.”76 As such, it can, of all his fiction, most be
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relied upon to approximate the author’s own opinion. Yet because it is allegory, the
necessity of identifying the correct referent is greater. When meeting a loosely
constructed parable, readers can let the details slide away without concern so long as in
the end they get the point. But with allegory, misinterpreting a detail or grabbing at the
wrong referent can destroy the intention of the work. In part because of this, when Lewis
reviewed the work ten years after its 1933 publication, he added (not without
reservations)77 “a running headline” at the top of each page as a “key” to his intentions.
While the implications of the Fall weave like the thread of a hem throughout the
whole work, the event of the Fall itself is represented as a past event, preceding John’s
life by many centuries. Thus John’s position approximates that of the reader, living in the
long shadow of the event. The history of the tragedy is therefore given as a flashback in
the mouth of Mother Kirk, as she explains the origin of the impassable canyon and the
dismal state of the Landowner’s country.78 The heading on the page lays out the intended
interpretation. It reads, “The Sin of Adam.”
She tells the story of a Landowner, who, desiring to share the glories of his
beautiful land with others, lets it to tenants. For the refreshment of himself and his
mountain-born children, he had caused to grow in former times trees throughout the
whole valley that bore a “very strong” fruit not suitable for the tenants’ digestion. Rather
than deforest the whole land, he simply told the tenants to not eat of the fruit, hoping that
they might “learn sense” from the refraining.
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Yet the Landowner had quarreled with one of his own children, and this
recalcitrant “land-grabber” persuaded them to eat. That disobedient eating caused an
earthquake that resulted in the formation of the great canyon, whose original name is
Peccatum Adae. Further, the tenants, now discontent with just eating the fruit, had grafted
the tree into every other kind of plant in the valley so that “every fruit should have a dash
of that taste in it.” Thus nothing in the valley is now free of the infection, and John has
never known anything wholly free of its taste.
Whatever the allegory may lack in its cumbersome style, little doubt can remain
as to its referent (with or without headlines). It is clear that God’s command to refrain
from eating was intended entirely for the good of humanity. Equally clear is that
humanity’s rebellion did not end in a single act of disobedience, but abounded in a
systematic privation of the goodness of the whole land. The story evokes feelings of both
pity and reproach on the part of the reader—followed by the haunting remembrance that
this is fiction only to a point. Beyond the pages of the story, the atrocious behavior of our
race has been asserted and explained before the intellect has had time to put up its proud
defenses.79
Perelandra
The theme of human fallenness is ubiquitous in the Space Trilogy. Yet so as to
prevent the discussion from degenerating into banal plot summaries, the focus here is
specifically on Perelandra. Out of the Silent Planet juxtaposes fallen humanity with an
unfallen world, whereas That Hideous Strength focuses on the results of human rebellion
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when pressed to their (il)logical ends. Perelandra focuses precisely on the question at
stake here—the moment of temptation and possible Fall.
Having been transported to Venus, Ransom finds himself in an aquatic Garden of
the Hesperides, and therein meets with pleasures of eating and bathing in such exquisite
newness and degree that he desires to repeat them indiscriminately. Yet he discovers an
unexpected resistance within himself to heedless repetition of pleasures for their own
sake. “He had always disliked the people who encored a favourite air in the opera—‘that
just spoils it’ had been his comment. But this now appeared to him as a principle of far
wider application and deeper moment. This itch to have things over again, as if life were
a film that could be unrolled twice or even made to work backwards… was it possibly the
root of all evil?”80 Ransom here experiences in fine what becomes a dominant theme of
the book—the desire to possess a real good, but in a wrong way.
While dwelling on the floating islands of Venus, he encounters the Green Lady,
the motherly Eve of her world, who has been forbad by holy Maleldil from overnighting
on a solitary fixed land in the midst of the planet’s trackless seas. In a quick succession of
events, they are joined by Weston, a maniacal scientist from earth whose obsession with
Life-force evolution opens him up to possession by the great evil archon of earth.
A rigorous temptation ensues, with the demonically-dominated Weston
oppressing the Green Lady with the glories of living on the fixed land in defiance of
Maleldil’s command. Thus the Garden of the Hesperides has become Eden, thick with the
threat of diabolical overthrow. As Ransom listens to and rhetorically intervenes against
the “Un-man’s” increasingly belligerent tactics, he has a realization…
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It was suddenly borne in upon him that her purity and peace were not, as they had
seemed, things settled and inevitable like the purity and peace of an animal—that
they were alive and therefore breakable, a balance maintained by a mind and
therefore, at least in theory, able to be lost. There is no reason why a man on a
smooth road should lose his balance on a bicycle; but he could. There was no
reason why she should step out of her happiness into the psychology of our own
race; but neither was there any wall between to prevent her doing so.81
Certain themes become clear in the exchanges. First, the arbitrariness of the
prohibition—just as with the fruit in Eden, no inherent reason seems to exist for this
command as opposed to some other.82 The question is wholly one of obedience and trust
in the Lawgiver. The arbitrariness here envisioned is, of course, central to the theological
point. Richard Hodgens is merely being obtuse when he implies the arbitrariness is only a
result of literary need, saying with unjustified vehemence, “It has no meaning. It’s just a
story. The rule is there simply because the plot needs one. Such silly questions spoil the
story.”83 Second, the questionable motive of the Lawgiver—The Un-man uses a warped
free-will argument to suggest that perhaps Maleldil wants her to disobey so to
demonstrate her growing autonomy both from him and her husband. Third, the oversignificance of the lady’s own role in the story—the Un-man spends a great deal of time
trying to convince her that this act would bring with it a nobility and undying glory which
would be hers long after her own death (death itself is ennobled in the argument).
Thus Lewis uses this mythical construction to imaginatively explore the same
content explored discursively by others throughout church history—the Fall as pride
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(Augustine),84 unbelief (Calvin),85 idolatry (Luther),86 selfishness (Strong),87 and so on.
Yet caution must be exercised here beyond that needed in Pilgrim’s Regress. While
Pilgrim’s Regress is intended to be an allegory of the terrestrial Fall, Perelandra
presumes it a past historical event. The events of Perelandra are not to be seen as a
repetition of the event (as Ransom himself concludes),88 but an exponential manifestation
of it. Thus the commentary is more indirect. Kilby, for example, misses the distinction
when he equates them pragmatically by saying, “[Lewis] suggests they [temptation and
Fall] were the result of deep-seated and flawlessly logical arguments thrusting at the very
nature of mankind. We are led to believe that the fall was no quick and accidental affair
but rather the result of a nice balancing of dialectic in which the ego and will of man
colluded to reject the notion of their dependence upon God.”89 Kilby thus equivocates the
Perelandrian temptation to the Edenic one in a manner that Lewis certainly did not
intend. The conclusion of the story could not make the distinction between the two
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narratives clearer. In the end the lady is freed from further seduction by Ransom’s
pugilistic intervention—a decidedly unexpected deviation from the Genesis story, but
necessary for the plot to unfold as a story of temptation ultimately resisted, that of
Paradise Retained.
The Magician’s Nephew
The Magician’s Nephew represents a Creation/Fall cycle set within the Narnian
universe. The epicenter of the book features the great lion Aslan singing the Narnian
cosmos into existence. Yet even on the day of its birth, amid all its glory, evil is already
present. The English boy Digory has stumbled into Narnia. In his entourage is a ruthless
Witch, who, detesting what the lion represents, flees into the hills of the new country.
Knowing she will return one day, bringing trouble, Aslan dispatches Digory to a walled
garden in the far west of the land to collect a magic golden life-giving apple that will
protect the land.
Lewis’ image is again more that of the Garden of the Hesperides than Eden, yet
the use he puts it to is much more akin to the Genesis material. For when Digory arrives
at the walled garden, he finds a sign on the gates that reads:
“Come in by the gold gates or not at all,
Take of my fruit for others or forbear.
For those who steal or those who climb my wall
Shall find their heart’s desire and find despair.”90
The implication is clear; he must not eat the fruit himself. Entering, he discovers
the witch has already entered by climbing the wall and eaten one of the apples herself.
The dialogue that ensues possesses all the character of the Edenic temptation. The witch
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argues that the fruit offers a great good to the one who eats (immortal youth and life),
further that Aslan is selfishly withholding this good from Digory, and that therefore
Digory ought to defy the lion and take the fruit back to England to heal his sick mother—
all in contradiction of the lion’s intentions.
Thus Digory, like Eve, is caught in the throes of a quandary. What the tempter
suggests in both stories is a qualified good—knowledge or life. Digory becomes muddled
in the suggestion that a greater good can be achieved by defiance than by obedience.
Unlike the serpent, however, the witch makes a rhetorical blunder that reveals her base
character and disenchants Digory. Had the serpent said similarly to Eve, “You needn’t
share any with your husband, you know,” perhaps she too would have seen the
temptation for what it was.91
What Lewis has presented by means of these examples is a powerful commentary
on what it means to be tempted with a good—but a good obtained in the wrong way. It is
reminiscent of Screwtape’s complaint that all hell’s research has never been able to
produce a single pleasure. Pleasure is the invention of “the Enemy,” and all a tempter can
do is “to encourage the humans to take the pleasures which our Enemy has produced, at
times, or in ways, or in degrees, which He has forbidden.”92 As the story plays out, it
becomes clear, as in Perelandra, that the Lord of Narnia does not intend to withhold the
good from Digory, only that the good should be preceded by the obedience and the trust
proper to its effect.
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On Using a Story to Interpret an (Inspired) Story
It may seem initially fruitless to use allegorical and fantasy stories as a means of
interpreting a mythical one. It may be argued that one has only moved from one vague
narrative footing to another. What ground has been gained? But this misunderstands the
imaginative function of myth. Since it is not the myth itself that is the point, but the truth
(Fact) that is to be imaginatively apprehended in it, the particular language of the myth is
negotiable. As Lewis has already pointed out, “The man who first learns what is to him a
great myth through a verbal account which is badly or vulgarly or cacophonously written,
discounts and ignores the bad writing and attends solely to the myth. He hardly minds
about the writing. He is glad to have the myth on any terms.”93
The corollary to this seems to be that it is possible to cast the mythic material into
a supplementary narrative context and thereby increase the chances of imaginative
appropriation. If the imagination fails to get precisely what the myth of the Genesis Fall
is saying (one of those “bad images” discussed in the last chapter), Lewis’ interpretive
narrative (insofar as he has properly understood Genesis 3) serves as a corrective to the
imagination, guiding it toward the real intention of the Genesis material. By laying his
own narrative overtop the biblical text, he offers a kind of hermeneutical grid that further
brackets away bad images, drawing more immediately into the foreground the key
components of the biblical myth. So as it turns out, Lewis has written a commentary on
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the text after all, albeit one of a different type—poetic, rather than scientific; concrete,
rather than abstract; aimed at the imagination rather than the intellect.94
As a Christian, however, Lewis must deal with an additional critique. The myth
he seeks to clarify by use of his own narrative commentary is an “inspired” one. Without
becoming mired in questions of inspiration or even of Lewis’ view of scripture, does this
strategy imply that the inspired myth of the Genesis Fall stands in need of some
interpretive assistance? Does this assert the poor quality of the biblical material? Is
Lewis’ own narrative more reliable for producing “good images” in the imagination than
the inspired text?
Obviously this would be of concern only to persons with particular views of
inspiration, inerrancy, and authority, but to forestall any concerns, Lewis recognized a
difference between his own fantasy literature and the biblical text—what’s more, between
“inspired myth” and all other myths. In reference to the early Genesis material, he says in
Problem of Pain, “…I have the deepest respect even for Pagan myths, still more for the
myths of Holy Scripture.”95 Further Lewis speaks on several occasions of the unique
status of the biblical words as divine speech—things he would never claim of his own
material.96 If it is so, as here asserted, that Lewis’ own mythic works serve the function of
a non-discursive commentary on biblical material, then they need claim no more or less
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authority than any scientific commentary would. Neither Augustine’s nor Calvin’s nor
Gunkel’s commentaries on Genesis claim an authority or inspiration superior or equal to
scripture. They serve as lenses by which the proper meaning of an inspired text may be
more clearly seen. Lewis’ work is similar, the difference being only the type of
commentary he has offered—a poetic rather than a scientific one.
That one may legitimately use a story, parable, or myth as a commentary on
another event or story is a technique at least as old as Nathan the prophet (I Samuel 12).
And it is worthy of note that Nathan’s story works in the exact way Lewis predicts.
David’s dragonish intellect is caught napping as Nathan uses David’s own imagination to
arouse his ire against injustice. By the time his intellect has awaked to the propositional
referents of the story, he is already condemned. Again Lewis sums up the principle in his
essay title, “Sometimes fairy stories may say best what’s to be said.”
On the Use of the Myth
One final area of examination is needed to conclude the chapter. For Lewis the
germane aspect of the Fall narrative is not what it means (in terms of how each detail
ought to be exegeted), but what the total narrative is intended to do within the reader, and
by corollary, how the reader is to respond to the story. Thus the final question here
regards the proper attitude of the reader as s/he encounters Genesis 3. Stated in terms
from the last chapter, what “surrender” is expected of the reader if s/he is to obtain to the
Fact of our fallenness?
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The last chapter argued that, whatever this act of surrender is, it does not
necessarily consist of a belief that the story reflects unvarnished history.97 The demand
was there shown to be more of an acknowledgment of “the profound meaning of the
myth regardless of its relationship to history.” But this principle needs further exploration
as it relates to the Genesis story.
One may not have to “believe,” but one must be willing to “suspend disbelief,”
which is by no means the same thing.98 While Lewis’ preferred term might be something
more positive like “imaginative embrace,”99 the implication is much the same. It
approximates the “looking along” perspective spoken of in the last chapter. The reader,
coming to Genesis 3, must not have as the driving force of her mental energy the idea that
such things never did and never could happen. Rather one must throw the self into the
story as if it had occurred.
Specifically applied to the Genesis Fall, Lewis knows and admits that the Genesis
account does not reflect an unaccomodated history. Yet in the throes of the existential
moment, this knowledge must be brushed backward into dustier parts of the mind, lest it
arouse the dragonish intellect from its slumber. The conclusion for the reader is then,
whether or not one believes the events of Genesis 3 happened in space-time as recorded,
one must act as if they did when meeting the narrative. To make the first stop of
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interpretation that of asserting the story’s status as “could not have happened” is to thwart
the work of the myth by assuming the “looking at” perspective.
If this seems a sacrificium intellectum then it is one common to all people of all
times. Any person who would contemplate their state of mind while enjoying any deeply
loved fictional book or movie will be forced to admit that the enjoyment is not generated
by the intellectual knowledge that the story “never happened.” No, surely the dominance
of such a thought is tantamount to a destruction of the narrative experience whether in
poem, book, or movie. Lewis believes, consensus gentium, that the imagination has the
power to silence the intellect and respond to the story as if it had or could have
happened—moreover, the imagination longs to assume such a stance; it is the nature of
the organ. Anything less is to treat the Genesis Fall story as something that it is not, and if
a cardinal rule of interpretation exists from Aristotle even unto the higher critics, it must
be something like “treat all things as their particular character demands.”
Conclusion
This chapter has purposed to examine how Lewis treats the Fall story of Genesis
3. It has followed a three-fold structure derived from Lewis’ own treatment of the subject,
examining first the story’s relationship to the space-time events of history, followed by a
consideration of its doctrinal implications, and finally by its mythic import.
On the historical question, Lewis believes the Fall is an historical event, but the
story in Genesis 3 is not an unaccomodated record of that history (it is rather a myth
“about” it). Lewis accepts a theory of guided evolution, climaxing in an act of special
creation wherein the human metaphysical package is divinely bequeathed upon a
specially prepared hominid (or group of them). He likewise believes it warranted to assert
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that at some point these creatures did in fact rebel against their creator in an act which is
historically undiscoverable. In this act, the first humans lost that ability to govern their
own organisms and, as an additional consequence, human relationships and society. Thus
humanity has become something it was never intended to be—a race of self-absorbed and
self-deceiving creatures who acknowledge no authority beyond themselves even to the
point of their own destruction. While Lewis does not believe the historical events behind
the myth are the location of its greatest meaning, he does use his “not-unlikely” history as
an apologetic to show that nothing historically incoherent exists in the Christian claim
that humanity is a once-good-now-wrecked species.
Regarding the doctrine, Lewis believes the only proper use of it is as a means of
articulating humanity’s hopeless position in relation both to itself and its creator. Lewis
believes that doctrinal structures, although authorized by the Holy Spirit and useful to the
church, are ultimately inferior to an imaginative appropriation of the myth itself. Doctrine
is by nature discursive, propositional, and scientific. Doctrine then tends to approximate
the “looking at” perceptive. Given the mythic nature of the Fall story, its most subtle
meaning will only be appropriated by means of an exegetical method more friendly to
myth—one that draws the reader into the story to experience rather than analyze it—the
“looking along” perspective.
Thus in relation to its mythic structure, Lewis places the Fall story at the head of a
scripture-wide progression. The Bible as a whole begins in the mythic voice and
progresses toward the historical incarnation by means of a gradual and imperceptible
shift. By this, the very text of the Bible succeeds in bypassing intellectual resistance until
a point where the imagination has already delivered its content. As such nowhere does
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Lewis seek to exegete the passage; rather he demonstrates this imaginative sneaking past
the dragonish intellect by means of his own imaginative works. Lewis’ recasting of the
Fall story into other narrative settings provides the opportunity for him to offer a unique
kind of commentary on the biblical story—one that is non-propositional and nondiscursive.
The demand on the reader of such a story is not necessarily to believe in its
historicity, but only to willingly suspend his disbelief while engaging the story—to
embrace the story as if it happened in this way. This act places the reader on the inside of
the story to experience it from within—an approximation of the “looking along”
perspective.
In conclusion, Lewis’ chief contribution here is not his work with history or
doctrine, all of which has been said before by professionals in those fields. Rather what
Lewis offers is the suggestion that a non-propositional, non-discursive read of the text by
means of the mythic imagination, rather than the scientific intellect, may furnish the
reader with access to the “subtler” meaning of the narrative, aided perhaps by narrative
commentaries which can guide the imagination without raising the incredulity of the
intellect. Thus in many ways Lewis casts the reader back upon the strength of narrative
itself, rather than upon the critical exegete for the text’s grandest meaning. Whether
Lewis is right or wrong to do this can best be seen by bringing his thoughts into
conversation with the theologians and movements illustrated in chapter 1, which is the
purpose of chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5
LEWIS MEETS THE THEOLOGIANS
The final chapter of this dissertation brings Lewis into conversation with the
theological trajectories and persons discussed in chapter 1. Several questions will be
examined here. First, how does Lewis’ structure compare to each of these trajectories?
That is, to what degree is his interpretation of the Fall narrative “traditional,” “critical,”
and so on? Second, how does his structure critique and advance the dialogue in each of
these trajectories? Third, how does Lewis’ work surpass the options of his historical
milieu with an eye toward his ultimate contribution to the subject? This question contains
the corollary question of his legacy on the topic. How was Lewis’ work both prescient of
and influential upon theological assumptions at work today? The chapter will proceed
roughly along the same lines as did chapter 1 with the question of Lewis’ legacy tackled
in the end zone.
Trajectory 1 Considered: Lewis Meets the Tradition
The central feature of pre-Enlightenment interpretation of the Genesis story was
its historical rootedness. Whatever allegorical, tropological, or other meanings the text
contained, they stood atop the “literal” meaning, rather than replaced it. The narrative
then possessed the same historical reliability as the courtly records of David or the Acts
of the Apostles. This trajectory survives in the mid-twentieth century in various branches
of fundamentalism, evangelicalism (old and new) and many theologically conservative
denominations. How does Lewis compare to this trajectory?
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Lewis’ position was nuanced in such a way as to affirm the historicity of the event
of the Fall, but not the historicity of the biblical account of it. Lewis is clear that a real
historical (and in principle datable) event took place wherein humanity moved from a
state of blessed submission to its creator to a state of rebellion and brokenness.
The biblical account, however, is not for Lewis an unaccomodated historical
record of that event, but a mythic and perhaps theological interpretation of it. Since Lewis
possesses a high view of scripture—that it is divinely authored—he further believes that
the scripture’s interpretation is theologically and imaginatively authoritative. Thus no
need exists to get behind it to some more basic history.
This distinction between the event and the account (and it is by no means unique
to Lewis) creates room for him to engage the conclusions of the modern sciences
regarding an extended terrestrial history, while still maintaining that the biblical record
governs authoritatively all theological discourse. The Fall narrative ultimately teaches
that “…man is now a horror to God and to himself and a creature ill-adapted to the
universe not because God made him so but because he has made himself so by the abuse
of his free will.”1 This reflects the general conclusion of the traditional trajectory, albeit
arriving there by a route both Augustine and Calvin would probably found overly rocky.
This observation, however, is of only marginal use, since it presumes that, if Augustine
and Calvin were anachronistically confronted with the same scientific data as was Lewis,
they would have persisted in their interpretations unchanged. This is, of course,
impossible to know.
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Coming closer to his own historical milieu then, one might be tempted to label his
position a form of “inerrancy” (a term he surely would have disliked as a literary
barbarism) insofar as he believed the bible was ultimately true and trustworthy—that is,
without error in any final theological sense. But his understanding of the exigencies of
the genre produced a very different understanding of what constitutes a “true” text than
dominated Warfield’s or the Hodge’s treatments. The Genesis Fall narrative is absolutely
true, being free of any unreliability, so long as (and herein lies the difference) one
recognizes the literary distinctions between a mythic interpretation of an historical event
and an unaccomodated account of that same event. What constitutes “error” in a myth is
different than that which constitutes it in a formal history. This distinction may not have
saved his job if he had been employed at Princeton Seminary at the turn of the twentieth
century, but it does perhaps underscore the immense role “genre” can play in the
hermeneutical process, which, never being the forte of pre-modern exegesis, created the
backdrop against which the Formgeschichte school found its hearing.
In the end it seems that Lewis’ difference with the “traditional” approach is not
ultimately one of doctrine, for he embraces the same assumptions on the text’s authority
as the church fathers and reformers and even their overall theological conclusions on its
meaning. His difference lies more in his method of exegesis—that is, how the text
functions and how meaning is derived from it. And it should be recalled that this was
exactly the sort of difference that separated the fathers from the reformers—a question
that persists even to this day within most theological traditions.
Thus the conclusion here is that Lewis reflects traditional orthodoxy both (1) in
his belief that the text is holy, inspired, and authoritative and (2) in his conclusions
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regarding the ultimate theological meaning of the Genesis Fall. Insofar as (3) the correct
method by which to derive meaning from an holy, inspired, and authoritative text is a
perennial debate even within traditional orthodoxy, it seems a category mistake to fault
Lewis here. By definition one cannot be un-orthodox in the absence of dogma.
Trajectory 2 Considered: Lewis Meets Kant and Niebuhr
C. S. Lewis, Immanuel Kant, and the Noumenal Fall
Lewis clearly knew Kant’s thought.2 And while Lewis does not always speak of
him with approval,3 aspects of their thought were similar. Both argued the insufficiency
of pure reason to pierce the noumenal realm (“higher reality” for Lewis), but expressed
confidence in practical reason’s ability to establish warrant for it.4 By specific
application, both constructed a moral argument for the proof of God’s existence.5
Similarities exist too on their treatment of the Fall narrative. For Kant the Fall
narrative is uniquely suited to take the self out of its phenomenal-historical bondage and
give it a glimpse of what a noumenal choice would look like. While Kant is not formally
interested in the genre question and so does not use “myth” language, he clearly sees the
narrative as functioning in an analogical (versus historical-literal) way. Its function is not
to give history with all the resulting complications of original sin, but to allow rational
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contemplation of a supra-temporal event—the choice with which “everyman” embraces
the predisposition to evil.
Similarly, Lewis does not treat the exegetical details as the greatest point of
meaning for the story. Rather, he too is concerned with the story’s proper function. Since
Reality in se is inaccessible to the senses for Lewis (for reasons similar to Kant), a
medium is needed. For Lewis patently and Kant by implication, a medium can be found
in particular kind of story. For Lewis the story is appropriated by the imagination, for
Kant probably (he does not precisely say) by practical reason.
It is the opinion here that Lewis’ structure is better adapted to explain this event
than Kant’s. What Kant gets out of the story is still the result of practical reason’s efforts.
That is, the story is still to be understood “rationally,” with the primary target being the
intellect. Yet it seems problematic to claim this, and then to ignore the significance of the
exegetical details of the passage. The Fall narrative in Kant’s hands gives a general sense
of the human situation—its flavor, but should not be pressed at the level of the textual
details. This, however, runs counter to the nature of the intellect, which thrives on the
contemplation and organization of the details, seeking their coherent arrangement. Kant
then is still “looking at” the story from without.
Lewis, however, by suggesting the imagination is the story’s target, is relieved of
this pressure. The imagination is by nature less interested in particularities. It delights in
involvement with the story. It apprehends it in its totality—the details, even the very
words, are negotiable. The reader “is glad to have the myth on any terms.”6 All the story
demands is that the reader enter it imaginatively—suspending disbelief and tasting it
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from within. In short, Lewis’ demand that we “look along” the story to that to which it
points (as opposed to Kant’s insistence on “looking at” it) reveals our existential
condition with clarity. Lewis is equally uninterested in the picayune details of the
exegete, but for him such lack of interest is now warranted and explicable. Thus Lewis’
theory of the imagination provides a more consistent explanation of our existential
identification with the text.
One further point of difference should be noted. Lewis does not, as Kant
ultimately and inevitably must, disregard the historical backdrop of the story. Kant’s
method denies him the ability to relate the story to time-space history except by analogy
(or metaphor) to each individual’s existential condition, making it, as Green says,
“essentially ahistorical.”7 Lewis tastes of the cake without having to consume it. He too
can bring the implications of the Fall story to bear on the existential reality of the reader,
but does not need to completely divorce the story from a possible historical event which
it interprets. The possible history is for Lewis of the most minor consideration, but it
brings him into conversation with traditional approaches in a way Kant is perennially
critiqued for having had to abandon.
This difference is, of course, predictable given their differing views of
Supernature’s intrusion into history in the miraculous. That the noumenal and
phenomenal are mutually exclusive for Kant is so by definition. For Lewis their
intermingling in myth and miracle is necessary and to be expected.

7

Green, “Myth, History, and Imagination,” 22.

284
C. S. Lewis, Reinhold Niebuhr, and the Existential Fall
While historically Reinhold Niebuhr should actually follow the section on higher
criticism below, he is considered here instead because of his similarity to Kant in his
treatment of the Fall narrative as shown in chapter 1.
It is clear that much stands in common between Niebuhr and Lewis. First, both
advance beyond Kant’s rigid metaphysical ramification in their recognition of the unique
implications of a mythic text for the imagination. Like Lewis, Niebuhr believed that
“myth” could mediate the dialectical relationship between Spirit-Eternity and NatureTime (his analog to Lewis’ Nature-Supernature distinction and his closest point of
contact to Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal distinction). To this Niebuhr adds the notion of
myth’s “symbolic” role, which he articulates in language almost identical to Lewis’
“transposition” theme—“one dimension upon which two dimensions must be recorded.”8
Thus for Niebuhr a deception inherently exists when speaking of the greater dimension
by means of the lesser. Thus those who believe are “deceivers, yet true.” One must speak
as if it is so, even knowing that it is not, for the “as if” is truer despite its perilous
tendency to “deceive.”
Second, beyond Kant, Niebuhr suggests that the best appropriation of myth is not
by the rational center. The great advantage of Christianity to Niebuhr is that it was able to
take over pagan myths and use them “without fully rationalizing them.”9 This claim has
the familiar ring of Lewis’ ideas on the utility of the imagination over the intellect.
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He is not, however, wholly compatible with Lewis. Consider again Lewis’
citation of Niebuhr in Problem of Pain.10 While introducing his “Socratic myth” of a
possible history behind the Genesis story, Lewis indicates that his “myth” should not be
confused with Niebuhr’s sense. Clarity is needed here on two points, lest one misread the
exact nature of the distinction to which Lewis refers.
First, as stated earlier, Lewis’ own use of the term “myth” here is sui generis
within his own canon. The story of the magic apple is for Lewis properly and precisely
the “myth;” what he is about to present is a teaching story about a possible history that is
itself to be distinguished from the biblical myth. Thus Lewis is not only using the term
differently than Niebuhr, but he does not mean what he will predominantly mean even
throughout his own writing.
Second, even given this distinction, Lewis’ treatment of the Genesis Fall mythproper is distinct from Niebuhr’s in significant ways. Lewis says that Niebuhr defines
myth as “a symbolical representation of a non-historical reality.” This is a fair
representation of Niebuhr at two germane points. First, the myth is a symbolic
representation of some truth. Lewis and Niebuhr agree on this point, as already seen. That
the reality is “non-historical” is a point of both agreement and disagreement.
If “non-historical” means merely transcendent or “higher reality,” then Lewis
would agree. Good myth does put the reader in contact with the Real or an external Fact.
Insofar as that Fact may be something of “Higher Reality,” even more so. Yet for Lewis
no necessary conflict exists in asserting a myth’s historical rootedness, as, say, an
accommodated version of some historical event. This is clearly the point of distinction
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that Lewis intends in the Problem of Pain citation, and this distinction—the level of
willingness to allow myth be related to historical events—produces at least three points
of divergence between the two men’s treatment of the Fall narrative.
First, that the text is unrelated to a particular historical space-time event may be
sufficient explanation for why Niebuhr makes such a Kantian usage of the text. No
interpretive controls exists on Niebuhr for what the text can mean other than those
imposed by his creativity (or more fairly, his existential need). It is clear that he already
has his own ideas on the nature of sin and fallenness, and to the degree that the biblical
narrative was useful in supporting it, he used its language. Upon realizing that his use of
the Genesis 3 story had caused his modern reader to misunderstanding him as actually
advocating the story’s veracity (that is, that it was historical in the traditional sense),
Niebuhr repents of having employed the biblical material at all.11
Second, the greatest (and perhaps only) use to which Niebuhr can put the text is
an existential one—which is what he does. Niebuhr, like Kant, makes a highly
individualized application. The story is a symbolic representation of how each person
succumbs to the Anxiety of our existential experience.
Third, if the existential condition of Anxiety lacks historical rootedness—that is,
no time existed before this condition arrived in history—then it is essential (in the
Aristotelian sense) to humanity. The race never was other than it is now, nor it would
seem could it ever be. This seems in Niebuhr to place a non-historical pressure on the
whole trajectory of redemptive history. He speaks not only of the Fall as one of the
“permanent myths” that enlivens Christianity, but also of incarnation, cross, and
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redemptive love.12 Niebuhr seems to want to move the entire core of Christian belief into
the realm of myth, which for him severs it from history.
To be sure, all that Niebuhr has said may be true of humanity’s existential
condition (at least this author has always found it insightful and useful), but he could
have said all of it without employing the Genesis story at all. Thus the Genesis story may
be helpful, but is more likely to be a source of distraction and misunderstanding.
The conclusion here then is that Lewis, primarily because of his willingness to
allow the mythic story some rootedness in a possible terrestrial history, is able to achieve
all the existential rumination that Niebuhr possesses, but with a more sincere treatment of
both this text and the whole of redemptive history. Lewis can argue for a textual and
historical movement from myth to Fact—in this case toward the fundamental historicity
of the gospel accounts. Because the Fall is rooted in some possible history, a time existed
before humanity became as it is now. Because of this, an historical redemption is possible
and warranted—we can possibly be something other than we are now.
Finally, the probable connection between the story and some primeval historical
event creates an interpretive constraint on the text for Lewis. The story seeks to impose
some Truth upon the reader—a Truth not of the reader’s design. Thus, while Lewis does
not make use of it to engage in textual exegesis, the process of formal exegesis could
move forward in a more controlled manner in Lewis’ model than in Niebuhr’s.
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Trajectory 3 Considered: Lewis Meets Higher Criticism
C. S. Lewis, Hermann Gunkel, and the Ignorant Ancients
In Gunkel’s version of higher criticism one initially meets a kindred spirit to
Lewis, at least insofar as both were deeply moved by the literary qualities of the text and
less concerned about its value to dogmatic construction. The kind of interaction between
Gunkel and Lewis then has a different flavor than with the more metaphysically-oriented
Kant and Niebuhr—that is, the discussion focuses more on what kind of text it is and less
what the text is trying to do.
Gunkel possessed a deep appreciation of the extant story’s beauty and superlative
literary effect. He perceived that “myth” is not synonymous with “lying,” rather it is a
form of “poetry.”13 All this is consonant with the mature Lewis, who had himself been
converted away from his youthful belief that such fairy stories were produced by merely
“breathing a lie through Silver.”14
The cause of this literary beauty, however, reflects a great difference between the
two men. To Gunkel the power and beauty of myth were accidental qualities that
occurred almost despite the myth-maker. They are rather results of primitive modes of
thought, as evidenced by their brevity and scarcity of detail. Ancient humanity was
simply unable to sustain the artistic detail of the modern novel, for they had not yet
“acquired the intellectual power to distinguish between poetry and reality.”15
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As has been shown, Lewis harangued against this view on a regular basis. He
believed that mythopoeia was a natural product of human creativity in every age and that
its existence said little about the intellectual capacities of the ancients. Fairy-stories
today, including his own, preserve this quality by shunning “close psychology” and
reveling in the Form’s “brevity, its severe restraints on description, its flexible
traditionalism, its inflexible hostility to all analysis, digression, reflections and ‘gas’.” 16
If anything, Lewis believed the ancients had the imaginative advantage for their ability to
hold concrete and abstract forms of thought together in single concepts in a way now
disagreeable to moderns.
It is clear that Lewis lacked Gunkel’s nuanced taxonomy—the movement from
“myth” to “legend” to “history,” which would be so influential on later theologians. Yet
since for Gunkel these terms were not merely descriptions of distinct genres, but of the
intellectual evolution of the race’s capacities (a point Lewis rejected), it is no surprise and
perhaps no loss that Lewis should shun them.
C. S. Lewis, F. R. Tennant, and the Suspension of Disbelief
The more theologically-oriented F. R. Tennant shared Gunkel’s belief in the
primitive nature of the myth-maker, yet without much interest in the aesthetic aspects of
the story. Still, he offers one germane advance on Gunkel; Tennant believed the original
myth-maker was indeed aware that he was spinning scientific untruths—he merely
ignored the fact. What is more, he wanted the reader to do the same. The Fall narrative
was known at the time of authorship to be non-historical, but is intended to be a “working
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substitute for history.”17 Regardless of the text’s relationship to history, the myth-maker
desired that the reader approach the text as though it were history, or at least “the
equivalent of history.”
At this point Lewis is poised to make a profound contribution to the discussion.
The point here is not that Lewis has said something similar—that the Fall narrative,
though being non-historical itself is meant to stand as an interpretation of some unknown
historical event—for it is not at all clear that Tennant believes the Fall narrative is related
to an actual historical anything.
The key is in the “as though.” Tennant seems to be advocating a position that he
is not willing to assume himself. Tennant’s analysis has all the character of the “looking
at” perspective—standing outside the narrative examining it scientifically and historically
for its original character—but knowing in advance that it “isn’t really true.” He can
recognize the original author’s intention that the reader should suspend their disbelief and
enter the story as if it had really happened. Tennant, a sensible modern researcher,
however, knows this suspension only as an historical aspect of the text. He does not
perceive the need to do so himself as a reader. It is his job to remain disinterested and
uninvolved, to preserve his scientific objectivity. He does not seem to suspect that his
reluctance to engage in such an act of submission costs him anything worth having.
Lewis, on the other hand, takes this as a basic requirement of reading a myth. It is
not enough to know the fact that the myth-maker demanded such a concession of the
reader. Rather, the act itself is the only reliable method of seeing what the text is trying to
say. If one wishes to experience its power and receive the truth it speaks, one must
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suspend disbelief and “look along” the story as if it is one’s own. One must enter it and
embrace it on its own terms as though it really happened as stated. This is the only way to
sneak past the cynicism of the abstractly dragonish intellect. Lewis might even agree with
Tennant on his abstract scientific conclusions regarding the text; yet he surpasses him by
actually performing the act of imaginative submission to that text that Tennant claims
was the text’s original purpose.
If Lewis is correct, the devastating implication to the modern theologian is that so
long as the theologian stands outside the story examining it as a scientist, its most
powerful and profound implications will remain unperceived. Intimates Lewis, to read
myth from Tennant’s perspective is to ask ‘Will the hero escape?’ To read it from Lewis’
is to apprehend “‘I shall never escape this. This will never escape me.’”18
Tennant himself may be proof of this, for by the end of his lengthy monograph he
has constructed only an “history of the doctrine of the fall;” he is not moved by the more
basic realization that “I am one who is so fallen.” The scientific and historical value of
the former is not to be underrated, but to remain unaware of the latter is to remain
ignorant of the doctrine’s most vital point. At the risk of overstatement, Lewis may here
give, not just an irreducible key to exegesis, but to redemption itself.
The Myth of Demythologization: Lewis Meets the Barth-Bultmann Debate
C. S. Lewis, Rudolph Bultmann, and Demythologization
Of all the theologians with whom Lewis is to be compared, he himself had the
most to say about Rudolph Bultmann—most of it teetering between critical and outright
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caustic. Chapter 2 outlined in some detail Lewis’ analysis of Bultmann while laying out
Lewis’ larger critique of higher criticism. Given that Bultmann was a New Testament
scholar, he cannot be compared to Lewis on the Genesis Fall directly. Yet as Bultmann
made a career of tackling myth as a biblical genre, a number of important correlations
ought to be made.
Their points of agreement ought to be identified first, being the more diminutive
list. First, Lewis and Bultmann agreed that the content of the gospel (or more generally,
that truth which the myth contained) was not aimed at the intellect. For Lewis it is aimed
at the imagination, for Bultmann to the “hearer as a self.” So even here one is not actually
dealing with a point of agreement, other than the admission that the intellect has limits.
But the point should not be undervalued as it set up for both the ability to subvert modern
assumptions about the sufficiency of the scientific analysis of the Bible.
Second, both acknowledged that a myth may have an historical origin or be rooted
in a lost historical event. Further they agree that the myth was intended as an
interpretation of the event—at attempt to give it meaning. But again, differences appear
immediately. For Lewis the myth stands as a non-negotiable and irreducible means by
which to apprehend some truth of Higher Reality, which is objectively true and in
principle common to all people of all ages. For Bultmann the myth was intended to bring
the original hearers into some truth about themselves—a truth that modern persons cannot
hear because they do not share the original worldview.19 Bultmann thus believes that both
the history and the myth are only of second tier importance to the existential application
of the story’s ultimate meaning. Of the two, however, the historical is more important as
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it is the originating event that gives rise to this ultimate meaning, which is its “abiding
significance.”20 Thus Bultmann is interested in the existentially relevant moral truth to be
liberated from the myth; Lewis is interested in objective Higher Reality understandable
only by means of the myth qua myth.21
Recall that Bultmann was characterized for the sake of this study as a “hybrid” of
both the Kantian and the Higher Critical trajectories. He stands within the trajectory of
higher criticism insofar as he acknowledges the history undergirding a myth, and shares
Gunkel-Tennant’s assumptions about the literary and scientific inabilities of pre-critical
peoples. Lewis (like Barth22) condemned with many words what he perceived as latent
and unwarranted anti-supernaturalism and historical elitism, which seemed to generate
much of Bultmann’s need to be free of mythological trappings.23 Yet unlike many highly
academic biblical critics, Bultmann is to be commended for having as his primary
concern, not just the analysis of the text’s historical Sitz im Leben, but rather its faithful
apprehension by the modern Christian church.

20

Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” 37.

21

Freshwater’s claim that Lewis and Bultmann had a lot in common seems from this analysis
simply wrongheaded. He claims, “…Lewis showed that the Christian story has a mythic power that is
independent of the historical reality. Thus, both Lewis and Bultmann recognized the kerygma and radical
obedience to it as the essence of Christianity.” Freshwater, 123f. This, however, is flawed in two different
ways. First, the area of agreement Freshwater has identified is roughly equivalent to the Poacher and the
Park Ranger agreeing that a deer lives in the woods. Bultmann claims one had to shoot the mythological
deer in order to eat the meat it contained. Lewis wanted to contemplate the living deer in motion. Second,
Lewis never gives any impression that the Christian ethic (i.e. obedience to Christianity’s kerygma) had any
value outside the objective reality of Christianity’s metaphysical claims regarding resurrection and
redemption. Freshwater repeatedly throughout his final chapter treats historical and mythical as opposites,
thereby muddling the whole point of the relationship between them in Lewis. Of course Lewis will not fare
well under these conditions. It misses entirely the idea that myth might have historical roots without ceasing
to be myth. Heron was far closer to the truth when he said simply that Lewis and Bultmann are
“irreconcilable.” Heron, 87.
22

Barth, “Rudolph Bultmann,” 109.

23

Evans reached a similar conclusion in his comparison of Lewis and Bultmann. Evans, 398.

294
Thus he glances off Kant’s methodology as well. Kant lifts the import of the story
into the noumenal realm; Bultmann too lifts, but not quite so high. The height is only that
of our own existential situation. Biblical myth does not reflect transcendent realities, as
Bultmann was most suspicious of these, but timeless moral truths. Stripped of its
mythological accretions, the narrative can be used by the careful interpreter to address the
existential situation of the modern person.
As expected then, much of Lewis’ disagreement with Bultmann parallels those
with Gunkel-Tennant and Kant. On one hand, Lewis rejects that myth is produced
because of scientific ignorance, as well as Bultmann’s belief that modern man has no
myths. On the other he rejects that the primary intention of a myth is to teach the reader
something about themselves. Rather, it teaches something about external objective
Higher Reality. That such a truth once seen would be of vital importance to the reader,
Lewis concedes as a matter of definition. Good myth puts readers in touch with
something for which they deeply long, as his theory of Sehnsucht explains. No
Heideggerian process of existential discovery is required; in fact, such a process only
reinforces a particular generation’s perceived need, which might only bolster the blind
narcissism of which Lewis believed the modern age as a whole was guilty.
In the end Lewis’ relation to Bultmann is very nearly antipodal. Lewis might be
said to be engaged in a re-mythologization project that is the inverse of Bultmann’s. Thus
no real conversation could have existed between them (as Barth found out) as they were
entirely at odds about the function of the mythic form. If one believes that the message of
the text is irreducibly integrated into its form, one cannot follow Bultmann. If message
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and form are separable in any meaningful way, one has parted company with Lewis at the
level of definitions.
That said, the choice between them is not simply one of preferences. Bultmann’s
whole case rests on the idea that modern culture has outgrown the old superstitious
worldviews, thereby necessitating the hermeneutical adjustments he proposes. If
Bultmann was correct, humanity might be expected to become increasingly rational and
non-mythical over time. Yet a scant generation or two later, the evidence of fibula cupido
at book stores, movie theaters, and in video games seems only to be increasing. This is
admittedly anecdotal, yet if subsequent research were in fact to show that “post-modern”
persons are generally more myth-loving than their modern predecessors (and this is by no
means a far-fetched thesis), which of the two proposals would better describe the
phenomenon?
Without a doubt, Lewis has offered a more compelling description of how the
mind (specifically the imagination) processes myth and why it longs for it in its mythic
Form—and has done so with a robustness Bultmann simply lacks. Rather than being
something humanity is outgrowing, Lewis claims the epistemological need for myth’s
activity on the imagination is common to all people—ancient, modern, and by corollary
post-modern as well. While it would require more sociological data than a document like
this can muster, the thesis that the Modern Age may have been overly committed to
rational and scientific methodologies and that this commitment is now crumbling under
the forces of multiculturalism, quantum mechanics, Form-less art, and all things “postmodern” does not seem scandalous.
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In terms of simple staying-power and explanatory value, Lewis’ model seems
superior to Bultmann’s as a total position. But if further, Lewis’ belief that humans are
irreducibly myth-shaped creatures is actually true, then it was true at the very moment
Bultmann was busy buttressing the myth of modern mythlessness.
C. S. Lewis, Karl Barth, and (Non)Historical Revelation
In many ways Karl Barth and C. S. Lewis reached similar conclusions on the
nature and function of this type of literature.24 Barth preferred the term “saga” (or
sometimes “legend”) to “myth,” primarily in response to Gunkel-like distinctions, which
played little part in Lewis’ thought. His use of “saga,” however, approximates effectively
what Lewis meant by “myth.” Thus, even though a fundamental difference will make
their models mutually exclusive in the end, their points of agreement are numerous.
First, they agreed against Bultmann that modern humans are as myth-oriented as
humans in any age. As a consequence both denied that the presence of saga-myth (a
compromise term for this section) in the ancients says anything about their intellectual,
literary, or scientific capacities. Second, they agreed on the central and nonnegotiable
role of the imagination in the creation of saga-myth.
Third and most significantly, they agreed that saga-myth was intended to serve as
the authoritative meaning-filled interpretation of an historically impenetrable event. They
said this for opposite reasons, however. For Lewis the relationship was (or may have
been) straightforward—the myth interprets an historical event that has been lost. An
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inspired myth is the lost event’s authorized interpretation—its true meaning. In Barth’s
language (for which Lewis has no analogue), the saga reflects, not the historie, which is
hidden from the eyes of the historian, but the Geschichte. It is the meaning-filled witness
to a supra-historical divine act of which the inscrutable historie is only the external form.
The force of the difference might be expressed as follows: for Lewis the historie
was lost because it is the nature of most historical events to be forgotten—that is, its loss
is incidental. For Barth, however, the event is inscrutable because it must be and could
not be otherwise. That the event remain historically impenetrable is a theological
necessity, for if it could be probed by the historian, it would cease to have the character
of Geschichte and be reduced simply to historie. This difference may appear minor at the
outset, but is actually sourced in the irreconcilable difference outlined later.
As all this would then imply, efforts to reconstruct the precise historical event
behind the saga-myth was of little priority or use to either of them. For neither believed
the meaning of the event was contained in the historie. Lewis condescended to ruminate
about it for apologetic purposes more so than Barth, but neither considered it necessary.
The inscripturated saga-myth itself is the account which must be taken at face value and
worked with. Whatever historie may stand behind it, the reader does not need it to
understand the message. Thus the saga-mythic Form in which it comes is irreducible to
its meaning. The act of demythologizing defeats itself.
The aspect of agreement and disagreement at work here can be seen in their
treatment of Adam as an historical man. Neither deny the possibility that an Adam lived
and breathed as a man in the time-space historie. But it is exactly his historical existence
that is irrelevant to the theological discussion. For Lewis the narrative’s use of “Adam” is
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merely the mythic device to get at the idea of an intact human nature that historically and
truly preceded the event of the Fall. Says Lewis, “God have made many such
creatures.”25 That they rebelled is the point of the story. With a decidedly more
theological flourish but with the same net result, Barth is careful in his discussion in
“leaving out of account what may have occurred to the historical Adam.”26 If an
historical Adam existed, make no mistake, he was a rebel like the rest of us, and was only
a first example of that rebellion. For Barth the real significance of Adam is his suprahistorical relationship compared to (more precisely being “brought to naught” in)
Christ—that is, the Adam of Geschichte, not historie. The point is that both Lewis and
Barth believed deeply that one must wrestle with the story of Adam and his apple as one
meets it in the text, not by means of some historically verifiable Adam behind the story.
A final point of agreement may be considered if it is not forced too heartily.
Barth’s view that the Redemptive Covenant was the very content of Geschichte is in
some ways comparable to Lewis’ idea of Myth moving toward Fact in the biblical canon.
At least this is so to the degree that the Reformed Covenant of Grace bears resemblance
to what the Anglican Lewis would have recognized as redemptive history. In Lewis the
Fall narratives are mythic, but redemptive in the sense that they confront and convert the
intellect with the claims of the historical Christ. To do this the myth directs its message
initially to the nondiscursive imagination, thereby allowing the unreasonable aspects of
the grander story to sneak past the dragonish intellect and be embraced. For Barth the Fall
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participates in the redemption by being given its meaning proleptically in Christ. Now
points of divergence have begun to emerge.
The first and less significant distinction rests upon the tangent of contact between
Barth and Kant that was mentioned in chapter 1. Both have opted in their own way for a
transcendental Fall, that is, a Fall that is not considerable as a phenomenal or historical
event. Yet it was there argued that Barth bests Kant by allowing for an intersection of
Geschichte with historie in a way Kant could not by definition allow the noumenal and
phenomenal to intersect. This gave Barth confidence to speak of “knowledge” whereas
Kant could speak only of “warrant.” The importance of this distinction between the two
is a larger subject, but insofar as they both intersect with Lewis, it is a real difference.
Lewis argues that a Fall event is in theory observable, concrete, and datable (even
though it is not the first concern), thereby establishing the possibility of historical time
prior to its occurrence. Barth’s categories, like Kant’s, allow for a logical discussion of a
pre-Fall reality, but not an historical one. For Barth no real time exists before the Fall.27
Human rebellion is the historical beginning of humanity. The idea of pre-fallen humanity
certainly plays a logically necessary role in theology as a category (eg. for the defense of
Divine goodness and as antithesis of das Nichtige), but has not an historical referent
(outside Christ). Meynell summarized him as follows:
The tales and pictures constitutive of myth are embodiments and expressions of
what happens always and everywhere, and do not allude to actual particular
events. And what myth immediately describes or depicts is always by way of
condescension and accommodation; intelligent persons are expected to penetrate
through the veil of myth to ‘its true non-historical, timeless, and abstract sense.’28
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For Barth the Genesis Adam (one cannot exactly call him “first” in Barth’s structure)
speaks of a condition that is existentially true of all humans at all times—we are and
always have been rebels. The idea of an historical unfallen humanity outside of the Christ
event was repugnant to Barth for reasons mentioned below.
This seems, however, as problematic for Barth as it was for Kant and Niebuhr. If
humanity’s deficiency is existential, then of what value is the original created human
nature? What of its narrative role and function to redemptive history? What of the
restoration aspect of redemption? These critiques are not new, and Barth is not, of course,
without a response to all of them. But it seems Barth’s approach is needlessly
complicated, as though it is a necessarily deduced position held in order to preserve some
other greater value.
This “greater value” is exactly the point of real incompatibility between Lewis
and Barth. Barth’s well known dislike for anything smacking of natural theology would
have made Lewis’ whole epistemology anathema to him while still in the gate. Lewis’
epistemology of myth rests upon the idea that the imagination is a human capacity
perfectly suited to derive meaning from myth. It can be wrong, faulty, or fallen, but it is a
truth-facilitating faculty at least as reliable as the fallible intellect. And it is so in its
natural state, as the pagans adequately demonstrated. As such, good myth working on a
properly-functioning imagination is capable of facilitating knowledge of Higher
Reality—in the case of the Fall narrative, of human fallenness.
This whole idea is absolutely incompatible with what may be Barth’s most basic
theological presupposition—that no human capacity in itself and as such (that is, outside
of the act of divine revelation) is capable of anything other than idolatry and pride. Barth
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asserts the necessity of imagination for the myth-maker, but nowhere attributes to it a role
in the reader. Although Barth does not say it directly, the imagination left to itself can
only be as unreliable and idolatrous as the intellect or the affections, about which he says
much. Thus Barth can say very little about the process of how saga-myth works upon the
reader because such conversation is excluded by his theological a priori.29 The Holy
Spirit makes the biblical witness profitable to the reader in the act of revelation, but the
“hows” of it are inscrutable.
It seems that one has met here two incompatible presuppositions that must be
judged by criteria beyond what this dissertation can afford. Suffice it to say here that if
one finds Barth’s absolute resistance to natural theology compelling, then admittedly
Lewis’ model will offer no help, because no problem has been admitted. To the reader
(and there are many) who, despite Barth’s compelling arguments, continue to believe that
scripture teaches and human experience affirms that some aspects of humanity have been
divinely designed for contemplation of that divinity, then Lewis has offered a compelling
model for how this might work.

Lewis’ Contribution Considered
It is remarkable to consider how many theological methods Lewis advocated that,
although not the dominant assumptions of his day, have become so. He argued the
unavoidability of models and metaphor in theological discourse long before Avery Dulles
and Sallie MacFague. He practiced narrative theological methodologies long before Hans
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Meynell suggests that this issue of natural theology is exactly the center of Barth’s and Lewis’
differences on the nature and function of saga-myth, saying that Lewis’ view is more akin to “Catholic and
Liberal Protestant views.” Meynell, 139f. The later, of course, is who lay in the early Barth’s crosshairs.
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Frei and George Lindbeck. 30 He demonstrated the fecundity of cross-disciplinary
thinking long before David Jasper and Ralph Wood. He held to the centrality of the
imagination in theological thinking a generation before Garrett Green, and stressed the
legitimacy of myth as literature before Joseph Campbell and Northrop Frye found a
hearing.31
Rather than being a cause of these trends, however, Lewis seems to have simply
foreseen them.32 He was no futurist; rather his penetrating mind simply recognized that
the theological presuppositions of modernity were not sustainable. They worked against
some of our most vigorous human instincts; they were parochial, prejudiced, and ignorant
of the fact; They asserted facts where they ought to have maintained hypotheses. Reading
Lewis feels at times like an explorer who believes he is forging a path through virgin
jungle, who pushes out of the undergrowth, beholds a sublime waterfall, and then sees a
sign that says “Kilroy was here.” Said Gruenler already in 1974,
In light of a decade of scholarship and reflection following his death in
November, 1963, C. S. Lewis appears to have been one of those gifted
forerunners who see things clearly and well in advance of the rest of their
contemporaries. Beyond his apologetic interests as a Christian scholar, he had a
phenomenological interest in letting things be themselves in all their
multidimensional richness. According to Lewis’s hermeneutical view, the Bible
must also be allowed to be itself, to function within the spiritual as well [as] in the
empirical and intellectual domains. Anything less, he felt, amounts to a serious
misrepresentation of the meaning and intention of the Story.”33
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With thanks to Green, who by omission of Lewis, allowed for the observation. Green, “Myth,
History, and Imagination,” 23.
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With thanks to Hart for the observation. Hart, Through the Open Door, 12.
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Kuteeva mourns that as recently as 2000, Lewis’ insightful approach to literary criticism
remains unappreciated by literary scholars. Kuteeva, 278.
33

Gruenler, 104. In the other direction, Heron outlines how a number of the trajectories Lewis
critiqued are still alive and well and bearing ugly fruit. Heron, 98ff.
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That future theologians would independently find themselves taking positions he
advocated a half century ago seems a bit of soft evidence that his thought may have been
superior even in its day.
This brings the dissertation to its final point of synthesis where the question posed
at the outset is given its final frame. How does Lewis’ more nuanced theory on the nature
myth and the human imagination help mediate the question of how to treat the Genesis
Fall narrative once it has been declared a “myth,” as was the dominant conclusion of
much of mid-twentieth century theology? Lewis’ total model offers the following
advantages and possibilities:
First, it takes seriously all parties at the table, yet is uncritical of none. To begin
with, Lewis’ approach treats the text of scripture with utmost seriousness, recognizing it
as divinely authored and authoritative. Unlike much of higher criticism, he believes he
must embrace the text in its preserved form, not some theoretical substrata of it. Yet he
does not foist a naïve literalness on the text either, which was at times present in
theological conservatism of his period. Further, he takes with great seriousness the
contribution of the ancient mind as well as that of “the tradition.” He gives them
opportunity to subvert modern parochialism by not prejudging their contribution simply
on the question-begging grounds that they are pre-modern. But he is not their epigone
either. The Ptolemaic cosmos was glorious and insightful, but it was also wrong. This
means Lewis can take seriously the work of the sciences, archeology, and even textual
criticism. He affirms their legitimacy when they adhere to the limits of their discipline
and are circumspect in their conclusions, critiquing them only when they become

304
arrogant or over-reaching. Thus Lewis’ ideas have a higher probability of being correct
because of the inclusivity of the voices to which he was willing to listen.
Second, Lewis’ conclusions are lucid and have high utility, yet remain humble.
To even have to assert the virtuousness of clarity underscores the abstract state of
theology in the mid-twentieth century. As Fred Graham wrote with panegyric force in
1974,
Tillich wrote of the theological a priori. No one could have guessed what it meant
from his own works. Lewis gave it opportunity on every page. Someone has
disparagingly described Lewis’s own literary criticism as belonging to Peter Pan.
That is, he always judged books by criteria adopted in his childhood and never
given up for more educated norms. Yet I suspect that many a professional
theologian will agree that Lewis’s romp in Narnia, or his space trilogy, or his
twice-told Psyche myth revealed more theology to him or her than all the great
books we have read on the subject. We nodded our heads in agreement with the
Germans; we felt awe, tenderness, joy with Lewis.34
A corollary to this comparison exists in Lewis’ treatment of myth. As opposed to
several of the theological trajectories surveyed, Lewis’ does not merely observe the
presence of myth in the Bible, but offers a deeply considered explanation for how it
works, thought out to the ruddy end. Higher criticism sought to explain how the myth
came about; Kant and Niebuhr (in a way Bultmann as well) used the myth to describe a
human condition discovered independently of the myth; Lewis, however, begins a
methodological step earlier by suggesting why such a story is compelling and necessary
in the first place, thereby explaining its utility to a degree theologians simply assume or
deny. Yet, Lewis does not attempt an exegesis beyond his ability, offering a final or
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W. Fred Graham, “Fantasy in a World of Monochrome: Where C. S. Lewis Continues to Help,”
Christian Century 39, no. 26 (November, 1975): 1081. Graham was less complementary of Lewis’
apologetics. He says, “The problem is not their orthodoxy. Rather, it has to do with the inevitable
narrowing and flattening effect, the prosaic quality that results when anyone must treat great and often
paradoxical themes in brief compass.” That many, like Graham, would find his stories more powerful than
his apologetics, is something Lewis could have predicted.
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definitive interpretation of its details. His theory admits that such work cannot be done
for the reader. The reader must encounter the text personally if s/he wishes to understand.
This models the admirable and humble restraint of mature Socratic midwifery in a
manner at odds with the frequent audacity of modern higher critics.
Third, in Lewis’ hands the story can serve the existential need, yet without
abandoning the interpretive limits of the text. The story for Lewis is not something to be
used; it is something to which one submits. It is not a thing the reader does something
with, but an agent that works upon the willing reader. As such, it will (as was Bultmann’s
laudable concern) address the existential situation of the reader. If readers have cast
themselves upon the story, and if Lewis is correct about what awaits them there, what
they shall find will be of shattering significance to them. Yet it will not be (as was
Barth’s laudable concern) something of their own making. It will bring the reader
faithfully into, in this case, a knowledge of human rebellion against God. This reflects a
staggering trust in the power of the text that theologians of every stripe claim for
scripture, but often deny by their utilization of it.
Fourth, Lewis treats the ontology of human language with a robustness not often
found in the theologians of his day. The theological discourse of Lewis’ day generally
traded in abstract, recondite, and scientific language. While this has great merit so far as
it goes, Lewis identified a presuppositional myopia in the commitment. His suggestions
regarding the necessity of the non-discursive and poetic in theological discourse has
become well recognized since his day. And again, here Lewis not only observes the fact,
but offers a very early construct for how it works psychologically.
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If the exegete-proper insists on identifying a flaw in Lewis, it may be that his
entire treatment of the Genesis Fall myth does not contain an ounce of textual exegesis. It
stands only as a doorstep to exegesis—a description of its pre-conditions. This may,
however, be no more than to say that much remains for the theologian to do after Lewis is
done. Setting aside the suggestion that Lewis has in fact offered a form of exegesis by
means of his own tutelary stories, this lack of exegesis-proper is as it should be. Lewis
confessed he was not a theologian. But he understood words and stories, and as the
material with which theologians must work comes inexorably in the form of words and
stories, Lewis has in a way outlined the prolegomenon of our task.
A Suggested Application
As a final point, Lewis’ model might have ongoing value for theological
consideration. Although a number of interesting possibilities could be suggested, space
considerations limit the suggestion to a single aspect of his thought. And it should be
underscored that this final section intends only to suggest the sorts of dialogue that might
open up on the basis of Lewis’ structure. If the application is in the end flawed, it may
still be fruitfully so.
The suggestion concerns Lewis’ development of the “looking at/looking along”
distinction, which herein has been used as a short hand for the whole scientific/poetic,
abstract/concrete, rational/non-discursive, intellect/imagination distinction that underpins
this whole work. While it is so that myth trades on the “looking along” side of the
continuum, and thus has been dealt with more generously throughout, Lewis confessed
the necessity of both modes of thought to the epistemological project.
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While several others might be considered, the suggested application of this
taxonomy is to two loci of current theological debate: 1) Classical versus Social
Trinitarianism, and 2) the eternality versus the temporality of God. In both of these cases
the alternatives are treated as mutually exclusive, which is understandable given that it is
supremely hard to say something like “God is both temporal and atemporal” at the same
time and in the same sense. Yet it bears remembering that to the lay person the assertion
that light seems to be made entirely of particles and waves of energy at the same time
seems equally impossible (by whatever master metaphor an actual particle physicist
imagines this is by definition unavailable to the neophyte). The bulk of consideration will
be applied to the Trinity question, followed by a short excurses showing how the
conversation might proceed similarly on the eternality question.
At least insofar as I can make out, Classical Trinitarianism offers little to the
imagination. Whatever the unity and simplicity of the divine essence “looks like,” the
imagination cannot tell us, for by definition all mental images are divisible and complex.
That distinctions within God are “logical” but not “real” may be true, but it remains as
unimaginable as “east” and “west” are logical-but-not-real places. The classical view of
God then is, and intends to be, a rational, discursive, even scientific (in a non-pejorative
sense) attempt to speak of God as God is in the abstract absoluteness of God’s being—at
least insofar as weak human language can attempt. It has all the rhetorical quality of
“looking-at” God.
The Classical model produces a real sense of awe and foreign otherness, but
Social Trinitarians are quick to notice how far removed (regardless of its truth-value) this
seems from the way God is represented in scripture. The God represented in scripture
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seems highly-interactive and relational even within God’s own self (as the incarnation
shows). This vision of a community of three divine perichoretic persons is a highly
imaginable picture. It is narrative, poetic, and familiar to the human imagination. It has
the rhetorical quality of “this is what it would be like to experience God’s self.” It thus
approximates a sort of “looking along” the experience of God—sharing and participating
in it.
One can perhaps begin to detect how this changes the nature of the discussion.
The question of “which is correct” now looks a little different. Might it be possible that
both models are merely reflecting the predictable and proper results of the method
employed from the start? When the Classical claims of God’s self-unity drawn from
scripture are pressed to their necessarily abstract end, one has thrust human language to
its absolute discursive limit, even to the point (interestingly) of creating a mathematical
problem (1+1+1=1).
The Social model tells a story of God that is compelling, emotive, and
sympathetic—exactly the right and proper conclusion expected from an epic myth—the
poetry of experience. And when the intellect is restrained, the imagination feasts and
even participates in the concrete reality in profound ways. Yet when the intellect enters
the story it immediately wonders if the unity of the divine essence has been compromised
by concessions to the affections and a problematic anthropomorphism.
Is it possible that some of this debate consists in the attempt to speak of God in
two different modes of thought—the abstract and the concrete? If so, asking which mode
of thought is correct may still be the wrong question. Like the particle-wave problem in
physics, it may become a matter of which conversation is needed at the moment. These
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two models, neither of which may reflect the Divine Ding an sich, may both be
indispensible to proper theological thought—not by means of a via media or a
compromised version of either, but each model in all the strength of its scandalous
claims. It is possible the intellect when pressed moves inevitably toward divine simplicity
because it loves abstractness, while the imagination moves inevitably toward sociality
because it loves concreteness.
That one thinker has a default preference for one model or the other hardly needs
explaining, being little more than a unique mixture of romanticism and rationalism in that
person’s outlook. But how then does one know which model is appropriate in a given
conversation? The answer might be nothing more or less than “wisdom.” At times it is
right and necessary to speak of God in a full scandalous simplicity, simply
acknowledging the absence of the imaginative attraction of the communal mythology. At
other times it may be right and necessary to speak of God in the full scandal of divine
community, recognizing that the intellect may balk at the overly de-centralized images
(the “horrid red things”) that inevitably accompany it.
Moving to the question of eternality, a similar argument might be constructed.
Recognizing that eternality and simplicity hang together in traditional responses, the
argument can be repeated. To posit “eternality” as a concept is to suggest to the
imagination precisely nothing. To a temporal creature’s imagination the idea of
“eternality” is a place holder for “we know not what.” At least any attempt to create a
mental picture of such a state inevitably produces temporal images. When Aristotle’s
rational dialectic meets the mythological Greek gods, the mythology dies and the abstract
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Unmoved Mover is born. Thus eternality may be the inevitable and proper result of the
abstracting intellect’s attempt to communicate the otherness or transcendence of God.
Yet the human imagination has always favored the interactive gods of the stories.
Christian scriptures are no different in this regard. Their narrative structure unavoidably
presents a God interacting within the human temporal stream to a degree that seems to
foil mere literary “accommodation.” That God should be presented as if in time is
inevitable if the imagination is to do anything with it. It is not as though the biblical
writers had an “atemporal” vocabulary they could have used, but chose a “temporal” one
to show that indeed God was “inside” time. Only temporal vocabulary exists. Thus,
whatever God is in God’s self, if it is to be expressed in human language, it must by
definition then be represented as temporal. The biblical writers telling stories—or myths
as herein defined—of God’s interaction with humanity is exactly what the human
imagination desires. And when the intellect is held at bay, the biblical myths of God’s
temporal nature are fecund with meaning. But this, as the atemporalist reminds, is not the
same as speaking in an unaccomodated way of God’s nature as God knows it.
In the necessarily limited form presented here, these proposals will surely be
unattractive to all parties. Thesis and Antithesis by nature prefer autonomy to Synthesis.
The suggestion, however, is a modest one seeking not a “solution” so much as an
invigorating new plane of discussion.
Conclusion
Lewis embraced sincerely the implications of the Genesis Fall story, even though
they were in no way complimentary to his person. From his apologetics to his
correspondence, from John’s regression through Puritania to Screwtape’s diabolical
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finagling, from the moral corruption of Belbury to the bloody altar of Ungit, Lewis
believed and taught that we are a “spoiled race,” each having now become “a horror to
God and to himself and a creature ill-adapted to the universe not because God made him
so but because he has made himself so by the abuse of his free will.”35 Further he
believed that this knowledge had been powerfully and inescapably revealed in the story
of Adam and his magic apple to anyone who was willing to suspend their disbelief and
cynicism and plunge themselves into the story’s depths. He believed that this imaginative
submission to the narrative was not a concession to superstition or a sacrificium
intellectum, but a liberating act which could ultimately free even the intellect to revel in
possibilities heretofore thought absurd. By this idea he sought to liberate his generation
from its uncritical and unwarranted commitments to abstraction, skepticism, and
intellectual autonomy. And he saw all this from outside the world of theology, from the
perspective of one who simply understood the power of words-written, of literature as an
expression of human nature, of what it means to be creatures who read, whose
meandering lives are temporal and story-shaped.
Thus my final argument is that the theological world would do well to consider
more deeply Lewis’ view of scripture, myth, and imagination—not because he stood
thigh-deep in the professional world of theological abstraction and technical jargon, but
precisely because he did not.
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APPENDIX
Propositions from the Dissertation
1. Some truths, if directed primarily at the intellect, will be dismissed as
incredible, yet will be lovingly embraced if addressed first to the
imagination…these are often the truths of greatest import.
2. Critical exegesis is not the only valid means of producing effective
commentary. The recasting of the text into an epic narrative form provides for
the possibility of a non-discursive commentary that may have the power to
draw the reader even more deeply into the center of the text’s intention.
3. The very epic and mythic form of the Fall narrative is itself a preparatio
evangelica, leading the reader toward the Fact of the incarnation, thereby
sneaking the whole of the biblical narrative past the dragonish intellect.
4. Nature, with all her good and holy pleasures, is sacramental, desiring to thrust
us beyond her into that greater glory of which she ceaselessly speaks.
Modernity’s fault was its contentment with the means rather than the end.
5. All generations and cultures embrace defining myths. Modernity’s greatest
and most self-reinforcing myopia may be its belief that it is myth-less.
6. The sanctioned models by which something is understood, whether in science
or theology, inevitably reflect the values of their advocates at least as much as
they reflect the facts they are meant to image.
7. The demand for a willing suspension of disbelief and a treatment of the text as
if it happened as recorded is most greatly needed and warranted at precisely
the point the modern critic is most inclined to be cynical.
Propositions from Graduate Work
8. In nearly all discussions that truly matter Aristotle is a more useful guide than
Newton.
9. The Medieval/Ptolemaic view of the cosmos was not so much wrong as it was
a reflection of different values. In the end, they may have been closer to the
truth that really mattered than was the Copernican West.
10. Karl Barth’s work is beautiful, powerful, and useful, often exactly in the
places where he is dead wrong.
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11. Scotus was correct. Because God is a just King, divine command and natural
law have the same content in their original iteration (but for one pedagogical
exception). The Fall is the source of competition between the affection for
justice and the affection for advantage.
12. Aristotle was correct, and Einstein confirmed it. Insofar as God lacks the
attribute of motion, he lacks the attribute of time. The theological debate, with
its Newtonian view of time, is an entire worldview behind.
Additional Propositions
13. Feelings of deep piety and reverence may only be as far away as a third cup of
coffee…this does not necessarily delegitimize them.
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